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Common Stochastic Point Processes used in the analysis of Repairable Systems do 
not accurately represent the true life of a repairable component mainly due to the 
underlying repair assumption. Specifically, the Ordinary Renewal Process uses an as-
good-as-new repair assumption while the Non-Homogenous Poisson Process uses an 
as-bad-as-old repair assumption. However, it is highly unlikely that any repairable 
system will readily fit into either repair assumption. Additionally, there is the 
possibility that any inspection or maintenance activity may actually worsen the 
system; worse-than-old. Regardless of the underlying repair assumptions and the 
limitation they impose on any solution, these point processes continue to be used to 
assist engineering and logistic decision making. While other solutions, mainly GRP 
based, have offered some resolution, no solution has sufficiently resolved the 
combined complexities of imperfect maintenance of multiple dependent failure 
  
modes, imperfect inspections and data uncertainty, specifically unknown times to 
failure. 
 
Accordingly, the solution offered here offers a model that can contend with all these 
factors through a Bayesian solution thereby allowing additional “soft-data” to be 
utilised during the analysis. The modelling scheme consisted of 10 cases divided into 
2 main types; Type I with known failure times, and Type II with unknown failure 
times (data uncertainty). Each of the cases are incrementally modified through the 
addition of factors including imperfect maintenance of a single failure mode through 
to multiple dependent failure modes, and finally imperfect inspection. Generalisation 
of the GRP equations and Bayesian estimation models were developed for these 
cases. As a closed form solution to each of these cases is unavailable, numerical 
procedures were formulated. Specifically, an alternative Markov Chain sampling 
methods, Slice Sampling, was utilised to solve the Bayesian implementation of the 
needed extensions to the KIJIMA Type I GRP model with an underlying 2-parameter 
Weibull Time-To-Failure distribution. 
 
Based on a number of examples the resulting models have shown the ability to 
accurately predict future failure trends. Furthermore, the model provides a number of 
insights into the results including relative maintenance effectiveness and the merit of 
optimising imperfect maintenance or inspection to maximise availability. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Repairable Item Models 
Common Stochastic Point Processes used in the analysis of Repairable Systems do 
not accurately represent the true life of a repairable component due to the underlying 
repair assumption. Specifically, the Ordinary Renewal Process (ORP) uses an as-
good-as-new repair assumption while the Non-Homogenous Poisson Process (NHPP) 
uses an as-bad-as-old repair assumption. However, it is highly unlikely that any 
repairable system will readily fit into either repair assumption. Additionally, there is 
the possibility that any inspection or maintenance activity may actually worsen the 
system; worse-than-old. 
 
One model that can be used to address the repair assumption concern is the General 
Renewal Process (GRP), introduced by KIJIMA and SUMITA1.  Simplistically GRP 
addresses the repair assumption by introducing the concept of Virtual Age into the 
Stochastic Point Processes to enable them to represent the full spectrum of repair 
assumptions2.  The GRP model, sometimes referred to as better-than-old-but-worse-
                                                 
1  KIJIMA, M. and SUMITA, U., “A Useful Generalisation of renewal Theory: Counting 
Processes Governed by Non-Negative Markovian Increments”, Journal of Applied 
Probability, #23, 1986, pp. 71-88 
2  Defined as “A repairable system may end up in one of the five possible states after a repair: 1. 
as good as new; 2.  as bad as old; 3.  better than old but worse than new; 4.  better than new; 
5.  worse than old.”, YANEZ, M., JOGLAR, F, and MODARRES, M., “Generalized renewal 
process for analysis of repairable systems with limited failure experience”, Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, Vol 77, USA, 2002, p167 
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than-new repair assumption, in its simplest form defines a single parameter, q, to 
represent the Goodness of Repair, or Repair Effectiveness. 
 
While the concept of Virtual Age introduced by KIJIMA and SUMITA3 in the form 
of a GRP model has started to make significant in-roads into the modelling and 
analysis of repairable items4, there is little literature on the practical application, 
interpretation, or even applicability of this technique.  Specifically, while the current 
engineering literature5 discusses the method, based on a Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator (MLE) approach used to find a single q, they do not include any discussion 
on either the implementation of the method or interpretation of the results (e.g. What 
does q = 0.67 mean?  What should I do and why should I care?).  Consequently, 
without an understanding of the underlying GRP methodology and subsequent 
meaning and sensitivity of all the GRP variables, potentially there is the GRP model 
simply becomes a different type of 3-parameter Weibull equation for an analyst to 
use. 
 
                                                 
3  ibid 
4  KAMINSKIY, M. and KRIVTSOV, V., “A Monte Carlo Approach to Repairable System 
Reliability Analysis” in Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, Springer-Verlag 
London Ltd, 1998, pp 1063-1068; YANEZ, et al, loc cit; METTAS, A. and ZHAO, W, 
Modeling and Analysis of Repairable Systems with General Repair, 2005 Proceedings 
Annual Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS06), Alexandria, VA, 
USA, 24-27 Jan 2005; JACK, N., “Age Reduction Models for Imperfect Maintenance”, 
Mathematical Sciences Division, School of Informatics, University of Abertay, Dundee, 
Scotland; HURTADO, J.L., JOGLAR, F. and MODARRES, M., “Generalized Renewal 
process: Models, Parameter Estimation and Applications to Maintenance Problems”, 
International Journal of Performability Engineering, Vol1, No. 1, July 2005, pp 37-50 
5  ibid 
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While the current solutions from the engineering literature6 offer resolution of the 
maintenance assumption, they do not address the full spectrum of complexities that 
exists in wider reliability community.  Specifically, these complexities include the 
simultaneous ability to address: 
 
• imperfect corrective and/or imperfect preventative maintenance for 
multiple failure modes existing in a single component including 
addressing failure mode dependencies (e.g. repair of failure mode 1 may 
effect the Virtual Age of failure mode 2 by making the future failure 
earlier or later); 
• imperfect inspection for multiple failure modes for a single component; 
• data uncertainty in terms of unknown failure times (i.e. observe a failure at 
next inspection but cannot establish exactly when the failure occurred 
within the inspection period); and 
• use of “soft-data” (e.g. data from similar equipment such as previous 
models, engineering judgement, etc) as an input to model. 
 
Although the limitations due to the underlying repair assumptions on any results is 
widely known, these point processes continue to be used to assist engineering and 
logistic decision making.  Therefore, despite the best endeavours of both engineering 
and logistics staff to optimise the maintenance and spares philosophy, any solution 
will be suboptimal. 
                                                 
6  ibid 
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Accordingly, one of the main reasons for the increasing interest in GRP is the desire 
for a more accurate model which may lead to a reduced Total Cost of Ownership 
(TCO).  One industry that is spending considerable resources in identifying and 
controlling their TCO is the aviation industry. 
 
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) in the Aviation Industry 
The aviation industry acknowledges that aircraft can be directly influenced by the 
Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) Measures of Effectiveness 
(MOEs) to the extent that only 20% of the overall TCO is typically attributed to the 
“up-front” acquisition cost.  In fact a recent detailed investigation by the Australian 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) found that over a 15 year 
aircraft life the acquisition cost of one fleet of aircraft was shown to be only 13%, 
with the other 87% in sustainment costs.  This represents a significant amount of 
money.  For example, the Australian Department of Defence (DOD) spends 
approximately 1 Billion Australian Dollars (AUD1B) (750 Million US Dollars), or 
5.7% of the total annual Australian Defence budget of AUD17.5B (13.125 Billion US 
Dollars) on sustainment of their aircraft, which only total 283 fixed wing and 145 
rotary wing aircraft of various complexity and age. 
 
Moreover, one the major costs identified within the TCO is the management of 
Repairable Item(s) (RI) (components) which can be defined as “An item which can be 
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restored to perform all of its required functions by corrective maintenance.”7.  As 
part of the report DSTO found that of the 9.25% of the TCO could be attributed to the 
management of RIs.  In this example the TCO was calculated as AUD8.1B and 
therefore the cost of managing RIs was a surprising AUD0.749B. 
 
Repairable Item Management 
Additionally, RI management can affect the Operational Availability8 (Ao) of both 
individual aircraft and whole fleets by ensuring that a serviceable spare is available to 
the user within a prescribed timeframe.  Clearly the key to ensuring that this occurs is 
to know the arising rate9 in order to calculate the total number of spares based on a 
prescribed repair Turn-Around Time (TAT). 
                                                 
7  Military Standard 721C (MIL-STD-721C), Definitions of Terms for Reliability and 
Maintainability, 12 June 1981, pg 9 
8  Operational Availability is defined as the percentage of time that an item is in a commitable 
state when considering both corrective and preventative maintenance, and spares and 
maintenance delays.  These delays are typically referred to as Administrative and Logistics 
Delay Time (ALDT).  Logistics Time Delay (LTD) is defined as the accumulated time during 
which a maintenance action cannot be performed due to the necessity to acquire maintenance 
resources, excluding any administrative delay.  LDT includes time waiting for a Spare to 
become available, time waiting for an item of test equipment, time waiting for transportation, 
time waiting to use a facility, etc.  LDT may also be referred to as Supply Delay Time.  
Administrative Delay Time (ADT) is defined as the accumulated time during which an action 
of corrective maintenance on a faulty item is not performed due to administrative reasons.  
Typical examples of ADT include time raising paperwork for the job, time assigning 
personnel priorities, Labour strike, time taken to travel to equipment site, time taken to 
complete paperwork to release equipment from maintenance, etc.  Refer to ELBING, “An 
Introduction of Reliability and Maintainability Engineering”, McGraw-Hill, USA, 1997, 
Section 11.1.3, pg 256, for further discussion. 
9  It is important to note that arising rate has been deliberately used since RI management within 
the aviation industry is concerned whether an RI has been demanded by a user regardless of 
whether an actual failure has occurred.  For example, consider a positive failure indicator by 
the aircraft maintenance Built In Test (BIT) which, after an investigation no failure can be 
found (typically referred to as Nil Fault Found (NFF)).  In this case regardless that a failure 
didn’t occur or couldn’t be detected, the aircraft stopped (or couldn’t start) flying and cause a 
maintenance action was required. 
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The reason for the interest in the optimal management of RIs from the aviation 
industry is divided into 2; those reasons that link to defence and those that link to 
commercial/civilian objectives. 
 
Commercial Aviation Concerns with Traditional Repairable Item Management 
Commercial aviation industry’s focus is on Ao to maximise shareholder profits 
through optimal utilisation of the individual aircraft.  To achieve this they will often 
purchase additional “insurance” spares to ensure that the ALDT, specifically the 
delay due to a lack of a spare, is minimised.  However, the cost of these “insurance” 
spares, both in terms of initial purchase and on-going repairs if maintenance is 
required regardless of whether fitted (i.e calendar based), is a significant portion of 
the overall TCO.  Accordingly, given the marginal profit margin that the commercial 
aviation industry operates under, especially post 11 September 2001, a more accurate 
model that realistically reflects the aviation environment is clearly warranted. 
 
Defence Aviation Concerns with Traditional Repairable Item Management 
Unlike commercial aviation organisations, defence aviation is not driven by profit, 
but rather the optimisation of operational capability10 of the aircraft while achieving 
Value For Money. 
 
                                                 
10  Operational Capability includes Systems Readiness (i.e. Availability), Mission Success (i.e. 
Mission Reliability), Logistics Footprint (i.e. support required to operate the aircraft such as 
maintenance staff, spares, test equipment, etc) and Demand Satisfaction Rate (i.e. availability 
of spares). 
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Life of an Aviation Repairable Item 
Before cases (models) can be developed to support this approach it is important to 
understand the “life” of an aviation RI.  As can be seen from Figure 1 the “life” of an 
RI has a significant amount of variation.  From the time an RI has been manufactured, 
it is either installed on an operating aircraft, or is placed in a warehouse until such 
time that it is demanded by the organisation operating the aircraft.  However, while 
on the aircraft, the RI can be subjected three further activities: 
 
• an unscheduled failure resulting in a Correct Maintenance (CM) action; 
• a scheduled servicing resulting in a Preventative Maintenance (PM) 
action; and 
• the RI is removed to satisfy a higher demand on another aircraft (could be 
different type), typically referred to within the Aviation industry as 
“Cannibalisation”. 
 
While it is clear from Figure 1 that an RI can migrate between these states, an RI can 
been removed from the inventory (i.e. thrown away) if it becomes uneconomical to 
repair. 
 
Summary of Aviation Industry’s Need for a Realistic Repairable Item Model 
Accordingly, given the complexity, dependence and low profit margin within the 
Aviation Industry the possibility of a reduction in TCO is a driving goal. 
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Preventative
Maintenance
(deeper
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(for Different Aircraft)
Operating 
Aircraft
 
Figure 1: Life of an Aviation Repairable Item 
 
The use of current Repairable Item models will result in a suboptimal solution to any 
spares modelling that may result in either: 
 
• an aircraft being unavailable to conduct a mission awaiting a spare, or 
• a higher TCO due to spare RIs that are not being utilised. 
 
However, neither result is acceptable and accordingly, there is a need to construct a 
model that more realistically represents the life of a RI within the aviation 
environment.  Any solution will need to address the combined complexities of 
imperfect maintenance of multiple dependent failure modes, imperfect inspections 
and data uncertainty, specifically unknown times to failure. 
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Area of Research 
Table 1 provides the road-map of the research that was conducted and is now 
presented in this document. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction Set the scene of the perceived need within the Aviation 
Industry to be solved.   
Chapter 2: Description of 
Cases to be Modelled 
Description of the life of an RI within the Aviation 
environment including the proposal of 2 case types; Case xA 
(known failure times) and Case xB (unknown failures times).  
These can be further divided as more realistic factors are 
introduced. 
Chapter 3: Current 
Techniques for Analysis of 
Renewal Process 
Description of Current techniques for analysis of RIs 
including KIJIM GRP equation.  Also highlights possible 
alternative renewal process. 
Chapter 4:  Mathematical 
Set-up of Each Case 
Described the mathematical setup including of the Cases from 
Chapter 3: Current Techniques for Analysis of Renewal 
Process 
Chapter 5:  Numerical 
Methods 
Described the implementation of the Slice Sampler numerical 
analysis procedure. 
Chapter 6:  Role of ‘q’ in 
Analysis of Realistic Cases 
Provides some rules of thumb to support insight into the 
behaviour of the GRP model for both the simple and complex 
cases will allow the reader to answer the traditional question 
of “so what?”.  Should I spend my limited budget on fixing 
imperfect inspection or imperfect maintenance? 
Chapter 7: Examples Review of a number of examples including real data for Cases 
1A and Cases 4A. 
Chapter 8:  Conclusion Conclusion and summary 
Table 1: Road-map of the Dissertation 
 
 
 
 10 
 
Chapter 2: Description of Cases to be Modelled 
 
Review of the Life of an Aviation Repairable Item 
Before examining the specific modelling requirements of each of the cases we need to 
revisit the life of a Repairable Item within the Defence Aviation environment as 
described in Chapter 1: Introduction and Figure 1.  Based on this description it is 
possible to construct a flowchart that represents the “life” of an RI including 
imperfect inspection, imperfect corrective and imperfect preventative maintenance.  
This flowchart is provided at Figure 2. 
 
Overall Case Assumptions 
Before examining the specific modelling requirements of each of the cases there are a 
number of assumptions that apply to all the cases.  These general assumptions are 
listed in Table 2. 
 
• Only valid for a single component (e.g. single serial number from a fleet) 
• Only 2 states observable; serviceable and unserviceable (i.e. failed) 
• When considering multiple failure modes, only the failure that was discovered 
in the failed state is repaired, with no repair of other failures regardless of state 
(e.g. whether in failed state or not). 
Table 2: Common Model Assumptions for all Cases 
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Figure 2: Flowchart of the Life of an Aviation Repairable Item 
 
Case Types 
There are two distinct case types; for the purposes of the modelling; labelled Case A 
and Case B.  The differences between Case A and Case B are detailed in Table 3. 
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Case A Case B 
Case A represents components with 
Known Failure Times.  These models are 
representative of components where a 
failure can be observed and repaired as 
they occur (e.g. avionics with an 
automatic Built In Test (BIT)11).  This 
definition is similar to the concept of an 
evident under Reliability Centred 
Maintenance (RCM) logic12. 
Case B represents components with 
Unknown Failure Times.  These models 
are representative of components where a 
failure is not observable during 
operation.  Failure is only observed, and 
therefore repaired, during scheduled 
inspection points.  This definition is 
similar to the concept of a hidden failure 
under RCM logic13. 
Table 3: Description of Case Types 
 
Case 1 
Case 1 represents the simplest model whereby data for a single failure mode is 
observed.  Once the failure has been observed it is repaired instantaneously, noting 
that since there is only a single failure mode, there is no need to model the impact of 
the maintenance (and inspection) on the other failure modes.  Case 1 is further 
divided along the lines of the Case Types listed above.  Specifically: 
 
Case 1A – Known Failure Times.  This is representative of equipment that is 
constantly monitored for failures through BIT, etc and repaired during After-Flight 
                                                 
11  Automatic built-in test (ABIT). A subset of BIT which is initiated automatically when 
subsystem electrical power is turned on; or iterative testing and monitoring, is non-
interruptive to (following the initial power-up tests) and invisible to the user, it provides 
continuous normal system operation except when an operator-relevant fault is detected and 
reported; detects and isolates each fault to the corresponding level of maintenance.  
Definition from para 3.1.41, Military Standard 1309D – Definitions of Terms of Testing, 
Measurement and Diagnostics dated 12 February 1992, pg 4 – 5. 
12  Evident Failure – “A failure mode whose effects will on their own eventually and inevitably 
become evident to the operating crew under normal circumstances.”  Definition from Defence 
Standard (DEFSTAN) 02-45 (NES 45), Requirements for the Application of Reliability-
Centred Maintenance Techniques to HM Ships, Submarines, Royal Fleet Auxiliaries and 
other Naval Auxiliary Vessels - Category 2, Issue 2, UK Ministry of Defence, 14 July 2000, 
B-7. 
13  Hidden Failure – A failure mode that will not, on its own, become evident to the operating 
crew under normal circumstances.  Definition from DEFSTAN 02-45 (NES 45), op cit, B-6. 
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(AF), Turn-Around (TA) or rectification maintenance actions.  A pictorial 
representation of both the real and virtual time for Case 1A is shown in Figure 3. 
 
t0 = 0
Combined Failure/Inspection Point
• Failure Observed
• Instantaneous Repair
• Perfect Inspection 
t1 = a t2 = b Real time (t)
X X
Virtual time (V) • Reduction in 
Virtual Age
 
Figure 3: Diagram of Case 1A 
 
Case 1B – Unknown Failure Times.  Representative of equipment that is not 
monitored for failures or the failure will not, on its own, become evident to the 
operating crew under normal circumstances.  Inspection, and the corresponding 
Before Flight (BF), AF, TA and/or rectification maintenance action, occurs at fixed 
(scheduled) intervals and is assumed to be perfect (e.g. inspection process does not 
‘age’ the equipment).  Furthermore, it is assumed that the component cannot 
accumulate any further ‘age’ from the time of failure, until the inspection 
(observation) and maintenance.  A pictorial representation of both the real and virtual 
time for Case 1B is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Case 2 
Case 2 differs from Case 1 by including the modelling of multiple independent failure 
modes.  Again, once the failure has been observed it is repaired instantaneously.  
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While multiple failure modes are included and therefore the ‘age’ of each of the 
independent failure mode must be tracked, the assumption of independence means 
that there is no need to model the impact of the maintenance (and inspection) on the 
other failure modes (refer to Cases 3 – 5).  Furthermore, the inspection process is still 
to be assumed perfect (e.g. inspection process does not ‘age’ the equipment); refer to 
Case 4 – 5 for imperfect inspection.  In comparison with Case 1, there is clearly an 
increased data requirement to support Case 2, including accuracy of assigning failures 
to specific failure modes.  Case 2 is further divided along the lines of the Case Types 
listed above.  Specifically: 
 
t0 = 0
Inspection Point 
•Perfect Inspection
• Instantaneous Repair
t1 = a t2 = b Real time (t)
X X
Virtual time (V) • Reduction in 
Virtual Age
Failure Point
• Failure Occurs but 
not Observed
• Item cannot accumulate 
‘age’ since in failed state
 
Figure 4: Diagram of Case 1B 
 
Case 2A – Known Failure Times.  Similar to Case 1A, Case 2A is representative of 
equipment that is constantly monitored for failures through BIT, etc and repaired 
during AF, TA and/or rectification maintenance action and where failure modes can 
be analysed separately and then combined in the GRP simulation.  A pictorial 
representation of both the real and virtual time for Case 2A is shown in Figure 5. 
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t0 = 0
Combined Failure/Inspection 
Point for FM1 only
• Failure Observed
• Instantaneous Repair
• Perfect Inspection 
t1 = a t2 = b Real time (t)
X
Virtual time (V)
• Reduction in Virtual 
Age of FM1
t0 = 0
Combined Failure/Inspection Point 
for FM2 only
• Failure Observed
• Instantaneous Repair
• Perfect Inspection 
t1 = a t2 = b Real time (t)
X
Virtual time (V)
• Reduction in Virtual 
Age of FM2
Fa
ilu
re
 M
od
e 
1
Fa
ilu
re
 M
od
e 
2
 
Figure 5: Diagram of Case 2A 
 
Case 2B – Unknown Failure Times.  Similar to Case 1B, Case 2B is representative 
of equipment that is not monitored for failures (e.g. failure can occur without 
observing).  Inspection, and the corresponding BF, AF, TA and/or rectification action, 
occurs at fixed (scheduled) intervals in this scenario.  A pictorial representation of 
both the real and virtual time for Case 2B is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Case 3 
Case 3 differs from Case 2 by modelling multiple dependent failure modes.  In this 
case, the multiple failure modes will impact the ‘age’ of each of the other failure 
mode.  Accordingly, in addition to the independent failure mode, the interaction 
between each failure mode must be tracked.  Furthermore, the inspection process is 
still to be assumed perfect (e.g. inspection process does not ‘age’ the equipment); 
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refer to Case 4 – 5 for imperfect inspection.  Case 3 is further divided along the lines 
of the Case Types listed above.  Specifically: 
 
t0 = 0 t1 = a t2 = b Real time (t)
X
Virtual time (V)
• Reduction in Virtual 
Age of FM1
Failure Point
• Failure Occurs in FM1 
but is not Observed
• FM1 cannot accumulate 
‘age’ since in failed state
t0 = 0
Inspection (Repair) Point
• Perfect Inspection
• Instantaneous Repair
t1 = a t2 = b Real time (t)
X
Virtual time (V) • Reduction in Virtual 
Age of FM2
Failure Point
• Failure Occurs in 
FM2 but is not 
Observed
Fa
ilu
re
 M
od
e 
1
Fa
ilu
re
 M
od
e 
2
• FM2 cannot accumulate 
‘age’ since in failed state
 
Figure 6: Diagram of Case 2B 
 
Case 3A – Known Failure Times.  This is representative of equipment that is 
constantly monitored for failures through BIT, etc and repaired during AF, TA and/or 
rectification action and where failure modes can be analysed separately and then 
combined in the GRP simulation.  A pictorial representation of both the real and 
virtual time for Case 2B is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Case 3B – Unknown Failure Times.  Case 3B is representative of equipment that is 
not monitored for failures (e.g. failure can occur without observing).  Inspection, and 
the corresponding BF, AF, TA and/or rectification action, occurs at fixed (scheduled) 
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intervals in this scenario.  A pictorial representation of both the real and virtual time 
for Case 2B is shown in Figure 8. 
 
t0 = 0
Combined Failure/Inspection 
Point for FM1 only
• Failure Observed
• Instantaneous Repair
• Perfect Inspection 
t1 = a t2 = b Real time (t)
X
Virtual time (V)
• Reduction in Virtual 
Age of FM1 due to 
repair of FM1
t0 = 0
Combined Failure/Inspection Point 
for FM2 only
• Failure Observed
• Instantaneous Repair
• Perfect Inspection 
t1 = a t2 = b Real time (t)
X
Virtual time (V) • Reduction in Virtual Age of FM2 due to 
repair of FM2
Fa
ilu
re
 M
od
e 
1
Fa
ilu
re
 M
od
e 
2
• Reduction (Increase)
in Virtual Age of FM2 
due to repair of FM1
• DEPENDENCY
• Reduction (Increase)
in Virtual Age of FM2 
due to repair of FM1
• DEPENDENCY
 
Figure 7: Diagram of Case 3A 
 
t0 = 0 t1 = a t2 = b Real time (t)
X
Virtual time (V)
• Reduction in Virtual 
Age of FM1
Failure Point
• Failure Occurs in FM1 
but is not Observed
• FM1 cannot accumulate 
‘age’ since in failed state
t0 = 0
Inspection (Repair) Point
• Perfect Inspection
• Instantaneous Repair
t1 = a t2 = b Real time (t)
X
Virtual time (V) • Reduction in Virtual 
Age of FM2
Failure Point
• Failure Occurs in FM2 
but is not Observed
• FM2 cannot accumulate 
‘age’ since in failed state
Fa
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1
Fa
ilu
re
 M
od
e 
2
• Reduction (Increase)
in Virtual Age of FM1 
due to repair of FM2
• DEPENDENCY
• Reduction (Increase)
in Virtual Age of FM1 
due to repair of FM2
• DEPENDENCY
 
Figure 8: Diagram for Case 3B 
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Case 4 
Case 4 builds on Case 3 by explicitly including modelling of where inspection 
process can ‘age’ a different failure mode that did not fail and/or was not repaired.  In 
this case, in addition to tracking each of the multiple failure modes and their 
individual impact (i.e. aging) on each of the other failure modes, it is important to 
track the impact of the inspection process on each of the failure modes.  Case 4 is 
further divided along the lines of the Case Types listed above.  Specifically: 
 
Case 4A – Known Failure Times.  Case 4A is representative of equipment that is 
constantly monitored for failures through BIT, etc and repaired during AF, TA and/or 
rectification action and where failure modes can be analysed separately and then 
combined in the GRP simulation.  A pictorial representation of both the real and 
virtual time for Case 2B is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: Diagram for Case 4A 
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Case 4B – Unknown Failure Times.  Representative of equipment that is not 
monitored for failures (e.g. failure can occur without observing).  Inspection, and the 
corresponding AF/TA/rectification action, occurs at fixed (scheduled) intervals.  
Furthermore, the inspection process is perfect (e.g. inspection process does not ‘age’ 
the equipment).  A pictorial representation of both the real and virtual time for Case 
2B is shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: Diagram for Case 4B 
 
Case 5 
Case 5 builds on Case 4 by modelling where the inspection process can ‘age’ a 
different failure mode that did not fail and/or wasn’t repaired.  This is representative 
of the case where any repair action is delayed from the failure discovery point, and is 
very common within the aviation industry since one of their prime objectives is to 
ensure that flights are completed on schedule.  Within the RAAF the process of 
delaying the repair of a known failure in a component is called a Carried Forward 
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Unserviceability (CFU).  A CFU is only allowed on certain components that do not 
affect safety, and can only be authorised by specifically appointed personnel.  In this 
case, the model must track each of the multiple failure modes and their individual 
impact (i.e. aging) on each of the other failure modes, the impact of the inspection 
process on each of the failure modes, and the impact of any delay on other failure 
modes.  Case 5 is the most data intensive.  Case 5 is further divided along the lines of 
the Case Types listed above.  Specifically: 
 
Case 5A – Known Failure Times.  This is representative of equipment that is 
constantly monitored for failures through BIT, etc and repaired during the AF, TA 
and/or rectification action and where failure modes can be analysed separately and 
then combined in the GRP simulation.  A pictorial representation of both the real and 
virtual time for Case 2B is shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Diagram for Case 5A 
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Case 5B – Unknown Failure Times.  Case 5B is representative of equipment that is 
not monitored for failures (e.g. failure can occur without observing).  Inspection, and 
the corresponding BF, AF, TA and/or rectification action, occurs at fixed (scheduled) 
intervals.  A pictorial representation of both the real and virtual time for Case 2B is 
shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Diagram for Case 5B 
 
Summary of Case 
A summary of the model assumptions for each of cases detailed above is provided in 
Table 4. 
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 Single Failure Mode 
Instantaneous Repair 
Perfect Inspection 
CASE 1 
Multiple Independent 
Failure Modes 
Instantaneous Repair 
Perfect Inspection 
CASE 2 
Multiple Dependent Failure 
Modes 
Instantaneous Repair 
Perfect Inspection 
CASE 3 
Multiple Dependent Failure 
Modes 
Instantaneous Repair 
Imperfect Inspection 
CASE 4 
Multiple Dependent Failure 
Modes 
Delayed Repair 
Imperfect Inspection 
CASE 5 
For Cases 2 – 5: 
1.  only repair failure mode that was discovered in the failed state (e.g. no repair of other failures regardless state) 
2. Increased data requirement from Case 1 to support the assignment of failures to specific failure modes 
CASE A 
Known Failure Times 
(failure observed and 
repair as occurs) 
Case 1A 
Representative of equipment 
that is constantly monitored 
for failures through BIT, etc 
and repaired during AF/TA 
/rectification action 
Case 2A 
Representative of case where 
failure modes can be analysed 
separately and then combined 
in the GRP simulation. 
Case 3A 
Representative of the case 
where failure modes will 
impact (e.g. ‘age’) other 
failure modes. 
Case 4A 
Representative of case where 
inspection process can ‘age’ a 
different failure mode that did 
not fail and/or was not 
repaired. 
Considered the most 
representative case of 
realistic aviation operations 
Case 5A 
Representative of the case 
where any repair action is 
delayed from the failure 
discovery point.  This case is 
common within the aviation 
industry to ensure that flights 
are completed on schedule. 
CASE B 
Unknown Failure 
Times 
(failure non-
observable and 
repaired at scheduled 
inspection point) 
Case 1B 
Representative of equipment 
that is not monitored for 
failures (e.g. failure can occur 
without observing).  
Inspection, and AF/TA/ 
rectification action, occurs at 
fixed intervals. 
Case 2B 
As above but unknown 
failure times. 
Case 3B 
As above but unknown 
failure times. 
Case 4B 
As above but unknown 
failure times. 
Case 5B 
As above but unknown 
failure times. 
Table 4: Summary of Model Assumptions for Cases 
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Chapter 3: Current Techniques for Analysis of Renewal Process 
 
Reason for GRP Model 
Repairable systems are generally not replaced by new systems following the 
occurrence of a failure; rather, they are repaired and put into operation again (e.g. 
cars, aircraft, etc).  Clearly this sequence of use, failure and repair, can be continued 
ad infinitum until either (1) the system can no longer be repaired, or (2) the cost of the 
repair exceeds a certain threshold such as the cost of replacing the component with a 
new one. The later is generally referred to as uneconomic fleet the next day.  The 
distinction is important from a predictive modelling point of view. Generally 
speaking, for the non-repairable items, the basis is the TTF distributions and all 
respective probabilistic and statistical procedures related to such distributions.  On the 
other hand, the basic mathematical models for the repairable items require 
consideration of at least two random processes, used as models for failure and repair 
processes.  The differences extends to such notions as failure rate (applicable to 
repairable items,) whereas in the case of repairable systems the appropriate measure 
is rate of occurrence of failures (ROCOF), which has a different meaning than the 
failure rate.  
 
With this is mind, traditional repairable item models such as the Homogenous 
Poisson Process (HPP), Non-Homogenous Poisson Process (NHPP) and the Ordinary 
Renewal Process (ORP) are used extensively.  Furthermore, these techniques are 
widely available in commercial software packages.  A detailed review of the HPP, 
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NHPP and ORP repairable item models can be found in many Reliability Engineering 
textbooks14. 
 
While HPP, NHPP and ORP solutions have also been used in repairable system 
analysis for many years, they suffer problems due to their model assumptions.  For 
example, the HPP model can only be used to model an item with an exponential 
failure time distribution where the ROCOF is assumed to be constant, regardless of 
the age of the item.  However, this assumption makes it impossible to model aging 
effects due to the memorylessness of the exponential function. 
 
The repair assumption in the ORP is based on any repair activity restoring the item to 
new, regardless of the age of the item.  This assumption is called perfect repair 
assumption, or as good-as-new. 
 
In contrast, the NHPP model offers the opposite extreme where the repair assumption 
is based on the premise that any repair activity restores the item exactly to the state 
(i.e., age) just prior to the failure.  This assumption is called the minimal repair 
assumption, same-as-old, or as-bad-as-old.  Furthermore, the NHPP can be used with 
any underlying failure time distribution (e.g., Weibull and Lognormal) which result in 
time-dependent ROCOF, capable of representing aging effects.  However, as 
HOYLAND and RAUSAND point out: 
                                                 
14  ASHER, H. and FEINGOLD, H., loc it;  MODARRES, M., KAMINSKIY, M. and 
KRIVTSOV, V., loc cit; ELBING, “An Introduction of Reliability and Maintainability 
Engineering”, McGraw-Hill, USA, 1997; HOYLAND, A. and RAUSAND, M., loc cit. 
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 “An NHPP is not a realistic model when the failed parts to be replaced have 
been in operation for a long time.  For the NHPP to be realistic, the parts 
put into service should be identical to the old ones and hence should be aged 
outside the system under identical conditions for the same period of time.“ 15 
 
Additionally, HOYLAND and RAUSAND also argue that “[t]he minimal repair 
assumption is . . . often applicable, and the NHPP may be accepted as a realistic 
model, at least as a first-order approximation” 16 for the analysis of a complex 
system based on the following argument: 
 
“. . . consider a system consisting of a large number of components.  
Suppose that a critical component fails and causes a system failure and 
that this component is immediately replaced by a component of the same 
type, thus causing negligible system downtime.  Since only a small fraction 
of the system is replaced, it seems natural to assume that the system’s 
reliability after the repair is essentially the same as immediately before the 
failure.  In other words, the assumption of minimal repair is a realistic 
approximation. 
 
A car is a typical example of a repairable system.  Usually the operating 
time of a car is expressed in terms of the mileage indicated on the 
speedometer.  Repair actions will not usually imply extra mileage.  The 
repair ‘time’ is thus negligible.  Many repairs are accomplished by 
                                                 
15  HOYLAND, A. and RAUSAND, M., op cit, pp 314-315 
16  ibid 
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adjustments and replacement of single components.  The minimal repair 
assumption is therefore often applicable, and the NHPP may be accepted 
as a realistic model, at least as a first-order approximation.“ 17 
 
While the ORP and NHPP can be used to approximate a solution, a realistic repair 
activity is somewhere in between these two models depending on a number of factors 
including overall age of the component, number of repairs, effectiveness of the repair, 
skill of the technicians, etc.  This is sometimes referred to as better-than-old-but-
worse-than-new repair assumption.  Furthermore, while it is clear that neither the 
NHPP nor the ORP adequately reflect this more realistic repair assumption, they 
represent the maximum and minimum conditions of the model. 
 
A more realistic model for the case of realistic maintenance is the so-called General 
Renewal Process (GRP), introduced by KIJIMA and SUMITA in 198618 allowing the 
goodness of repairs to be modelled from as-good-as-new (i.e. ORP) to same-as-old 
(i.e. NHPP).  In the simplest form of GRP, a single parameter, q, represents the 
goodness of repairs, or Repair Effectiveness.  Unfortunately, there is no closed form 
solution to the GRP model equation, and even the numerical integration approaches 
are difficult to apply.  Instead, a numerical method is required to undertake this 
replacement KAMINSKIY and KRIVTSOV19 proposed a Monte Carlo (MC) 
simulation based solution which has been adopted by a software tool. Although the 
                                                 
17  ibid 
18  KIJIMA, M. and SUMITA, U., loc cit. 
19  KAMINSKIY, M. and KRIVTSOV, V., loc cit. 
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study was aimed at the component model, the tool can be equally applied to any 
repairable object such as a system, subsystem, or component based purely on the data 
availability.  YANAS, et al and  
 
A summary of the various repairable item models, their underlying distribution, repair 
effectiveness and ability to model aging effects is provided in Table 5. 
 
Repairable 
Item Model 
Underlying Reliability 
Distribution 
Repair Effectiveness 
Assumption 
Assessment of 
System Aging 
HPP Exponential only N/A N/A 
Renewal 
Process (RP) 
Any distribution  As good as new (q = 0) N/A 
NHPP Any distribution  
(usually Weibull) 
As good as old, q =1(as it 
was just before a failure) 
Applicable 
GRP Any distribution  Any (0 ≤ q ≤ 1) Applicable 
Table 5: Summary of Repairable Item Models 
 
Formulation of GRP Model 
Aging effects can be modelled through the reduction of ROCOF during the lifetime 
of a system/component.  This concept of Virtual Age (VA) was introduced by KIJIMA 
and SUMITA20 in 1986 and is now referred in most literature to as GRP. 
 
The GRP model allowing the goodness of repairs to be modelled from as-good-as-
new (i.e. ORP) to same-as-old (i.e. NHPP).  The variation between the two repair 
assumptions is achieved through this notion of VA. 
                                                 
20  KIJIMA, M. and SUMITA, U., loc cit. 
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Let An be the VA of the item immediately after the nth repair.  If An = y, then the 
product has the time to (n + 1)th failure Xn+1, which is distributed according to the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) shown in Equation 1. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )yF
yFyXFyAXF n −
−+
==
1
 
Equation 1: CDF of the GRP Model 
 
where F(X) is the CDF of the Time-To-First-Failure (TTFF) distribution of a new 
item.  The Real Age of a component is the sum where S0 = 0 is shown in Equation 2. 
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Equation 2: Real Age of a Component under the GRP Model 
 
KIJIMA21 introduced 2 models for virtual age, typically referred to as the KIJIMA 
Type I and Type II equations, whose construct is shown in Equation 3. 
 
( ) IITypeKIJIMAVYAV
ITypeKIJIMAYAVV
iiii
iiii
__
__
1
1
−−⋅=
−⋅+=
−
−  
Equation 3: KIJIMA Type I and Type II Virtual Age Equations for GRP Model 
where Ai may be a random variable. 
 
Note that throughout the study Ai is assumed = constant = q. 
 
                                                 
21  KIJIMA, M., loc cit. 
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One method of understanding the concept of virtual age for both the KIJIMA Type I 
and Type II GRP model is through the plotting of real age versus virtual age for 
varying q.  This can be seen in Figure 13 where an item is exposed to a series of 
operation, failure and renewals.  In this case let tk, be the time of the kth failure, xk 
represent the virtual age immediately after restoration, and yk represent the virtual 
age immediately before the kth failure. 
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line
y1
y3
y2
t1 t2 t3
y2-x2
x1
x2
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Figure 13: Virtual Age versus Real Age for Varying q Values 
 
From Figure 13 it is possible to find an expression for tk, in terms of xk and yk as 
follows: 
( )kkkk xytt −+= ++ 11  
Equation 4: Expression for tk, in terms of xk and yk 
 
The expected number of failures in the interval (0, t] for both the KIJIMA Type I and 
Type II GRP models, called the Cumulative Intensity Function (CIF), is given by a 
solution of the GRP equation22 as shown in Equation 5. 
 
                                                 
22  KIJIMA, M. and SUMITA, U., loc cit 
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Equation 5: CIF of the GRP 
 
Where Equation 5 is the conditional PDF such that g(t|0) = f(t), and F(t) and f(t) are 
the CDP and PDF of the TTFF distribution. 
 
Unfortunately, as previously highlighted there is no closed form solution to this 
equation, and even the numerical integration approaches are difficult to apply.  The 
numerical integration approach(es) can be found in . 
 
The GRP model is very useful when realistically modelling repairable items since it 
has the flexibility to model various repair assumptions; i.e. better-than-old-but-worse-
than-new repair assumption.  For example, if q = 0, the solution of the GRP 
corresponds to the solution of an ORP model with the as-good-as-new repair 
assumption.  Conversely, if q = 1, the solution of the GRP corresponds to the solution 
of a NHPP, that is the same-as-old repair assumption.  While development of the 
GRP model is relatively intuitive the only concern is in the parameter estimation, 
especially q, and the simulation of a result. 
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Limitations of KIJIMA GRP Model 
DAGPUNAR23 states that the limitation of KIJIMA Type I GRP model is that any 
reduction in virtual age on the ith repair affects only the most recent operating time Yi.  
Thus, the state of an item (i.e. operating time) cannot undergo any major 
improvement through the introduction of better repair techniques, modification of the 
item, etc since the item will still have a large virtual age, but only a small recent 
operating time.  Furthermore, under a failure rate increasing to infinity the KIJIMA 
Type I GRP model (with the exception of Ai = 0) will result in zero operating times in 
the limit. In order to eliminate the limitation of the KIJIMA Type I GRP model, 
DAGPUNAR24 proposes the TYPE III model as follows. 
 
Let the initial age of the item is S0 = s, a specified value.  Let the repair function φ(w), 
the virtual age immediately after the ith repair be defined in Equation 6. 
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Equation 6: Type III Virtual Age Equations for GRP Model 
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that repair does not age the item, i.e. 0 ≤ φ(w) ≤ w, or 
equivalently as shown in Equation 7. 
 
                                                 
23  DAGPUNAR, J.S., “Renewal-type Equations for a General Repair Process”, Quality and 
Reliability Engineering International, Vol 13, No 4, July-Aug. 1997, p. 235-45 
24  ibid 
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Equation 7: Virtual Age of Type III GRP Equation 
 
In the case of the TYPE III model the solution is shown in Equation 8. 
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Equation 8: CIF of the Type II GRP Model 
 
where the general repair function {φ(w): w ≥ 0}, initial age of the item s, and 
the TTFF is y.   
 
Similar to the KIJIMA Type I and Type II GRP models, there is no closed form 
solution to this equation, and even the numerical integration approaches are difficult 
to apply, therefore a MC based solution offered by KAMINSKIY and KRIVTSOV25, 
YANEZ, et al26, METTAS, et al27 or JACK28 approach can be used. HURTADO et 
al29 provided an alternative approach to the MLE through the application of a Genetic 
Algorithm (GA) to solve the GRP equation.  However, the Type III model introduced 
by DAGPUNAR has not been examined as part of this study. 
 
                                                 
25  KAMINSKIY, M. and KRIVTSOV, V., loc cit. 
26  YANEZ, M., JOGLAR, F, and MODARRES, M., loc cit. 
27  METTAS, A. and ZHAO, W, loc cit. 
28  JACK, N., loc cit. 
29  HURTADO et al, loc cit. 
 
 33 
 
Simulation of General Renewal Process (GRP) 
Introduction into GRP Simulation 
In order to study both the KIJIMA Type I and Type II GRP models it was necessary 
to develop a simulation tool.  This was completed using the programming feature of 
MathCad® software; specifically MathCad® Professional 12.  The setup of both GRP 
simulation tools was based on the similar work completed by Dr Frank Groen30 using 
a straight MC simulation (i.e. a simulation without any constraints).  It is then 
possible to undertake the studies based on the simulated CIF data from the KIJIMA 
Type I and Type II GRP models.  The simulation method and study techniques are 
provided in the following paragraphs. 
 
Simulation of the GRP Model 
Setup of the KJIMA Type I GRP model was based Dr Frank Groen’s work31 as 
follows: 
 
Straight MC Simulation 
 
The following algorithm is proposed to perform the straight MC simulation, i.e. simulation 
without any constraints. Let tk, the time of the k-th failure be known. The time of the next 
failure tk+1 is then found as 
 
                                                 
30  GROEN, F., “Supplement to ‘Bayesian Data Analysis for General-Renewal Process’”, 
Technical Paper, University of Maryland, 2003 
31  ibid 
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• xk represents the virtual age immediately after restoration 
• yk represents the virtual age immediately before the kth failure 
• ln(Rk) represents the natural log of the reliability at virtual age xk 
• u represents a standard uniform random sample 
 
The only subtraction in this algorithm takes place in the last line. Given the expected values of 
yk+1 and xk, this should normally not be a problem. Furthermore, in the worst case scenario 
where q = 1, the value of ln(Rk) will increase by 1 on average for every iteration of k. The 
value of ln(Rk) should therefore stay small enough for the addition in the second to last line 
not to pose a problem. The algorithm can therefore be used for high values of k.  
 
However, derivation, including assumptions, of the MC equations was not included in 
the paper.  Therefore, the following derivations are provided in support of the use of 
these equations. 
 
From these equations it is possible to iteratively find the time of next failure, tk+1, 
using values for the virtual age immediately after restoration, xk, and the virtual age 
immediately before the (k+1)th failure, yk+1.  Specifically, the time of next failure, tk+1, 
is shown in Equation 9. 
 
( )kkkk xytt −+= ++ 11  
Equation 9: Time of Next Failure, tk+1, for GRP Equation 
 
The derivation of this relationship was previously shown. 
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To find the expression for tk+1, the expressions for xk and yk+1 need to be determined.  
However, given both the expressions for xk and yk+1 are dependent on the method of 
calculating the virtual age, the expressions for xk and yk+1 will be different for the 
KIJIMA Type I and Type II models. 
 
The expression for yk+1 can be found by rewriting the previously defined CDF for the 
GRP model as shown in Equation 10. 
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Equation 10: Expression for yk+1 
 
where R(tk) is the reliability just after the kth failure/renewal and R’(tk+1) is 
the reliability just before the (k+1) th failure. 
 
However, since F(X|An = y) is a Failure Distribution we know that F(X|An = y) = U 
where U ∈ <0,1> and thus the CDF can be re-written as shown in Equation 11. 
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Equation 11: CDF of GRP Model 
 
where U ∈ <0,1>, then U’ = 1 – U where U’ ∈ <0,1>. 
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Now since R’(tk+1) is defined as the reliability just before the (k+1)th failure, and 
using a Weibull Distribution as the underlying TTF distributions, it is possible to 
derive the equation for the virtual age immediately before the (k+1)th failure, yk+1, as 
shown in Equation 12. 
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Equation 12: Virtual Age Immediately Before the (k+1)th Failure 
 
We now have expression for yk+1 as a function of xk, which as previously mentioned 
is dependent on whether a KIJIMA Type I or Type II GRP model is being simulated.  
Therefore, we now need to find an expression for xk for both the KIJIMA Type I and 
Type II GRP model. 
 
Simulation of the KIJIMA Type I GRP Model 
From the original KIJIMA Type I expression for virtual age provided in Equation 3, it 
is possible to derive an expression for xk as shown in Equation 13. 
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Equation 13: Virtual Age Immediately After Restoration, xk, for KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation 
 
However, assuming the initial assumptions that t0 = 0, x0 = 0 and q = constant the 
final expression for xk for the KIJIMA Type I model is shown in Equation 14. 
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Equation 14: Simplified Virtual Age Immediately After Restoration, xk, for 
KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation 
 
Now substituting yk+1 and xk it is possible to solve for tk+1 for the simplified straight 
MC equation for simulation of a KIJIMA Type I GRP model as shown in Equation 
15. 
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Equation 15: Time of Next Failure, tk+1, for KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation 
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An interesting observation of the final expression of tk+1 is that it is only dependent on 
tk, the previous TTF.  Thus the prediction of any future TTF value is only dependent 
on the previous TTF value, whether found through actual data, simulation or by 
approximation. 
 
While the original straight MC equations developed by Dr Frank Groen32 were 
implemented to find the mean and distribution of the number of failures/renewals (ie 
CIF) for a given t, the implementation used throughout this study was based on 
finding the mean and distribution of the TTF to the kth failure. 
 
Simulation of the KIJIMA Type II GRP Model 
Similar to the KIJIMA Type I GRP expression, from the expression for the virtual 
age for KIJIMA Type II previously defined it is possible to derive an expression for 
xk as provided in Equation 16. 
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Equation 16: Virtual Age Immediately After Restoration, xk, for KIJIMA Type II GRP Equation 
 
                                                 
32  ibid 
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However, assuming the initial assumptions that t0 = 0, x0 = 0 and q = constant the 
final expression for xk for the KIJIMA Type II GRP model is shown in Equation 17. 
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Equation 17: Simplified Virtual Age Immediately After Restoration, xk, for 
KIJIMA Type II GRP Equation 
 
Substituting for yk+1 and xk it is possible to solve for tk+1 for the simplified straight 
MC equation for simulation of a KIJIMA Type II GRP model as follows: 
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Equation 18: Time of Next Failure, tk+1, for KIJIMA Type II GRP Equation 
 
Unlike the expression for tk+1 for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model, the expression for 
the KIJIMA Type II GRP model is dependent on all previous values of tk. Any future 
prediction of tk+1 will require that all previous values of tk be known, and therefore 
increase the data requirements for actual failure data, simulation of data or the use of 
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an approximation technique.  This requirement also significantly increases the 
complexity of the prediction model of the KIJIMA Type II GRP model compared to 
the KIJIMA Type I GRP model. 
 
Furthermore, from the simplification of xk for both the KIJIMA Type I and Type II 
GRP models it is clear that the virtual age immediately after renewal (i.e. xk) of the 
KIJIMA Type I GRP model will always be greater than the KIJIMA Type II GRP 
model, except where q=1. 
 
Discussion of GRP Equation Parameters 
Given the utilisation of a 2-parameter Weibull distribution as the underlying Time-
To-Failure distribution, the resulting Time of Next Failure, tk+1, for the KIJIMA Type 
I GRP Equation as shown in Equation 15 relies on the following three parameters: 
 
• GRP Equation Scale Parameter (α) 
• GRP Equation Shape Parameter (β) 
• GRP Equation Repair Effectiveness Parameter (q) 
 
Each parameter will be examined separately in order to establish their nature, 
characteristic and role. 
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GRP Equation Scale Parameter (α) 
The scale parameter (α) of a KIJIMA Type I GRP equation with an underlying  
2-parameter Weibull distribution “influences both the mean and spread, or dispersion, 
of the distribution.”33.  The scale parameter (α) is also called the characteristic life of 
the component. 
 
GRP Equation Shape Parameter (β) 
The shape parameter (β) of a KIJIMA Type I GRP equation with an underlying 2-
parameter Weibull distribution provides an “insight into the behaviour of the failure 
process”34.  For example, if β = 1, λ(t) is constant and the distribution is identical to 
the exponential distribution.  In general terms, if β < 1, there is a decreasing failure 
rate (DFR), if β = 1 there is a constant failure rate (CFR) and therefore identical to the 
exponential distribution, while if β > 1, there is an increasing failure rate (IFR).  A 
summary of the effect of the shape parameter is shown in Table 6. 
 
Consequently, and quite logically, as the shape parameter (β) increases, the TTF 
decreases. 
 
 
 
                                                 
33  ELBING, C., “An Introduction of Reliability and Maintainability Engineering”, McGraw-
Hill, USA, 1997, pg 63 
34  ibid 
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Value of Shape 
Parameter 
Property 
0 < β < 1 Decreasing Failure Rate (DFR) 
β = 1 Constant Failure Rate (CFR) 
1 < β < 2 Increasing Failure Rate (IFR), Concave 
β = 2 Rayleigh Distribution (linear)  
β > 2 IFR, Convex 
3 ≤ β ≤ 4 IFR, Approaches normal distribution, symmetrical 
Table 6: Effect of Shape Parameter on GRP Equation35 
 
GRP Equation Repair Effectiveness Parameter (q) 
The nature, characteristic and role of the GRP Equation Repair Effectiveness 
Parameter (q) requires significant discussion, which is held in Chapter 6:  Role of ‘q’ 
in Analysis of Realistic Cases. 
 
HURTADO et al36 provided an alternative to the MLE approached used by 
KAMINSKIY et al37, YANEZ, et al38, METTAS, et al39 and JACK40 to solve the 
single failure mode with perfect inspection via a Genetic Algorithm (GA).  
                                                 
35  ELBING, C., op cit, Table 4.1, pg 64 
36  HURTADO et al, loc cit. 
37  KAMINSKIY, M. and KRIVTSOV, V., loc cit. 
38  YANEZ, M., JOGLAR, F, and MODARRES, M., loc cit. 
39  METTAS, A. and ZHAO, W, loc cit. 
40  JACK, N., loc cit. 
 
 43 
 
Additionally, HURTADO et al41 solves the GRP equation where the underlying TTF 
distribution can be assumed to be a 2-parameter Weibull or lognormal. 
 
Alternative Renewal Process Models 
While the focus of the research was based on the utilisation of GRP a number of 
alternative renewal process models were reviewed.  Each of these models varied in 
terms of assumptions (e.g. perfect maintenance and inspection, etc), their intended 
use (e.g. optimisation of throughput based on condition-based maintenance, etc) and 
level of complexity (e.g. low – simple closed equations). 
 
Estimation and Testing in an Imperfect Inspection Model 
The Estimation and Testing in an Imperfect Inspection Model developed by 
SRIVASTAVA and YANHONG42 was intended to estimate p (failure probability 
between successive inspection; expf(λT)) and β in order to determine whether 
imperfect-inspection is occurring.  To do this the model makes the following 
assumptions: 
 
• inspection duration is negligible, 
• failed component is replaced by a new, 
                                                 
41  HURTADO et al, loc cit. 
42  SRIVASTAVA, M. S. and YANHONG, W., Estimation & Testing in an Imperfect-inspection 
Model, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, v 42, n 2, Jun, 1993, p 280-286 
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• system of n components which have IID exponential life distribution with 
rate λ, 
• inspection process is otherwise benign, and 
• all components can be considered as either new or in a state of undetected 
failure after an inspection and subsequent replacement of the detected 
failures. 
 
Overall, the imperfect-inspection model works through the probability of detecting a 
failure = β, where 0 < β ≤ 1, therefore allowing undetected failures to remain in the 
system after each inspection.  The solution to this model was found through 
application of an approximate likelihood filtering of a Markov Chain.  This method 
uses a first order autoregressive binomial model as an approximation of the original 
model where βestimate is small.  In more general situations [i.e. when the assumption of 
exponential component life distribution does not hold], this approach can be quite 
complicated.  However, we recommend using the autoregressive binomial models as 
a replacement.  This results in the model being considered medium complexity since 
the solution requires MLE numerical solution and simulation. 
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Hybrid Maintenance Model with Imperfect Inspection for a System with 
Deterioration and Poisson Failure 
The Hybrid Maintenance Model with Imperfect Inspection for a System with 
Deterioration and Poisson Failure developed by HOSSEINI, KERR and RANDALL43 
was intended to provide a comparison between break-down, planned scheduled 
maintenance, and condition-based maintenance to determine which provides better 
throughput.  To do this the model makes the following assumptions: 
 
• no preventative maintenance, and 
• perfect inspection 
 
The solution to the model was through the use of a state based solution using 
generalised stochastic Petri-Net where condition-based maintenance is undertaken 
(i.e. no preventative maintenance), subject to deterioration-failures and to Poisson-
failures.  Specifically the model uses two types of failures: 
 
• Deterioration failure – a process where the important parameters of a 
system gradually worsen.  If left unattended, the process leads to a 
deterioration failure.  Sometimes called “hard faults” since they occur 
instantaneously in any deterioration stage and are generally unpredictable, 
so that a failure cannot be prevented and inevitability should be restored 
                                                 
43  HOSSEINI, M.M., KERR, R.M., RANDALL, R.B., Hybrid Maintenance Model with 
Imperfect Inspection for a System with Deterioration and Poisson Failure, Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, 50, 12, Dec 1999, p 1229-1243 
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by a corrective action.  This is represented by a multi-state continuous-
time Markov deterioration process. 
• Poisson failure – a failure for which the failure-rate is constant.  
Sometimes called “soft faults” (trend faults), as they grow gradually with 
time, and lead to a predictable situation that lends itself to condition 
monitoring (i.e. inspection). 
 
Furthermore, the model uses two types of restoration (repair/replace): 
 
• minimal maintenance – limited effort and effect – for deterioration 
model, minimal maintenance restores the system to the previous 
deterioration state; and 
• major maintenance – the system is restored to as-goods-as-new 
 
Finally, after an inspection, based on the degree of deterioration, a minimal 
maintenance, or major maintenance, or no action is taken where: 
 
• a deterioration failure is restored by major repair 
• a Poisson failure is restored by minimal repair 
 
Overall, the model is based on Hard Faults occurring instantaneously in any 
deterioration stage.  These faults are generally unpredictable with the emphasis of the 
model on the maximisation of the system throughput, and optimal inspection policy 
 
 47 
 
within this strategy and optimal inter-inspection time are obtained.  Due to the 
required use of a Petri-Net simulation to find a solution the complexity of this model 
is considered high. 
 
Inspection, Maintenance and Replacement Models 
The Inspection, Maintenance and Replacement Models developed by ABDEL-
HAMEED44 was intended to establish the optimal replacement level that yields the 
policy that simultaneously minimises (1) total discounted cost of maintenance and 
replacements and (2) long-run-average cost of maintenance and replacements per unit 
time.  To do this the model makes the following assumptions: 
 
• failure is detected only by inspection, 
• perfect inspection, 
• replacements are done using new and identical devices, and 
• time to make the replacement is negligible. 
 
Overall the model is based on based on semi-Markov damage from deterioration of 
the device subject to inspection and imperfect maintenance.  The complexity of this 
model is considered low since there is a closed form solution. 
 
                                                 
44  ABDEL-HAMEED, M., Inspection, Maintenance and Replacement Models, Computers & 
Operations Research, Vol 22, No. 4, Apr, 1995, pp 435-441 
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Modelling of Inspection Reliability 
The Modelling of Inspection Reliability developed by WALL45 intended to provide a 
review of the reliability of the inspection process including how to model this 
process.  The review of reliability of the inspection process, specifically: 
 
• Probability of Detection (POD), and 
• Probability of False Indication (PFI). 
 
Furthermore, WALL discussed the definition and method of experimentally 
measuring POD and PFI.  WALL also attempted to model, including the various 
approaches, of POD and PFI through theoretical estimation in lieu of measurement as 
a cost-effective means of progression.  Finally, WALL discussed the validation of the 
models.  Unfortunately, while WALL provides a comprehensive review of POD and 
PFI there is very little quantitative substance to the review and no model is provided. 
 
Continuous-Time Predictive-Maintenance Scheduling for a Deteriorating System 
The Continuous-Time Predictive-Maintenance Scheduling for a Deteriorating System 
was developed by GRALL, DIEULLE, BÉRENGUER and ROUSSIGNOL46.  This 
method was intended to establish the optimal inspection and preventative-
replacement decision in order to balance the cost caused by failure and unavailability 
                                                 
45  WALL, M., Modelling of Inspection Reliability, IEEE, 1996 
46  GRALL, A., DIEULLE, L., BÉRENGUER, C., ROUSSIGNOL, M., Continuous-Time 
Predictive-Maintenance Scheduling for a Deteriorating System, IEEE Transactions on 
Reliability, Vol 51, No.2, June 2002 
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on an infinite horizon (i.e. steady state).  It was based on 2 maintenance decision 
variables; (1) the preventative replacement threshold and (2) inspection schedule 
based on the system state.  To do this the model makes the following assumptions: 
 
• Perfect inspection – each inspection reveals instantaneously, and without 
error, the true state of the system 
• Failure is detected only by inspection.  Hence, if the system fails, it 
remains failed until the next inspection, and therefore active alarmed 
systems are not considered.  The focus is on passive or inaccessible 
systems or structures whose failures are not obvious to the user and can be 
difficult to characterise and identify 
• The time to make the replacement is negligible 
• After a maintenance action, the system is as-good-as-new (i.e. perfect 
maintenance/repair) 
 
Overall the model is based on the following decision variables that have to be jointly 
optimised to minimise the long-term cost of the maintained device: 
 
• preventative-replacement threshold M, and 
• inspection schedule 
 
However, the model does not assume that the system is regularly inspected; irregular 
inspection dates are allowed; the next inspection depends on the system state revealed 
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by the current inspection.  Furthermore, the deterioration within the model is based on 
the Gamma function which describes a positive, increasing jump processes with 
statistically independent stationary increments.  Due to the required use of numerical 
integration to allow the optimisation of the various factors, the complexity of this 
model is considered high. 
 
Renewal Process in Reliability Engineering Software 
Through the course of the research it was clear that interest in “realistic” modelling of 
the renewal process, mainly for repairable items (or systems) was increasing.  This 
trend is evidenced by the increasing number of journal and conference papers.  While 
some of the most interesting model that can take into account imperfect inspection 
and maintenance are discussed above, there was a similar change in reliability 
engineering software.  The software allows repairs to components to be effected by a 
“repair factor”, which is essentially the same as the KIJIMA ‘q’ value (refer to 
Chapter 3: Current Techniques for Analysis of Renewal Process).  Consequently, the 
“repair factor” creates a KIJIMA Type I or Type II model. 
 
Software that includes a “repair factor” are as follows: 
 
• AvSIM+ (v9.0) by Isograph (refer to http://www.isograph-
software.com/avsover.htm).  While AvSIM+ does allow the user to enter a 
value for the “repair factor”, it does not provide a technique for calculating 
the “repair factor”. 
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• Weibull++ (v7) by Reliasoft (refer to 
http://www.reliasoft.com/Weibull/index.htm).  Similar to the AvSIM+ 
product the Weibull++ (v7) product allows the user to enter a value for the 
“repair factor”.  However, unlike the AvSIM+ product the Weibull++ (v7) 
product also includes a ‘q’ parameter estimator based on a Maximum 
Likelihood Estimator (MLE) approach as described in METTAS et al47. 
• Bayesian Reliability Assessment Tool (BRASS) (V1.2) by Prediction 
Technologies (refer to 
http://www.prediction-technologies.com/products/brass.htm) 
 
Summary of Renewal Process Models 
While there are many renewal process models that vary in terms of their underlying 
assumptions, intended use and level of complexity these alternative models appear 
unable to improve on the GRPs mechanism for allowing the inclusion of imperfect 
inspection and maintenance. 
 
Accordingly, the GRP model was selected as the underlying renewal process model 
given its ability to contend with both imperfect inspection and maintenance and 
therefore capable of the realistic study of RIs. 
 
                                                 
47  METTAS, A. and ZHAO, W, loc cit. 
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Chapter 4:  Mathematical Set-up of Each Case 
 
Introduction 
Generic Model 
Modelling of the various cases involves two distinct steps as illustrated in Figure 14; 
Parameter Estimation and CIF simulation. 
 
Start
Parameter 
Estimator
End
α, β, q
Field DataProfessionalJudgement
CIF Simulator RecordCIF
 
Figure 14: Generic Mathematic Set-up of Cases 
 
For simplicity each model component will be examined separately.  Furthermore, 
although the individual cases have some factors in common, there are also a number 
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of differences in each step and therefore the solution to individual cases will be 
examined separately. 
 
Model Time 
At first glance there appears to be only two timeframes within these models; 
operating time and virtual time.  However, the ability of a component to be in a failed 
state without being discovered (e.g. Case xB and Case 5A) there is a requirement to 
introduce a third timeframe; aircraft time.  The reader should note that this generic 
reference to “time” equally represents other aviation “times” such as number of 
engine starts, landings, hull pressurisations, etc.  Accordingly, in the modeling of all 
the cases detailed in Chapter 2: Description of Cases to be Modelled, three “time” 
clocks are used to monitor the “times” involved: 
 
• Operational hours,  
• Virtual hours, and 
• Airframe hours. 
 
Treatment of Uncertain and Soft Data 
Before examining the mathematical set-up each individual case, it is important to 
discuss how to treat uncertain and soft data.   
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General Methodology for the Treatment of Uncertain Data 
The standard Bayes Theorem is provided at Equation 19. 
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Equation 19: Standard Form of Bayes Theorem 
 
Here  π (x | E) = probability of observing x given the evidence (E) 
L (E | x) = likelihood of the evidence (E) given the variable x 
  π0 = prior distribution of x 
 
Additionally, the evidence, and specifically in this case the uncertain data, can be 
defined as shown in Equation 20. 
 
{ }ii wEE ,=  
Equation 20: Format of Uncertain Data/Evidence 
 
Here   Ei = ith piece of evidence 
  wi = belief or “weight” of the ith evidence 
 
Given the form of the uncertain data provided at Equation 20 it is possible to modify 
Equation 19.  Specifically there are three methods as described in MOSLEH48 of 
making allowance for the uncertain data as follows: 
                                                 
48  MOSLEH, A., ENRE655 – Advanced Reliability Modelling Course Notes; University of 
Maryland, USA, 2005 
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Method 1 – Weighted Likelihood Method 
The first method of treating uncertain data is through the modification of the 
likelihood function L (E | x) from Equation 19.  There are two techniques for 
modifying the likelihood function as shown in Equation 21 and Equation 22. 
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Equation 21: Weighted Likelihood Function – Product Technique 
 
Where there are n pieces of evidence. 
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Equation 22: Weighted Likelihood Function – Power Technique 
 
Method 2 – Weighted Posterior Method 
The second method of treating uncertain data is through the modification of the 
posterior function as shown in Equation 23. 
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Equation 23: Weighted Posterior Technique 
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Method 3 – Weighted Data 
The third method of treating uncertain data is through the modification of the 
individual evidence, or data, as shown in Equation 24. 
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Equation 24: Weighted Data Technique 
 
Each of the three methods for treating uncertain data have differing advantages and 
disadvantages.  Consequently, the selection of the method for implementation should 
be made with these in mind. 
 
Implementation of the Treatment of Uncertain Data in GRP Equation 
Throughout the research one area that I concentrated on was uncertainty in the failure 
times, ti, defined as Case xB, in Table 3.  Here the likelihood function was constricted 
when ti is uncertain and then integrated over a range of times.  Furthermore, the 
management of the uncertain failure times assumed equal weighting (i.e. relevance) 
 
However, it is possible to modify the solution offered in the research to allow 
different weighting (i.e. relevance) for different portions of the data.  Specifically, the 
technique used throughout the research could be modified as shown in Equation 25 to 
allow for different weighting (i.e. relevance) for different portions of the data. 
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Equation 25: Implementation of Weighted Likelihood Function – Power Technique 
 
Additionally other soft data can be introduced into the GRP equation through the 
prior distribution as described in Role of the Prior Distribution. 
 
Selection of Method for the Treatment of Uncertain Data in GRP Equation 
Given each of the three methods for treating uncertain data have differing advantages 
and disadvantages, and the possible use of introducing soft data via the prior 
distribution, the nature of the data uncertainty will determine how the Bayesian GRP 
solution is modified. 
 
Case 1A 
Parameter Estimator for Case 1A 
The estimation of α, β and q for Case 1A is relatively simple using the Slice Sampling 
technique described in Chapter 5:  .  The reader should note that rather sample from a 
distribution for x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) by applying a single variable slice sampler, it is 
possible to sample from the multivariate distribution.  This technique is referred to by 
NEAL49 as multivariate slice sampling.  Since the number of parameters (n) in Case 
                                                 
49  NEAL, R. M., loc cit. 
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1A = 3, this technique is not overly burdensome in either complexity or computation 
time.  A high level process map of the estimator model used is provided in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Estimation Process for Case 1A 
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CIF Simulator for Case 1A 
The simulation of the simple GRP (Case 1A) was previously provided in JACOPINO, 
A., GROEN, F. and MOSLEH, A50.  However, for clarification the equation for 
simulating a KIJIMA Type I GRP equation is provided in Equation 26. 
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Equation 26: KIJIMA Type I GRP TTF Simulation Equation 
 
Please refer to Chapter 3: Current Techniques for Analysis of Renewal Process or 
JACOPINO, et al51 for additional discussion on the TTF simulation of GRP 
equations. 
 
Case 1B 
Parameter Estimator for Case 1B 
In Case 1B the estimator now needs to take into account data uncertainty of the times 
to failure by including the inspection intervals in order to bound when a failure could 
have occurred.  Accordingly, the equations now include the intervals as auxiliary 
                                                 
50  JACOPINO, A., GROEN, F. and MOSLEH, A., Behavioural Study of the General Renewal 
Process, Reliability, Availability and Maintainability Symposium, Los Angles, CA, USA, 
2004 
51  ibid. 
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variables as shown in Equation 27 where Ii and Ii-1 is the most recent ith and (i-1)th 
inspection interval. 
 
( )11 ,,,,, −−Π iiii IItqt βα  
Equation 27: Auxiliary Variable Equation including Inspection Intervals 
 
Graphically, using the underlying Weibull pdf, this appears as shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Inspection Interval and Underlying Weibull pdf 
 
Here the pdf for the slice sampler for Case 1B is of the form provided in Equation 28. 
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Equation 28: Slice Sampler f(x) for Case 1B 
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The use of the auxiliary variables and the KIJIMA Type I model in which the next 
TTF, ti, is only dependant upon the previous TTF, ti-1, allows the simplification of 
Equation 27 as shown in Equation 29: 
 
( ) K
K
K
K
),,,(),,,(),,,(),,(
Then
,,q,,
,,q,,
,,q,,
Given
3423121
,312
,321
,321
tqttqttqtqtxf
ttt
ttt
ttt
βαπβαπβαπβαπ
βα
βα
βα
⋅⋅⋅=
 
Equation 29: Simplification of Auxiliary Variable Equation for Case 1B 
 
Consequently, to find t2, only need Π(t1 | α, β, q) x Π(t2 | α, β, q, t1), and to find t3, 
only need Π(t3 | α, β, q, t2) x Π(t2 | α, β, q, t1), etc 
 
Therefore, f(x) for the slice sampler for each time is as shown in Equation 30 and 
Equation 31. 
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Equation 30: f(x) for t1 for Case 1B 
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Equation 31: f(x) for t2 . . . tn for Case 1B 
 
CIF Simulator for Case 1B 
The GRP simulator for Case 1B must be taken into account the delay from the time of 
failure to the time of inspection (and instantaneous repair).  Therefore, the simple 
GRP simulation found in JACOPINO, et al52 and can be modified as shown in 
Equation 32. 
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Equation 32: CIF Simulation Equation for Case 1B 
 
Case 2A 
Case 2A is relatively simple.  In this situation the independent data sources for each 
of the particular failure mode are analysed using the estimator in Case 1A.  The key 
to this technique is the assumption of independence and the use of multiple ‘clocks’ 
to independently simulate and compare the TTF of each of the individual failure 
                                                 
52  JACOPINO, et al, loc cit. 
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modes.  A process map describing the mathematical set-up of the Case 2A model is 
provided in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17: Process Map for Case 2A Model 
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Parameter Estimator for Case 2A 
In Case 2A the parameter estimator for each failure mode is assumed to be 
independent and therefore the solution is the same as for Case 1A.  However, for 
Case 2A the output from the parameter estimator are series of <α, β, q> parameters 
sets for each failure mode. 
 
CIF Simulator for Case 2A 
Similar to the parameter estimator the CIF simulator uses multiple independent Case 
1A CIF simulators.  However, the technique, typically referred to as “competing 
failure modes53” is then used to identify which failure mode fails (and therefore is 
renewed) next. 
 
Case 2B 
The model set-up for Case 2B is the same as for Case 2A, however, the individual 
(and independent) estimators and simulators for each failure model corresponds to the 
Case 1B solutions.  Again, the key to modelling Case 2B is through the assumption of 
independent simulation and comparison of multiple ‘clocks’, representing each failure 
mode, in order to determine the TTF of the overall component. 
 
                                                 
53  NELSON, W. B., Accelerated Testing : Statistical Models, Test Plans, and Data Analysis, 
Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics, Wiley-Interscience, USA, 1990 
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Parameter Estimator for Case 2B 
Here the parameter estimator for each failure mode is assumed to be independent 
from each other and therefore is the same as for Case 1B.  Again, the output from the 
Case 2B parameter estimator is a number of <α, β, q> parameters sets for each failure 
mode. 
 
CIF Simulator for Case 2B 
Similar to the Case 2B parameter estimator the CIF simulator uses multiple 
independent Case 1B CIF simulators where a “competing failure mode” model is then 
used to identify which failure mode fails (and therefore is renewed) next. 
 
Case 3A 
Introduction 
Case 3A introduces dependent failure modes into the previous Case 2A solution.  The 
dependency between failure modes is achieved through the use of additional q 
variables which represent both the effect of the maintenance action on the failure 
mode undergoing direct maintenance (i.e. in a failed state), and also the indirect effect 
on the other failure modes.  Consequently, each direct and indirect failure mode 
relationship requires a variable.  For example, considering two dependent failure 
modes results in the variables listed in Equation 33. 
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Equation 33: Variable Set-up for Case 3A/3B 
 
As can be seen from Equation 33 each additional failure mode will increase the 
number of variables to be solved.  For example, while a two failure mode solution 
requires 8 parameters, a 4 failure mode solution requires 24 parameters. 
 
Again in Case 3A, inspection is assumed perfect and therefore only associated with 
corrective maintenance actions.  However, unlike Case 1A – 2B the dependent 
relationship makes it possible for the virtual age of the indirect failure mode to be 
advanced after maintenance actions (i.e. worse-than-old where q > 1).  For example, 
in a 2-dependent failure mode model, if failure mode 1 incurs some corrective 
maintenance, then while failure mode 1 will be restored, the virtual age of failure 
mode 2 will be effected by qFM1-Indirect and may be worse than before the maintenance 
action. 
 
Estimator for Case 3A 
The parameter estimator for Case 3A uses the same f(x) defined in Case 2A at 
Equation 28 noting that the input data must now include: 
 
• failure by failure mode, and 
• when the Preventative Maintenance actions are scheduled to occur. 
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However, unlike Case 2A, when a maintenance action occurs the Virtual Age for all 
failure modes are updated including the potential for making the indirect failure 
modes worse-than-old.  In Case 3A the results from the parameter estimation are a 
series of <αi, βi, qi – Direct Corrective Maintenance, qi – Indirect Corrective Maintenance> parameter sets.  
A process map describing the mathematical set-up of the Case 3A model is provided 
in Figure 18. 
 
Simulator for Case 3A 
The CIF simulator for Case 3A uses a similar technique to the CIF simulator for Case 
2A.  However, unlike Case 2A when a Corrective Maintenance action occurs the 
virtual age of all failure modes is adjusted based on the time when an individual 
failure mode failed and therefore which direct and indirect q’s need to be applied.  As 
before, the next simulated TTF for these various failure modes are then combined via 
the completing failure mode technique.  A process map describing the mathematical 
set-up of the Case 3A model is provided in Figure 19. 
 
Case 3B 
Simular to the difference between Case 2A and Case 2B, Case 3B only varies the 
Case 3A parameter estimator through the change in f(x) to include the inspection 
intervals as defined boundaries.  Consequently the data required for Case 3B must 
include the inspection times.  Furthermore, similar to Case 3A the model includes a 
number of new parameters to represent both the direct and indirect application of q. 
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Figure 19: Process Map for Case 3A/4A TTF Simulator 
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Case 4A 
Introduction 
Case 4A introduces Imperfect Inspection in the Preventative Maintenance actions to 
the previous Case 3A model of imperfect maintenance of multiple dependent failure 
modes.  The modelling of the Imperfect Inspection is achieved through the use of 
additional q variables which represent the effect of the inspection activity on each of 
the failure modes.  For example, considering 2 dependent failure mode with Imperfect 
Inspection results in the variables listed in Equation 34. 
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Equation 34: Variable Set-up for Case 4A/4B 
 
As can be seen from Equation 34 each additional failure mode will increase the 
number of variables to be solved.  For example, while a 2 failure mode solution 
requires 10 parameters, a 4 failure mode solution requires 28 parameters. 
 
Similar to Case 3A the maintenance actions and inspection makes it possible for the 
Virtual Age of the failure mode to be advanced (i.e. worse-than-old where q > 1). 
 
Estimator for Case 4A 
The parameter estimator for Case 4A is the same as in Case 3A except that if a 
preventative maintenance action, including inspection occurs, the qinspection is re-
evaluated.  Again, when either a corrective or preventative maintenance action occurs 
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the virtual age for all failure modes are updated including the potential for making the 
failure modes worse-than-old.  In Case 4A the results from the parameter estimation 
are a series of <αi, βi, qi – Direct Corrective Maintenance, qi – Indirect Corrective Maintenance, qi – Preventative 
Maintenance> parameter sets.  A process map describing the mathematical set-up of the 
Case 4A model is provided in Figure 18. 
 
Simulator for Case 4A 
The CIF simulator for Case 4A uses a similar technique to the CIF simulator for Case 
3A.  However, unlike Case 3A when a Preventative Maintenance action occurs, 
including inspection, the Virtual Age of all failure modes is adjusted.  As before, the 
next simulated TTFs for these various failure modes are then combined via the 
completing failure mode technique.  A process map describing the mathematical set-
up of the Case 4A model is provided in Figure 19. 
 
Case 4B 
Simular to the difference between Case 3A and Case 3B, Case 4B only varies the 
Case 4A parameter estimator through the change in f(x) to include the inspection 
intervals as defined boundaries.  Consequently the data required for Case 4B must 
include the inspection times.  Furthermore, similar to Case 4A the model includes a 
number of new parameter to represent both the dependency of the corrective 
maintenance action and imperfect maintenance. 
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Case 5A 
Introduction 
Case 5A introduces delays in maintenance actions from the point of discovery of the 
failure.  While the modelling of Case 5A uses the same variable as Case 4A (refer to 
Equation 34) the actual set-up of the Case 5A parameter estimator and TTF simulator 
are different. 
 
Estimator for Case 5A 
The parameter estimator for Case 5A is the same as in Case 5A expect that delays can 
be observed between the detection of a failure and the maintenance action.  Again, 
when either a corrective or preventative maintenance action occurs the virtual age for 
all failure modes are updated including the potential for making the failure modes 
worse-than-old.  In Case 5A the results from the parameter estimation are a series of 
<αi, βi, qi – Direct Corrective Maintenance, qi – Indirect Corrective Maintenance, qi – Preventative Maintenance> 
parameter sets.  A process map describing the mathematical set-up of the Case 4A 
model is provided in Figure 18. 
 
Simulator for Case 5A 
The CIF simulator for Case 5A uses a similar technique to the CIF simulator for Case 
4A.  However, unlike Case 4A a delay in the maintenance action can be introduced 
where the virtual age of all failure modes is adjusted.  As before, the next simulated 
TTF for these various failure modes are then combined via the competing failure 
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mode technique.  A process map describing the mathematical set-up of the Case 5A 
model is provided in Figure 20. 
 
Case 5B 
Simular to the difference between Case 4A and Case 4B, Case 5B only varies the 
Case 5A parameter estimator through the change in f(x) to include the inspection 
intervals as defined boundaries.  Consequently the data required for Case 5B must 
include the inspection times.  Furthermore, similar to Case 5A the model includes a 
number of new parameter to represent both the dependency of the corrective 
maintenance action and imperfect maintenance. 
 
Most Likely Case for Aviation Industry 
While 10 cases have been presented to satisfactorily model reality, there are 2 cases 
that are most representative.  Specifically, Cases 4A and 4B are considered the most 
representative since they are flexible in terms of failure modes and associated 
dependencies. 
 
Cases 5A and 5B are not considered the most representative for the aviation industry 
since the major systems are all monitored for failures.  While there are some RIs and 
circumstances where a failure may not be repaired for a period of time (called a 
Carried Forward Unserviceability (CFU) with Australian Defence aviation areas) 
these items, by definition, are not safety critical.  Accordingly, while they are 
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legitimate part of the aircraft, given there is insufficient resources for all Case 5A and 
Case 5B RIs they are not considered a high priority for RI analysis. 
 
 
Figure 20: TTF Simulator for Case 5A 
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Chapter 5:  Numerical Methods 
 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3: Current Techniques for Analysis of Renewal Process, 
unfortunately there is no closed form solution to the GRP equation.  Accordingly, a 
numerical method is needed to estimate the various parameters of the GRP equation.  
Initially, a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method, such as Gibbs sampling or 
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, was considered to sample from the complex, 
multivariate distribution defined by the cases in Chapter 2: Description of Cases to be 
Modelled.  However, both these MCMC methods have a number of disadvantages 
with their use and consequently an alternative MCMC sampler developed by 
NEAL54, typically referred to as the Slice Sampling method, was utilised. 
 
The aim of this chapter is threefold.  Firstly, this chapter will provide a background 
on the Slice Sampling method including comparison with other MCMC methods.  
Secondly, this chapter will describe the implementation of the Slice Sampling 
method, including describing the role of f(x) on the final result.  Finally, this chapter 
will examine the effects of autocorrelation, a common problem in MCMC samplers, 
and discuss the solution utilised throughout the research. 
 
                                                 
54  NEAL, R. M., loc cit 
 
 76 
 
Posterior Density Function for Bayesian GRP Equation 
According to Bayes Theorem, the probability distribution for known failure times (i.e. 
Case xA) can be represented as shown in Equation 35. 
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Equation 35: Posterior Density Function for Case xA 
 
Here, the posterior density function is the normalised product of the general 
likelihood function L(E | α, β, q) and the prior distribution π0(α, β, q).  The general 
likelihood function L(E | α, β, q) describes the probability of observing evidence E, 
given that α, β and q are the true parameters of the GRP model.   
 
Additionally, Equation 35 can be modified for the case where there is uncertainty in 
the failures time (i.e. Case xB) which are defined as (t1, . . . ,tn+1), where ti is the time 
of the ith failure and n is the number of failure observed at the time of last observation. 
In this case the general likelihood function L(E | α, β, q, (t1, . . . ,tn+1)) describes the 
probability of observing evidence E, given that α, β, q and (t1, . . . ,tn+1) are the true 
parameters of the GRP model.  The equation for the probability distribution for Case 
xB is provided in Equation 36. 
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Equation 36: Posterior Density Function for Case xB 
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In both equations the evidence is either of known failure times or unknown failure 
times (but known inspection intervals). 
 
General Likelihood Function for Bayesian GRP Equation 
GROEN55 showed that the GRP failure density of the ith failure could be represented 
as shown in Equation 37. 
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Equation 37: GRP Failure Density of the ith Failure 
 
While Equation 37 describes the influence of individual failures, the data will be 
represented as a sequence of failure times (t1, . . . ,tn+1).  Therefore, Equation 37 can 
be utilised to find some function g(x) which represents the probability density of a 
particular sequence (t1, . . . ,tn+1) as shown in Equation 38. 
 
( ) ( )[ ]attxg n ,,11 βαπ += K  
Equation 38: Probability Density of a Particular Failure Sequence 
 
                                                 
55  GROEN, F., “Bayesian Framework for General Renewal Process Modelling Report”, 
Technical Paper, University of Maryland, 2002 
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However, the density function at Equation 38 using the fact that Equation 14 showed 
that for a KIJIMA Type I GRP equation that the ith failure is only dependant on the  
(i-1)th failure.  Accordingly, Equation 38 can be constructed iteratively as shown in 
Equation 39. 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nnnnn tttttttattxg 1112111 ,, +−+ ⋅⋅== ππππβαπ LK  
Equation 39: Probability Density of a Particular Sequence Failure Sequence 
 
Computation of the Posterior Density Function 
Unfortunately the either Case xA or Case xB the general likelihood function and 
consequently the posterior density function at Equation 35 and Equation 36 are 
mathematically intractable.  Therefore, a numerical method, such as the Gibbs 
sampler or Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, is required to provide a representation of 
the posterior distribution in the form of a set of samples < αi, βi, qi >, where i = 1, . . . 
, n, and αi, βi, qi are realistations of the parameter values.  Indeed GROEN56 has 
implemented a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm as a solution to the Case 1A Posterior 
Density function. 
 
However, there has been considerable research published on the commonly 
used MCMC methods, specifically the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and Gibbs 
sampler, regarding their individual limitations as follows: 
 
                                                 
56  ibid 
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Gibbs Sampler.  It is acknowledged that once a method for sampling from all 
required conditions using a Gibbs sampler is found, no further tuning of the 
parameters is required in order to produce the final MC sampler.  However, to 
achieve this, a method for sampling the multi-variate GRP distribution with 
data uncertainty needs to be devised.  As will be shown, this is not a trivial 
exercise. 
 
Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm.  The Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm is 
similar to the Gibbs sampler requiring an appropriate “proposal” distribution 
to ensure sampling can take place, and again, this would need to be completed 
to all sampling of the non-standard multi-variate GRP distribution. 
 
Accordingly, given these acknowledged limitations a simpler, alternative Numerical 
Method was sought. 
 
Slice Sampling Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) Sampling Technique 
Concept of the Slice Sampling Technique 
The concept of the Slice Sampling technique is described by NEAL57 as follows: 
 
“Suppose we wish to sample from a distribution for a variable, x, taking 
values in some subset of ℜn, whose density is proportional to some function 
                                                 
57  NEAL, R. M., op cit, pg 706 
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f(x).We can do this by sampling uniformly from the (n +1)-dimensional region 
that lies under the plot of f(x). This idea can be formalized by introducing an 
auxiliary real variable, y, and defining a joint distribution over x and y that is 
uniform over the region U = {(x, y) : 0 < y < f(x)} below the curve or surface 
defined by f(x). That is, the joint density for (x, y) is [shown in Equation 40] 
 
 
Equation 40: Slice Sampler Joint Density for (x, y) 
 
The marginal density for x is then [shown in Equation 41]. 
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Equation 41: Slice Sampler Marginal Density for x 
 
To sample for x, we can sample jointly for (x, y), and then ignore y. 
 
Generating independent points drawn uniformly from U may not be easy, so 
we might instead define a Markov chain that will converge to this uniform 
distribution. Gibbs sampling is one possibility: We sample alternately from 
the conditional distribution for y given the current x, which is uniform over the 
interval (0, f(x)), and from the conditional distribution for x given the current 
y, which is uniform over the region S = {x :y < f(x)}, which I call the “slice” 
defined by y. Generating an independent point drawn uniformly from S may 
still be difficult, in which case we can substitute some update for x that leaves 
p(x, y) = ⌠ 1/Z,   if 0 < y < f(x), 
⌡0   otherwise 
 
where Z = ∫ f(x)dx
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the uniform distribution over S invariant. Higdon (1996) has interpreted the 
standard Metropolis-Hastings algorithm in these terms. Beyond this, however, 
reducing the problem to that of updating x so as to leave a uniform distribution 
invariant allows us to use various tricks that would not be valid for a non-
uniform distribution.”58 
 
Single Variable Slice Sampling Method 
The single variable slice sampling method uses an iterative process to replace the 
current value, x0, with a new value, x1, through a three step procedure: 
 
“(a) Draw a real value, y, uniformly from (0, f(x0)), thereby defining a 
horizontal “slice”: S = {x :y < f(x)}. Note that x0 is always within S. 
(b) Find an interval, I = (L, R), around x0 that contains all, or much, of the 
slice. 
(c) Draw the new point, x1, from the part of the slice within this 
interval.”59 
 
NEAL60 describes four schemes for finding the interval at step 2.  However, the use 
of the GRP equation with an underlying 2-parameter Weibull TTF equation limits the 
                                                 
58  NEAL, R. M., op cit, pg 710 
59  NEAL, R. M., op cit, pg 712 
60  NEAL, R. M., op cit, pg 714 
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possible values of x such that the interval, I = (L, R), can be set to this boundary.  The 
limitation of each of the parameters is described in Table 7. 
 
Variable Interval Lower Bound (L) Variable Interval Upper Bound (R) 
Weibull Scale Parameter (αmin ≤ α ≤ αmax) 
Since a rule of thumb for an estimate of α for a 
component is typically equal to the Time To 
First Failure (TTFF), t1, then: 
0 ≤ αmin  
Although a rule of thumb for an estimate of α for 
a component is typically equal to the TTFF, t1, it 
is recommended that: 
αmax ≤ 2 x t1 
Weibull Shape Parameter (βmin ≤ β ≤ βmax) 
Realistically a β value of less than 0.5 for a 
physical component is unrealistic.  Therefore: 
0.5 ≤ βmin 
A β value of greater than 5 for a physical 
component is unrealistic.  However, to allow the 
Slice Sampler the greatest freedom with the 
space, S, therefore: 
βmax ≤ 10 
Repair Effectiveness Parameter (qmin ≤ q ≤ qmax) 
The set-up of the Virtual Age of a component 
using the Type I KIJIMA GRP equation 
therefore defines ‘q’ as: 
0 ≤ qmin. 
Otherwise, if q < 0, the result is better-than-
new61. 
The set-up of the Virtual Age of a component 
using the Type I KIJIMA GRP equation allows 
‘q’ to be considered 1 < q (i.e. worse-than-old).  
However, to allow the use of Interval 
implementation of the Slice Sampler method 
qmax ≤ 1.5 
Although this could be set higher. 
Time To Failure (TTF) (Ii-1 ≤ ti ≤ Ii) (Case xB only)62 
Given the set-up of Case xB includes periodic 
inspection points, the TTF by definition cannot 
be before the previous inspection point (Ii-1): 
Ii-1 ≤ ti  
Given the set-up of Case xB includes periodic 
inspection points, the TTF by definition cannot 
be after the next inspection point (Ii): 
ti ≤ Ii 
Table 7: Parameter Intervals for Slice Sampler 
 
                                                 
61  While from a modelling perspective allowing q < 0 (i.e. better-than-new) is valid since the 
maintenance activity may modify the component (i.e. through a modification program), it has 
not been considered as part of the research. 
62  The TTF for Case xA are not parameters for the Slice Sampler method since they Case xA 
assumes the sequence of TTFs are known. 
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Multivariate Slice Sampling Method 
NEAL describes a number of techniques for using the Slice Sampling method to 
sample from multivariate distributions for x = (x1, . . . , xn).  The two main choices are 
either: 
 
Option 1 – Update each variable (xi) in turn by sampling from a multivariate 
distribution using the single-variable Slice Sampling method.  This is simply the 
sequential application of the single-variable Slice Sampling method described above.  
Option 1 was implemented for solving Case xB (unknown failure times) utilising the 
interval bounds as described above. 
 
Option 2 – Apply the idea of the Slice Sampling method directly to the multivariate 
distribution.  NEAL refers to this technique as Multivariate Slice Sampling with 
Hyperrectangles and describes this process as: 
 
“We can generalize the single-variable slice sampling methods of Section 4 to 
methods for performing multivariate updates by replacing the interval  
I = (L, R) by an axis-aligned hyperrectangle H = {x :Li < xi < Ri for all  
i = 1, . . .,n}. Here, Li and Ri define the extent of the hyperrectangle along the 
axis for variable xi. The procedure for finding the next state,  
x1 = (x1,1, . . ., x1,n), from the current state, x0 = (x0,1, . . ., x0,n), parallels the single-
variable procedure: 
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(a)  Draw a real value, y, uniformly from (0, f(x0)), thereby defining 
the slice S = {x :y < f(x)}. 
(b)  Find a hyperrectangle, H = (L1, R1)×···×(Ln, Rn), around x0, 
which preferably contains at least a big part of the slice. 
(c)  Draw the new point, x1, from the part of the slice within this 
hyperrectangle. 
 
When all the variables have bounded ranges we might set H to the entire 
space, but this may be inefficient, since S is likely to be much smaller.”63 
 
Option 2 was implemented for the solution of Case xA (known failure times) since 
the boundary conditions imposed on the parameters did not result in a comparatively 
large S compared with the computation time required for other techniques.  
Specifically, rather than sequentially update α, then β, then q, each iteration updates a 
single combination of < α, β, q > and thereby reduces computation time required. 
 
Implementation of the Slice Sampling Method 
Implementing the Slice Sampling method required three factors: 
 
1. development of a continuous distribution, f(x), that is proportional to the 
density; 
                                                 
63  NEAL, R., op cit, pg 721 
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2. development of a prior distribution that adequately addresses the prior 
knowledge of the various parameters; and 
3. advice on the initial guess values for each of the parameters. 
 
As previously discussed, f(x) is the key to the use of the Slice Sampling method and 
accordingly, a significant proportion of the research went into verifying a f(x), 
originally proposed by GROEN64 for use in a Metropolis-Hastings  algorithm 
solution, that adequately represented the individual Case xA and xB scenarios.  This 
f(x) is based on a likelihood estimator for the Bayesian GRP Algorithm described in 
GROEN65. 
 
Role of the Prior Distribution 
The role of the Prior Distribution in any Bayesian Analysis is to represent the 
relevant prior knowledge, including subjective judgement, regarding the 
characteristics of the parameter and its distribution.   
 
The prior distribution, shown in Equation 34, is made up of a vector of q’s which 
could relate to the direct maintenance of individual failure modes, the indirect (or 
dependent) impact on failure modes not undergoing maintenance or inspection. This 
set-up allows the analyst to use their professional judgement to pick the shape and the 
range of the individual priors. 
                                                 
64  GROEN, F., “Bayesian Framework for General Renewal Process Modelling Report”, loc cit 
65  ibid 
 
 86 
 
In the case of the GRP equation with an underlying 2-parameter Weibull distribution 
the Prior Distribution reflects the analyst’s knowledge, including subjective 
judgement, regarding the Weibull Scale (α) and Shape (β) parameters, and the 
specific GRP parameter(s) (q). 
 
Furthermore, analyst has the ability to assume that (initially) each of the prior 
distributions are independent and therefore the prior distribution can be written as 
shown in Equation 42. 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )qq 0000 ,, πβπαπβαπ ⋅⋅=  
Equation 42: General Independent Form of Prior Distribution 
 
However, given the set-up of the equations the posterior function of π0(α, β, q) is no 
longer independent. 
 
The Prior Distribution is used in conjunction with a MCMC sampler in order to 
generate the Posterior Distribution of the GRP equation.  Additionally, the Prior 
Distribution was developed conscious of one of the objectives of the parameter 
estimator; specifically to limit the requirement of the analyst to tune the algorithm to 
the individual data. 
 
Weibull Scale Parameter (α) Prior 
At the beginning of the research it was expected that a prior distribution for the 
Weibull Scale Parameter (α) (i.e. π0(α)) would be established based on the judgement 
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of the analyst, utilising a lognormal Probability Density Function (pdf) of the form 
shown at Equation 43. 
 
( )
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Equation 43: Lognormal PDF for Weibull Scale Parameter (α) 
 
Although Equation 43 is a lognormal distribution, based on the relationship between 
the lognormal distribution and some other parameters shown in Equation 44 it is 
possible to elicit a range of values, including a confidence, from the analyst.  For 
example, if the analyst is 90% confident that 100 ≤ α ≤ 150 then µα and σα can be 
calculated. 
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Equation 44: Calculation of Weibull Scale Parameter Prior 
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However, given one of the objectives of the analysis was to be able to conduct the 
analysis without tuning it was decided to make the prior distribution of α uniform.  
Accordingly, π0(α) = 1. 
 
Furthermore, it was observed to have only limited impact on the final results; a 
testament to the Slice Sampling technique.  One reason for the limited impact on the 
final result is due to the boundaries (i.e. I = (L, R)) utilised by the Slice Sampler.  
Specifically, that whether the parameter estimation is undertaken with a non-
informative prior the parameter boundaries defined in Table 7 shall effectively restrict 
the possible parameter set of the space (S). 
 
Weibull Shape Parameter (β) Prior 
Unlike the Weibull Scale Parameter (α) and the GRP Parameter (q), it is possible to 
define a prior distribution for the Weibull Shape Parameter (β) ) (i.e. π0(β)) due to the 
physical nature of the equipment under assessment.  Specifically, for technical 
equipment β can be described within a finite boundary, 0 ≤ β ≤ 10, and therefore 
represented with a prior distribution based on a modified lognormal pdf where 
µβ=0.63 and σβ=0.5.  This result is shown in Equation 45 and shown graphically in 
Figure 21. 
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Equation 45: Lognormal PDF for Weibull Shape Parameter (β) 
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Of interest, although both the prior and the interval boundary allowed 0.5 ≤ β ≤ 10, in 
reality, in all the cases run β never exceeded 6.  Again, this results is a testament to 
the Slice Sampling method. 
 
GRP Parameter (q) Prior 
The original intent of the GRP Parameter, q, constrains it to the boundary of q = 0 
(as-good-as-new restoration) to q = 1 (as-bad-as-old restoration).  However, this 
would ignore two of the five cases defined in YANEZ, et al66; better-than-new (i.e. q 
< 0) and worse-than-old (i.e. q > 1).  Given that q is an abstract construct of the GRP 
concept it may not have a direct physical representation. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Weibull Shape Parameter (Beta)
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Figure 21: Prior Distribution of Weibull Shape Parameter 
 
                                                 
66  YANEZ et al, op cit, pg 167 
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Accordingly, there are circumstances where q > 1 where imperfect maintenance 
action(s) cause the component to be left in a worse condition than before the 
maintenance action.  Furthermore, while there are also cases where q < 0 (i.e. better-
tan-new) this is due to the incorporation of an modification and/or Engineering 
Change Proposal (ECP) program, this was considered outside the scope of the 
research.  Therefore, the model uses 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.5. 
 
Moreover, given one of the objectives of the research was reduce the requirement to 
tune the algorithm it was decided to make the prior distribution of q uniform across 
the interval 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.5.  Accordingly, π0(q) = 1. 
 
Combined GRP Prior Distribution 
Accordingly, the final prior equation was developed and is shown in Equation 46. 
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Equation 46: Prior for f(x) for both Case xA and xB 
 
The prior equation is the same for both Case xA and xB, and reflects the knowledge 
of the GRP parameters (i.e. α, β and q). 
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Sensitivity of the Combined GRP Prior Distribution 
It is possible to review the sensitivity of the model to the prior.  To do this the USS 
Halfbeak example (refer to Case 1A Solution – USS Halfbeak) was revisited and a 
GRP Parameter (q) Prior introduced based on the lognormal prior equation and 
relationship shown in Equation 43 and Equation 44.  Three prior values of q were 
then examined, simplistically representing the analysts judgement that q = high (i.e. 
as-bad-as-old repairs), q  = low (i.e. as-good-as-new repairs) and q = constant = non-
informative.  A summary of these three cases and their respective values is provided 
in Table 8 and shown graphically in Figure 22. 
 
 Analyst Low 
q guess 
Analyst 
High q guess 
Analyst 
Confidence 
Calculated 
µq 
Calculated 
σq 
q = low 0 0.4 90% -1.847 0.69 
q = non-
informative 
0 1.5 100% - - 
q = high 06 1.0 90% -0.242 0.193 
Table 8: Summary of q Prior Distribution 
 
The parameter estimator was re-run against the data utilising 51 data points in the 
parameter estimator, but then comparing the output from the CIF simulator with all 
71 data point.  A graphical representative of the variation in CIF is shown is Figure 
23.  From Figure 23 it is obvious that the q prior had very little effect on the outcome.  
However, logically this is to be expected since by definition a Bayesian prior should 
have less and less impact as “real” data becomes available.  In this case, since 51 data 
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points are being used the influence of the q prior in the parameter estimator should be 
very little, which Figure 23 illustrates. 
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Figure 22: Prior q Values as Input to USS Halfbeak Sensitivity Analysis 
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Figure 23: Sensitivity Analysis of Bayesian Prior for q on USS Halfbeak Data 
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f(x) for Case 1A – 2A 
The f(x) for Case xA is based on the unnormalised posterior density function 
originally proposed by Dr Frank Groen67 for use in a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm 
solution as shown in Equation 47. 
 
( ) { }( ) { }( ) ( )qttqELttqX nn ,,,,,ˆ,,, 011 βαπβαβαππ ⋅== KK  
Equation 47: Unnormalised Posterior Density Function for Case xA 
 
The prior distribution was based on the understanding of the expected values of each 
parameter (i.e. α, β and q (and ti where i = 0 . . . n for Case xB)) and is discussed in 
Role of the Prior Distribution. 
 
Using the equation for finding the probability density of a particular failure sequence 
is it possible to find f(x) for use in the Slice Sampler method for Cases 1A – 2A.  The 
resulting f(x) is provided at Equation 48. 
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Here the TTF is represented by a sequence of failure times (t1, . . . ,tn+1), where ti is 
the time of the ith failure and n is the number of failures observed at the time of last 
observation. 
 
f(x) for Case xB 
Case xB refer to those cases where there is uncertainty on the exact failure time of the 
ith failure.  In lieu of an exact failure time it is known that the ith failure occurred 
between two known inspection times, Ij-1 and I j, where j = 1, . . ., m representing the 
inspection intervals. 
 
While the f(x) for Case xB is based on the unnormalised posterior density function 
originally proposed by GROEN68 for use in a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm solution 
as shown in Equation 47, additional auxiliary variables had to be included.  
Specifically, Equation 38 was modified to include the additional auxiliary variables, 
known inspection times (I), as shown in Equation 49. 
 
( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( ) ( )qttqELttqX nn ,,,,,ˆ,,, 011 βαπβαβαππ ⋅′′== KK  
Equation 49: Probability Density of a Particular Failure Sequence including Inspection Points 
 
Again, the prior distribution was based on the understanding of the expected values of 
each parameter (i.e. α, β and q (and ti where i = 0 . . . n for Case xB)) and is discussed 
in Role of the Prior Distribution. 
                                                 
68  ibid 
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Using the equation for finding the probability density of a particular failure sequence 
as shown in Equation 49 is it possible to find f(x) for use in the Slice Sampler method 
for Cases 1B-2B, and is shown in Equation 50.  Furthermore, due to the fact that by 
definition t0=0, therefore f(x) for ti=1 can be simplified. 
 
Again, the TTF is represented by a sequence of failure times (t1, . . . ,tn+1), where ti is 
the time of the ith failure and n is the number of failures observed at the time of last 
observation. 
 
f(x) for Case 3A-4A-5A and 3B-4B-5B 
Cases 3A-5A and Cases 3B-5B now include multiple dependent failure modes and 
imperfect inspections.  Accordingly, a new f(x) needs to be found. 
 
Firstly consider that any of the failure modes, including the inspection, can 
independently cause the component to fail through the application of separate sets of 
failure mechanisms (e.g. Failure Mode 1 = fatigue, Failure Mode 2 = corrosion).  This 
relationship can be represented via a series arrangement based on the assumption that 
the underlying TTF distribution of each failure mode is a 2-parameter Weibull.  For 
example, a component with 2 dependent Failure Modes including imperfect 
inspection is shown in Figure 24. 
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Equation 50: f(x) for Cases 1B-2B 
 
 
In this concept the Weibull Scale (α) and Weibull Shape (β) parameter for each maintenance event remains the same regardless of the 
action (i.e. corrective, preventative or an inspection).  However, a different q applies to each of the different maintenance action types, 
reflecting the variation in repair assumption (e.g. as-good-as-new, worse-than-old, etc) made possible through the GRP concept of 
Virtual Age.  Additionally, in the case of the multiple dependent failure modes (Cases 4A-5A and 4B-5B), the dependent q does not 
represent a physical activity, but rather as a method of affecting a ‘jump’ in the Virtual Age of an individual failure mode by 
increasing, decreasing or leaving the dependent q values unchanged. 
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Figure 24: Reliability of Component with 2-dependent Failure Modes and Imperfect Inspection 
 
Given the series arrangement the overall reliability of the component is simply the 
product of distribution the individual failure modes. Therefore, using the equation for 
finding the probability density of a particular failure sequence as shown in Equation 
39 and the relationship of the various dependent failure modes as shown in Figure 24, 
it possible to find f(x) for Cases 3A-5A and Cases 3B-5B.  
 
Firstly, we need to modify Equation 37 given the underlying TTF distribution is a 2-
parameter Weibull distribution.  Therefore, for a series system it is possible to find 
the GRP failure density of the ith failure for a component with multiple dependent 
failure modes and imperfect inspection as shown in Figure 24. 
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Equation 51: GRP Failure Density of the ith Failure for a Component with Multiple Dependent 
Failure Modes and Imperfect Inspection 
 
Here j represents the number of failure modes including dependent failure modes and 
imperfect inspection failure modes where j = 1 . . . r. 
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Accordingly, the results from Equation 51 can be inserted into Equation 39 resulting 
in f(x) for use in the Slice Sampler method for Cases 3A-4A-5A as shown in Equation 
52. 
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Equation 52: f(x) for Cases 3A–5A 
 
Similarly, this same substitution can be made to the Case xB f(x) previously provided 
in Equation 50, and can be found at Equation 54. 
 
The key to the practical implementation of this approach is the identification and 
recording of the failure mode (mechanism) for each maintenance event and must be 
able to indicate whether the action was corrective, preventative or an inspection, and 
what, if any, failure mode (mechanism) was observed.  Fortunately, the Failure 
Reporting And Corrective Action System (FRACAS) of most complex technical 
equipment will include this information.  This knowledge is then used in deciding 
which q is then applied to the f(x).  For example, consider a component with two 
failure modes, which are dependent and are also exposed to imperfect inspections.  
Therefore, using the equation for finding the probability density of a particular failure 
sequence (based on the times to failure) as shown in Equation 39 it is possible to 
calculate f(x) as shown in Equation 53. 
 
 99 
 
f(x) = f(x)FM1 * f(x)FM1 * f(x)Inspection * f(x)FM1 * f(x)FM2. . . 
where 
f(x)FM1 = f(α FM1, βFM1, qFM1) + f(α FM2, βFM2, qfFM2 due to FM1) 
f(x)FM2 = f(α FM2, βFM2, qFM2) + f(α FM1, βFM1, qfFM1 due to FM2) 
f(x)Inspection = f(α FM1, β FM1, qInspection of FM1) + f(α FM2, β FM2, qInspection of FM2) 
Equation 53: Implementation of Calculation of f(x) for Cases 3A/B – 5A/B 
 
Initial Guess Values for Slice Sampler 
The implementation of the Slice Sample method required initial values of the various 
parameters, α, β and q, for both Case xA nad xB, and (t1 guess, . . . , tn guess) for Case xB 
only.  While it is possible to mechanise these initial values, given the emphasis of this 
technique on using soft-data the concept of allowing the analyst to select these initial 
values was included.  As a result, Table 9 provides a recommended method for 
determining the guess values for use in the GRP Slice Sampler. 
 
Auto-correlation and Interleaving Effects 
Introduction 
Given most MCMC sampling techniques suffer from the effect of auto-correlation, as 
part of the analysis of the Slice Sampling technique it was important to examine both 
Case xA and xB parameter estimation output.  Specifically, to examine this output 
was correlated and what the impact this had on the output and the recommended 
solution. 
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Equation 54: f(x) for Cases 3B-5B 
 
 
Auto-correlation 
As part of the simulation of the Slice Sampler parameter estimator and GRP simulator, a step was included to determine whether the 
parameter estimation output was being observed. 
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Weibull Scale Parameter (αmin ≤ α ≤ αmax) 
A rule of thumb for an estimate of α for a component is typically equal to the TTFF, t1. 
αguess = t1 or αguess = MTBF if β ≈ 1 
Weibull Shape Parameter (βmin ≤ β ≤ βmax) 
Unless a β value is known or assumed, it is recommended that the initial guess be: 
βguess = 1 (i.e. constant failure rate) 
Repair Effectiveness Parameter (qmin ≤ q ≤ qmax) 
Unless q is known or assumed, it is recommended that the initial guess be: 
qguess = 0.5 (i.e. between as-good-as-new and as-bad-as-old) 
Time To Failure (TTF) (ti-1 ≤ ti ≤ ti+1) (Case xB only) 
Unless ti is known or assumed, it is recommended that the initial guess be: 
ti guess = (Ii - Ii-1) / 2 
Table 9: Recommended Guess Values for the GRP Parameters 
 
Using the USS Grampus dataset69 for the case xA and one simulated result for case 
xB, it was possible to investigate whether parameter estimation output was correlated 
over a range of lag 1 to lag 30.  Given that LAW and KELTON70 recommended that 
while there may be no appreciable correlation at lags 1 or 2, there may be a 
dependence at lag 3 due to some anomaly of the generator.  The graph of the 
correlation for lag 1 to lag 30 of the outcome of the parameter estimation output for 
both the Case xA can be seen in Figure 25.  While the fact that output was correlated 
was not unexpected, the duration of the correlation (e.g. even at lag 5) was surprising. 
 
                                                 
69  Additional details for the Grampus dataset can be found in Chapter 8 
70  LAW, A.M. and KELTON, Simulation Modelling and Analysis, 3rd Ed., McGraw-Hill Higher 
Education, USA, 2000 
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Figure 25: Correlation Graph for Case xA (10,000 iterations) 
 
Interleaving 
Given the clear indication that the output from the parameter estimation was strongly 
correlated, an interleaving technique was included within the algorithm.  The aim of 
the interleave is to only record the ith value from the MCMC and therefore reduce the 
effect of correlation.  While it is clear that some form of interleaving is required, the 
significant issue is to what extent.  From Figure 25 it is clear that there is still 
correlation at high levels of lag (e.g. 10), however, this needs to be offset by the 
reduction in efficiency of the MCMC sampler.  Accordingly, an interleave value of at 
least 10 was selected for use throughout the research.  An example of the impact of 
the inclusion of interleaving on the individual parameters and the final output is 
shown in Figure 26 and Figure 27. 
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Figure 26: Analysis of Grampus Data with No Interleaving 
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Figure 27: Analysis of Grampus Data with Interleaving = 5 
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Chapter 6:  Role of ‘q’ in Analysis of Realistic Cases 
 
While the General Renewal Process (GRP), including it’s unique identifier q, are 
becoming more common in engineering literature71 and even in some reliability 
software packages72, neither provides guidance on the use and/or interpretation of q.  
For example, if q = 0.7, should there be concern that maintenance is not efficient?  
Furthermore, if the maintenance is undertaken by a third party under a performance 
based contract, should a portion of the payment be withheld given the apparent lack 
of “goodness of repair”. 
 
Accordingly, it is the intent of this chapter to provide some insight into the use and 
interpretation of q. 
 
The chapter begins with some findings on the effect on the Cumulative Intensity 
Function (CIF) in response to changes in α, β and q.  This initial review is based on a 
simple component with a single failure mode with no inspection and/or preventative 
maintenance.  Unlike the rest of the study, this phase examined both the KIJIMA 
Type I GRP model, which is the basis of the research, and the KIJIMA Type II GRP 
model.  The second section is a review of the effect on the CIF based purely on the 
effect of the q related to inspection/preventative maintenance compared with the q 
                                                 
71  KAMINSKIY, M. and KRIVTSOV, V., loc cit; YANEZ, M., et al, loc cit; METTAS, A. et al, 
loc cit, JACK, N., loc cit, HURTADO, et al, loc cit. 
72  Software that include a parameter estimator for q includes Reliasoft’s “Weibull++ (Version 7) 
and Prediction Technology’s BRASS (Version 1.1). 
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related to the actual corrective maintenance actions.  The third section expands the 
second section by examining the effect of multiple dependent failure modes with both 
imperfect inspection/preventative maintenance and imperfect corrective maintenance. 
 
Effect of q on a Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Single Failure Mode 
Set-up 
Table 10 provides the values of α, β and q, the number of renewals and number of 
realisations that were used throughout the study, including the range of values of β 
and q used in the sensitivity study.  The initial value of α = 2.84 was based on an 
estimated results for a complex system using a KIJIMA Type I GRP estimation 
model.  The research was based on a different but related area of study. 
 
 Single/Poisson 
Distribution 
Sensitivity Study 
Variation in q 
Sensitivity Study 
Variation in β 
α 2.84 2.84 2.84 
β 1.5 1.5 1 ≤ β ≤ 2 
q 0.6 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 0.6 
Number of 
Renewals 
161 161 161 
Number of 
Realisations 
10, 000 10, 000 10, 000 
Table 10: Setup of Variables during MC Simulation 
 
A sensitivity study of the Weibull distribution scale parameter, α, was not undertaken 
since any variation in α will only result in a linear translation in the time of the CIF 
curve of both the KIJIMA Type I and Type II GRP model. 
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Output from CIF Simulator 
Figure 28 and Figure 29 illustrate the output from the MathCad® model including 
showing the mean, and the upper and lower 95% CL values for all 10,000 
realisations.  Additionally, Figure 28 and Figure 29 shows four of the 10,000 possible 
realisations as an illustration of the MC simulation methodology. 
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Figure 28: Simulation of KIJIMA Type I Model - Mean, 95%CL and Realisations 
(α = 2.84, β = 1.5, q = 0.6) 
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Figure 29: Simulation of KIJIMA Type II Model - Mean, 95%CL and Realisations 
(α = 2.84, β = 1.5, q = 0.6) 
 
Results from the Comparison between the KIJIMA Type I and Type II GRP Model  
The first part of the study involved examining the CIF curve versus Time-To-Failure 
(TTF) from the KIJIMA Type I and Type II GRP models over a large number of 
renewals; in this case 161 renewals.  Both models used α = 2.84, β = 1.5, q = 0.6 and 
total number of realisations = 10,000. 
 
From Figure 30 and Figure 31 it is possible to observe the differences in output as a 
function of the number of renewals from the KIJIMA Type I and Type II GRP 
models.  Three conclusions could be drawn from these observations. 
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Figure 30: Comparison of Simulated Output from KIJIMA Type I and Type II Models 
(α = 2.84, β = 1.5, q = 0.6) 
 
Remembering that the implementation of the MC simulation used throughout this 
study was based on finding the mean and distribution of the TTF to the kth 
failure/renewal it is possible to observe that at low numbers of renewals (i.e. < 10) the 
TTF of the KIJIMA Type I and Type II GRP models are almost identical.  For 
example, TTF based on the mean values of the 10,000 realisations for the 8th failure is 
12.587 hours for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model.  This compares with 14.654 hours 
for the KIJIMA Type II GRP model.  The similarity can be better seen in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31: Log-Log Scale Comparison of Simulated Output from KIJIMA Type I and Type II 
Models (α = 2.84, β = 1.5, q = 0.6) 
 
Secondly, at higher number of renewals the outputs from the two GRP models vary 
considerably.  This observation confirms DAGPUNAR’s73 notion that under a failure 
rate increasing to infinity the KIJIMA Type I GRP model (with the exception of q = 
0) will result in zero operating times (i.e. the item will fail immediately after renewal) 
in the limit.  For example, the TTF based on the mean values of the 10,000 
realisations for the 50th failure is 50.9 hours for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model 
compared with 101 hours for the KIJIMA Type II GRP model which is a significant 
difference.  This variation can be better observed in Figure 30 and Table 11. 
 
 
                                                 
73  DAGPUNAR, J.S., loc cit 
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No of Failures/Renewals GRP Type I GRP Type II 
5 8.9 9.6 
10 14.8 18 
20 24 34.6 
40 38.6 67.8 
60 50.9 101 
80 61.8 134.2 
100 71.9 167.5 
150 94.4 250.56 
Table 11: Comparison of Simulated Output from KIJIMA Type I and Type II Models 
(α = 2.84, β = 1.5, q = 0.6) 
 
Thirdly, it was possible to observe that the CIF curve for the KIJIMA Type II GRP 
model becomes a straight line at higher numbers of renewals.  This observation 
agrees with KIJIMA’s initial findings where it was noted that output of the KIJIMA 
Type II GRP “grows linearly for large n [renewals]”74.  The linearity indicates that 
the virtual age for the KIJIMA Type II GRP model becomes constant, or is at 
equilibrium, at higher numbers of renewals.  The reason for this equilibrium can be 
seen from Equation 17, the equation for xk, where as k (the number of renewals) 
increases, the impact on each additional renewal becomes smaller since xk is a 
function of qk(1-q). 
 
While this difference is hardly surprising, the knowledge of the performance and 
variation between the two models at high number of renewals is a very important 
consideration in model selection.  Specifically, the selection of the GRP model type 
                                                 
74  KIJIMA, M., op cit, p100 
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should be representative of the physical failure mode(s) that the component/system 
will undergo over the appropriate number of renewals. 
 
Consider a complex system consisting of a number of sub-systems and components 
which are purely mechanical, purely electrical/electronic or a hybrid of both 
elements.  An example of such a system is an modern aircraft with purely mechanical 
components such as landing gear and engines, purely electrical/electronic components 
such as the flight computer, or hybrid components such as control actuators which 
combine both the electronic controllers and the mechanical (actually hydraulic) 
actuators.  While, such complex systems can be modelled using the KIJIMA Type I 
GRP model, it results in the case where at the limit of renewals the system will have 
zero operating time.  From a physical understanding of the system, it is possible to 
see that this may not be the case.  In the example of the modern aircraft so long as the 
airframe remains within the fatigue life the aircraft can remain operational with non-
zero operating times for a large number of renewals.  For example, some the B-52 
operating with the United States Air Force (USAF) have been in service for more 
than 50 years and remain operational. 
 
However, there are cases where the KIJIMA Type I GRP model can be used and is 
appropriate; mainly in purely mechanical systems/components.  For example, 
consider a hydraulic ram that is subjected to corrosion.  Typically the maintenance 
and repair process includes cleaning using either mechanical or chemical abrasives.  
As the hydraulic ram undergoes many renewals, at some point in time there is 
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sufficient wear75 of the ram to result in permanent leaks since the diameter of the ram 
is now less than seal tolerance.  Therefore, the hydraulic ram will continuously fail 
regardless of whether a renewal is undertaken, and will therefore have a zero 
operating time. 
 
Based on these observations it is possible to make recommendations on model 
selection based on the item to be modelled.  For example, based on the observations a 
logical conclusion would be as follows: 
 
• a complex system such as an aircraft or car should be modelled using the 
KIJIMA Type II GRP model, and 
• individual components should be modelled using the KIJIMA Type I 
GRP models. 
 
While these recommendations offer some guidance on model selection, it is important 
that the type of model is representative of the physical failure mode(s) that the 
component/system will undergo over the appropriate number of renewals.  Ultimately 
model choice should be at the discretion of the analyst. 
 
                                                 
75  wear can be defined as ‘. . . as the undesirable cumulative change in dimensions brought 
about by the gradual removal of discrete particles from contacting surfaces in motion, due to 
predominately mechanical action.  It should be further recognised that corrosion often 
interacts with the wear process to change the character of the surfaces of wear particles 
through reaction with the environment.  Wear is, in fact, not a single process but a number of 
different processes that may take place independently or in combination.’ from COLLINS, 
J.A. “Failure of Materials in Mechanical Design – Analysis, Prediction, Prevention”, 2nd Ed., 
John-Wiley & Sons, USA, 1993 
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Results for GRP Type I from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in q (0 ≤ q ≤ 1) 
for β = 1.5 
The first part of the sensitivity study examined the impact on the CIF curve from the 
KIJIMA Type I GRP model due to a variation in q from 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, where β = constant 
= 1.5. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model that as q increased from 0 ≤ q ≤ 
1, while β = constant = 1.5, the CIF curve increased.  This can be seen in Figure 32 
and Figure 33.  Interestingly, it was also observed that the MTBF of the KIJIMA 
Type I GRP model is very sensitive to variation of low values of q (i.e. 0 ≤ q ≤ 0.2).  
This can again be seen in Figure 32 and Figure 33. 
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Figure 32: Simulated KIJIMA Type I Model (β = 1.5, q = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1) 
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Figure 33: Log-Log Simulated KIJIMA Type I (β = 1.5, q = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1) 
 
Results for KIJIMA Type II GRP model from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in q (0 
≤ q ≤ 1) for β = 1.5 
The first part of the sensitivity study also examined the impact on the CIF curve from 
the KIJIMA Type II GRP model due to a variation in q from 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, where β = 
constant = 1.5. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type II GRP model that as q increased from 0 ≤ q ≤ 
1, while β = constant = 1.5, the CIF curve increased.  This can be seen in Figure 34 
and Figure 35.  This observation agrees with KIJIMA’s initial findings where it was 
noted that the difference between the output of the model for q = 1 compared to q < 1 
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“is big, especially for large n [renewals]”76. However, unlike the KIJIMA Type I 
GRP model which was sensitive to low values of q (i.e. 0 ≤ q ≤ 0.2), the KIJIMA 
Type II GRP model was more sensitive to variation of higher values of q (i.e. 0.8 ≤ q 
≤ 1).  This can again be seen in Figure 34 and Figure 35. 
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Figure 34: Simulated KIJIMA Type II Model (β = 1.5, q = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1) 
 
                                                 
76  KIJIMA, M., op cit, p101 
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Figure 35: Log-Log Simulated KIJIMA Type II Model (β = 1.5, q = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1) 
 
Results for KIJIMA Type I GRP model from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in β (1 
≤ β ≤ 2) for q = 0.6 
The second part of the sensitivity study examined the impact on the CIF curve from 
the KIJIMA Type I GRP model due to a variation in β from 1 ≤ β ≤ 2, where q = 
constant = 0.6. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model that as β was increased from 1 ≤ 
β ≤ 2, while q = constant = 0.6, the CIF curve increased.  This can be seen in Figure 
36 and Figure 37.  The increase of the CIF curve as a result of an increasing β value 
was expected given that the underlying TTF distribution is Weibull, and therefore any 
increase in β in a TTF distribution should result in a higher CIF. 
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Figure 36: Simulated KIJIMA Type I Model (q = 0.6, β = 1, 1.12, 1.16, 1.2, 1.5, 2) 
 
Interestingly, the KIJIMA Type I GRP model was very sensitive to any change in the 
value of β.  In fact there were noticeable variations in the shape of the CIF curve for a 
change in β of 0.04.  This is counter-intuitive since variation of β where 1.2 ≤ β ≤ 1.4 
in a typical Weibull TTF distribution would be generally considered to have minimal 
effect on the Weibull Hazard Rate (which can be considered equivalent to the GRP 
CIF) and therefore considered the same value.  For example, a variation of ±0.2 in the 
estimation of β of a Weibull TTF distribution through probability plotting is not 
considered significant to the final model output.  However, clearly from Figure 36 
and Figure 37 this is not the case for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model.  Therefore, the 
accurate selection of β is very important, especially for the prediction of future 
values. 
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Figure 37: Log-Log Simulated KIJIMA Type I Model (q = 0.6, β = 1, 1.12, 1.16, 1.2, 1.5, 2) 
 
Results for KIJIMA Type II GRP model from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in β (1 
≤ β ≤ 2) for q = 0.6 
The second part of the sensitivity study also examined the impact on the CIF curve 
from the KIJIMA Type II GRP model due to a variation in β from 1 ≤ β ≤ 2, where q 
= constant = 0.6. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type II GRP model that as β was increased from 1 ≤ 
β ≤ 2, while q = constant = 0.6, the CIF curve increased.  This can be seen in Figure 
38 and Figure 39. 
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Similar to the KIJIMA Type I GRP model, the KIJIMA Type II GRP model was 
sensitive to any change in the value of β.  However, it was observed that the KIJIMA 
Type II GRP model was less sensitive to variation of β than the KIJIMA Type I GRP 
model. 
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Figure 38: Simulated KIJIMA Type II Model (q = 0.6, β = 1, 1.12, 1.16, 1.2, 1.5, 2) 
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Figure 39: Log-Log Simulated KIJIMA Type II Model (q = 0.6, β = 1, 1.12, 1.16, 1.2, 1.5, 2) 
 
Effect of ‘q’ on Combined Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance 
Regime with a Single Failure Mode for KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation 
Set-up 
Table 12 provides the values of α, β, qInspection and qMaintenance, the maintenance 
interval, the number of renewals and number of realisations that were used 
throughout the study, including the range of values of β, qInspection and qMaintenance used 
in the sensitivity study.  The initial value of α = 150 is based on the value used for 
Failure Mode 1 for Case Study 4A.  As before, a sensitivity study of the Weibull 
distribution scale parameter, α, was not undertaken since any variation in α will only 
result in a linear translation of the CIF curve. 
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 Sensitivity Study 
Variation in β 
Sensitivity Study 
Variation in qInspection 
Sensitivity Study 
Variation in 
qMaintenance 
α 150 150 150 
β β = 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.25, 
3.5 
1.5 1.5 
qInspection 0.5 q = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 
1, 1.25, 1.5 
0.5 
qMaintenance 0.7 0.7 q = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 
1, 1.25, 1.5 
Inspection Interval Every 400 hours Every 400 hours Every 400 hours 
Number of 
Renewals 
16 16 16 
Number of 
Realisations 
10, 000 10, 000 10, 000 
Table 12: Setup of Variables during Study on the Effect of ‘q’ on Combined 
Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Single Failure Mode 
 
Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in β (0.75 ≤ β ≤ 3.5) 
This part of the review examined the impact on the CIF curve from the KIJIMA Type 
I GRP model with a separate periodic inspection and maintenance regime due to a 
variation in β from 0.75 ≤ β ≤ 3.5, where α = constant = 150, qinspection = constant = 
0.5, qmaintenance = constant = 0.7. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model that as β increased the CIF curve 
increased, which was as expected given the previous findings.  This variation can be 
seen in Figure 40.  As before, the increase of the CIF curve as a result of an 
increasing β value was expected given that the underlying TTF distribution is 
Weibull, and therefore any increase in β in a TTF distribution should result in a 
higher CIF. 
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Variation in Beta
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Operating Hours
N
um
be
r o
f M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 A
ct
io
ns
Beta = 0.75 Beta = 1.0 Baseline (alpha=150, beta=1.5, q(inspect)=0.5, q(maint)=0.7 Beta = 2.25 Beta = 3.5  
Figure 40: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in β on Combined 
Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Single Failure Mode for 
KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation 
 
Similar to the previous study, the KIJIMA Type I GRP model with a separate 
periodic inspection and maintenance regime appeared sensitive to small changes in 
the value of β away from β = 1.0.  However, major changes of β > 2.0 appeared to 
have less impact.  For example the difference in CIF between β = 1 and β = 1.5, 
compared with β =1.5 and β = 2.25, and with β = 2.25 and β = 3.5 decreased with 
increasing β. 
 
Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qinspection (0 ≤ qinspection ≤ 1.5) 
This part of the review examined the impact on the CIF curve from the KIJIMA Type 
I GRP model with a separate periodic inspection and maintenance regime due to a 
variation in qinspection from 0 ≤ qinspection ≤ 1.5, where α = constant = 150, β = constant = 
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1.5, qmaintenance = constant = 0.7 and scheduled maintenance interval every 400 
operating hours. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model that as qinspection increased the CIF 
curve increased, which was as expected given the previous findings.  This variation 
can be seen in Figure 40.  While there was change in the CIF curve due to changes in 
qinspection the relatively small change, especially for higher qinspection values, was 
unexpected.  Moreover, the apparent limited effect of qinspection > 1 (i.e. worse-than-
old) was surprising.  However, in further review these results appear quite logical for 
one main reason.  In this example given the value of the underlying 2-parameter 
Weibull TFF there were more corrective maintenance tasks (i.e. unscheduled failures) 
than preventative maintenance activities.  Therefore, there will be comparatively less 
preventative maintenance actions, and consequently less impact on the Virtual Age 
(VA) over the observation time in comparison with corrective maintenance actions 
(e.g. dominate failure mode). 
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Figure 41: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qinspection on Combined 
Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Single Failure Mode for 
KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation 
 
Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qmaintenance (0 ≤ qmaintenance ≤ 1.5) 
This part of the review examined the impact on the CIF curve from the KIJIMA Type 
I GRP model with a separate periodic inspection and maintenance regime due to a 
variation in qmaintenance from 0 ≤ qinspection ≤ 1.5, where α = constant = 150, β = constant 
= 1.5, qinspection = constant = 0.5 and a scheduled maintenance interval every 400 
operating hours. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model that as qmaintenance increased the 
CIF curve increased, which was as expected given the previous findings.  This 
variation can be seen in Figure 42.  Unlike the change in the CIF due to a change 
qinspection, a change in the CIF curve due to changes in qmaintenance were significant, 
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especially for lower higher qmaintenance values.  Based on the previous findings this was 
expected given the impact on the VA. 
 
Variation in Independent Corrective Maintenance 'q'
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
Operating Hours
N
um
be
r o
f M
ai
nt
en
an
ce
 A
ct
io
ns
Baseline (alpha=150, beta=1.5, q(inspect)=0.5, q(maint)=0.7 Corrective Maintenance 'q' = 0
Corrective Maintenance 'q' = 0.25 Corrective Maintenance 'q' = 0.5
Corrective Maintenance 'q' = 0.75 Corrective Maintenance 'q' = 1
Corrective Maintenance 'q' = 1.25 Corrective Maintenance 'q' = 1.5  
Figure 42: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qmaintenance on Combined 
Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Single Failure Mode for 
KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation 
 
Combined Results from Sensitivity Study 
Figure 43 provides a summary of the three sensitivity studies completed on the 
Combined Preventative Maintenance/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime 
with a Single Failure Mode for KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation.  Specifically the 
sensitivity study on the variation of: 
 
• Inspection/Preventative Maintenance q; 
• Independent Corrective Maintenance q; and 
• Inspection/Preventative Maintenance Interval 
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Comparison of Variation in (1) -  Independent Corrective Maintenance 'q', (2) - 
Inspection/Preventative Maintenance 'q' and (3) - Inspection/Preventative Maintenance Interval
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Figure 43: Summary of Results from Sensitivity Study for a Combined Preventative/Inspection 
and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Single Failure Mode for KIJIMA Type I GRP 
Equation 
 
The rationale for this comparison is to provide further insight into the behaviour of 
the KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation.  Furthermore, based on these insights this 
research provides guidance on the decision making process by highlighting where to 
concentrate resources to assist the achievement of an organisational goal (e.g. 
increased reliability or decreased TCO for the same reliability). 
 
From Figure 43 it is clear that the CIF curve is most sensitive to the q related to the 
corrective maintenance actions; especially at low (i.e. qmaintenance < 0.5).  Surprisingly, 
there is little sensitivity, indicated by the lack of spread in CIF curves, due to 
variation in either preventative maintenance/inspection or maintenance interval.  
Furthermore the apparent limited effect of qinspection > 1 (i.e. worse-than-old) and 
reducing the maintenance interval by half (i.e. 400 hours to 200 hours) was 
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unexpected.  However, in further review these results appear quite logical for one 
main reason.  In this example, given the value of the underlying 2-parameter Weibull 
TFF, there are more corrective maintenance tasks (i.e. unscheduled failures) than 
preventative ones.  Therefore, even if a preventative maintenance action does occur, 
given there are significantly less over the observation time the corrective maintenance 
q will dominate on the VA of the component. 
 
Accordingly, in this example the guidance for a decision maker would be to 
concentrate resources (i.e. personnel and/or funding) on lower the corrective 
maintenance q.  However, this will be highly dependent on the setup of each case and 
it is strongly recommended that each case undertake a sensitivity study similar to that 
conducted in this chapter. 
 
Effect of ‘q’ on Combined Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance 
Regime with a Multiple Dependent Failure Modes for KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation 
Set-up 
Table 13 provides the values of α, β, qInspection and qMaintenance for each Failure Mode 
including the dependency, the maintenance interval, number of renewals and number 
of realisations that were used throughout the study.  Additionally, Table 13 includes 
the range of values of α β, qInspection and qMaintenance used in the sensitivity studies.  The 
initial values for both Failure Modes 1 and 2 are based on the research provided in 
Case Study 4A.  However, unlike previous analysis, a sensitivity study of the Weibull 
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distribution scale parameter, α, was undertaken given there is a significant difference 
(100%) in the α values corresponding to each of the different Failure Modes. 
 
Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in α 
This part of the review examined the impact on the CIF curve of a variation in either 
α value of Failure Mode 1 or 2. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model that as α increased the CIF curve 
decreased.  This variation can be seen in Figure 44.  As before, the decrease of the 
CIF curve as a result of an increasing α value was expected given that the underlying 
TTF distribution is Weibull, and therefore any increase in α in a TTF distribution 
should result in a lower CIF curve.  However, of interest is the difference in variation 
of the CIF curve between Failure Mode 1 and 2.  Specifically, a 50% 
increase/decrease for variation of α of Failure Mode 1 had a larger variation in the 
CIF curve than the same 50% increase/decrease for Failure Mode 2.   
 
The reason for the difference in variation is similar to that discussed in the previous 
findings.  Specifically, that a slight variation in the dominant failure mode will have 
comparatively larger impact on the CIF curve.  In this example, the dominant Failure 
Mode is Failure Mode 1 whose α value (e.g. 150 hours) is 50% of the Failure Mode 2 
α value (e.g. 300 hours). 
 
 αFM1 αFM2 βFM1 βFM2 qI_1 qI_2 qM_1 qM_2- qM_1- qI_2 
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1 2 
Baseline 150 300 1.5 3.5 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.2 1.2 0.2 
αFM1 75, 
150, 
225 
         
αFM2  150, 
300, 
450 
        
βFM1   0.75, 
1.0, 
1.5, 
2.25 
       
βFM2    1.0, 
1.75, 
3.5, 
5.25 
      
qI_1     (1)77      
qI_2      (1)     
qM_1       (1)    
qM_2-1        (1)   
qM_1-2         (1)  
qI_2          (1) 
Inspection 
Interval 
Every 400 hours 
Number of 
Renewals 
16 
Number of 
Realisations 
10, 000 
Table 13: Setup of Variables during Study on the Effect of q on Combined 
Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Multiple Dependent Failure 
Modes 
 
                                                 
77  Consists of varying the specific ‘q’ across a range of specified values; 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 
1.25, 1.5 
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Figure 44: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in α on Combined 
Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Multiple, Dependent Failure 
Modes 
 
Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in β 
This part of the review examined the impact on the CIF curve due to a variation in 
either β value of Failure Mode 1 or 2. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model that as β increased the CIF curve 
increased, which was as expected given the previous findings.  This variation can be 
seen in Figure 45.  As before, the increase of the CIF curve as a result of an 
increasing β value was expected given that the underlying TTF distribution is 
Weibull, and therefore any increase in β in a TTF distribution should result in a 
higher CIF curve.  However, of interest is the difference in variation of the CIF curve 
between Failure Mode 1 and 2.  Specifically, that a change in the β value for Failure 
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Mode 2 had an insignificant change on the CIF curve compared to changes in Failure 
Mode 1.   
 
The initial reason for the difference in variation is the similar to that discussed was 
presented in the previous section.  Specifically that slight variation to the failure 
modes will have comparatively larger impact on the CIF curve.  However, in this 
example, the dominant failure mode is failure mode 1 whose β value (e.g. 1.5) is 
much smaller than failure mode 2 (e.g. 3.5 hours).  So why is the smaller β dominant?  
Again, this is linked to the notion that the dominant failure mode is the one with the 
most renewals, and therefore α plays a more significant role, rather than β. 
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Figure 45: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in β on Combined 
Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Multiple, Dependent Failure 
Modes 
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Furthermore, similar to the previous study, the KIJIMA Type I GRP model appeared 
sensitive to small changes in the value of β away from β = 1.0.  This can be seen in 
Figure 45 where the variation of the CIF curve compared with the β value of Failure 
Mode 1. 
 
Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qinspection (0 ≤ qinspection ≤ 1.5) 
This part of the review examined the impact on the CIF curve from the KIJIMA Type 
I GRP model due to a variation in qinspection from 0 ≤ qinspection ≤ 1.5 for both Failure 
Mode 1 and 2. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model that as qinspection for failure mode 2 
increased the CIF curve increased, which was as expected given previous findings.  
This variation can be seen in Figure 46.  However, of most interest was the 
observation of no variation in the CIF curve due to variation in qinspection for failure 
mode 1.  The absence of variation can be seen in Figure 47.   
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Variation in Inspection 'q' - FM1
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Figure 46: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qinspection for Failure Mode 1 on 
Combined Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Multiple, 
Dependent Failure Modes 
 
Variation in Inspection 'q' - FM2
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Figure 47: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qinspection for Failure Mode 2 on 
Combined Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Multiple, 
Dependent Failure Modes 
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While there was change in the CIF curve due to changes in qinspection for Failure Mode 
2 as single failure mode example, the relatively small change, especially for higher 
qinspection values, was unexpected.  Furthermore the apparent limited effect of qinspection 
> 1 (i.e. worse-than-old) was surprising.  However, in further review these results 
appear quite logical for one main reason.  In this example given the value of the 
underlying 2-parameter Weibull TFF there are more corrective maintenance tasks (i.e. 
unscheduled failures) than preventative ones.  Therefore, even if a preventative 
maintenance action does occur, the significantly lower numbers over the observation 
time mean that corrective maintenance q will dominate. 
 
Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qmaintenance 
This part of the review examined the impact on the CIF curve from the KIJIMA Type 
I GRP model due to a variation in qmaintenance from 0 ≤ , qmaintenance ≤ 1.5 for both 
Failure Modes.  This part of the review also examined the impact on the CIF due to 
variation in the dependent ‘q’ value which affected the failure mode. 
 
It was observed for the KIJIMA Type I GRP model that as qmaintenance increased, 
regardless of the Failure Mode or dependency, the CIF curve increased, which was 
predictable given the previous findings.  This variation can be seen in Figure 48, 
Figure 49, Figure 50 and Figure 51.  Unlike the change in the CIF due to a change 
qinspection, a change in the CIF curve due to changes in qmaintenance were significant, 
especially for lower higher qmaintenance values.  Based on the previous findings this was 
expected. 
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Again, the difference in effect of the variation across the four qmaintenance values can be 
attributed to the impact of the dominant Failure Mode.  Specifically that slight 
variations to the direct and dependent q for the dominant Failure Mode will have 
comparatively larger impact on the CIF curve.  This can be observed since the 
difference in the CIF due to the same variation in qmaintenance on Failure Mode 1 is 
larger than for Failure Mode 2, or indeed the dependent Failure Mode 2 due to 1, or 
Failure Mode 2 due to 1. 
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Figure 48: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qmaintenance for Failure Mode 1 on 
Combined Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Multiple, 
Dependent Failure Modes 
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Variation in Dependent Corrective Maintenance 'q' on FM2 due to Maintenance on FM1
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Figure 49: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qmaintenance for Failure Mode 2 based 
on a Repair to Failure Mode 1 on Combined Preventative/Inspection and Corrective 
Maintenance Regime with a Multiple, Dependent Failure Modes 
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Figure 50: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qmaintenance for Failure Mode 2 on 
Combined Preventative/Inspection and Corrective Maintenance Regime with a Multiple, 
Dependent Failure Modes 
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Variation in Dependent Corrective Maintenance 'q' on FM1 due to Maintenance on FM2
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Figure 51: Results from Sensitivity Study of a Variation in qmaintenance for Failure Mode 1 based 
on a Repair to Failure Mode 2 on Combined Preventative/Inspection and Corrective 
Maintenance Regime with a Multiple, Dependent Failure Modes 
 
Representative Links to the GRP Parameters 
Set-up 
 
While it is clear that the various parameters of the GRP equation have a symmetric 
impact on the CIF curve they are also representative of other, more tangible factors.  
Indeed, while the original intent of the research was to use data from the Australian 
Defence Force aviation sector to compare and contrast the use and variation of q, the 
access to fleet wide specific serial number data, and the detailed operating 
environment, was very difficult.  In isolation this behaviour may appear contrary to 
the highly regulated nature of the aviation industry, however, this lack of serial 
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number level data is quite common across the defence, commercial and civil aviation 
practices. 
 
Accordingly, it was not possible to undertake any detailed study on the variation of 
the GRP parameters due to operations factors such as: 
 
• Geographic location, 
• Maintenance facility/staff, 
• Maintenance tools/manuals/procedures, 
• Incorporation of a design change/modification, or 
• Mission profile. 
 
Notwithstanding, it is quite possible to hypothesise mapping the GRP parameters, 
especially q, to some operations factors.  This can be seen in Table 14. 
 
Cause Mechanism Parameter to be 
Adjusted 
Operational Flight Profile (i.e. mission profile) α, q 
Climate (i.e. location of the base) α 
Introduction of new technology (i.e. replacement/modification of 
existing item): 
• Removal of Failure Mode(s) 
• Increase repairability 
 
 
α 
q 
Inspection/Maintenance Training/Proficiency q 
Inspection/Maintenance Procedures q 
Table 14: Cause Mechanism verses Parameter Adjustment 
 
 
 140 
 
Summary of Role of ‘q’ 
The research into the behaviour of the KIJIMA Type I and Type II models have 
provided some useful insights into their implementation and interpretation as follows: 
 
a. At low number of renewals (i.e. < 10), there is little difference between the 
KIJIMA Type I and Type II models. 
b. At high numbers of renewals (i.e. > 40), there is a significant difference 
between the KIJIMA Type I and Type II models.  For example at t = 40 
hours there is almost 100% difference in CIF.  Refer to Table 11. 
c. At high numbers of renewals (i.e. > 40) the CIF curve of the KIJIMA 
Type II model approaches a straight line. 
d. As β and q increased the TTF decreased for both KIJIMA Type I and Type 
II models. 
e. TTF of the KIJIMA Type I GRP model is: 
i. very sensitive to variation of low values of q (e.g. 0 ≤ q ≤ 0.2); and 
ii. very sensitive to variation in the value of β. In fact there were 
noticeable variations in TTF for a change in β of 0.04. 
f. TTF of the KIJIMA Type II GRP model is: 
i. very sensitive to variation of high values of q (e.g. 0.8 ≤ q ≤ 1.0); 
and 
ii. sensitive to variation in the value of β; although the β - sensitivity 
observed for the KIJIMA Type II GRP model is less than with the 
KIJIMA Type I GRP model. 
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g. The selection of either the KIJIMA Type I or Type II should ensure that 
the chosen model is representative of the physical failure mode(s) that the 
component/system will undergo over the appropriate number of renewals.  
For example, based on the observations the following guidance is 
recommended: 
i. complex systems such as an aircraft or car should be modelled 
using the KIJIMA Type II GRP model, and 
ii. individual components should be modelled using the KIJIMA 
Type I GRP model. 
h. When examining the effect on multiple q, whether representing change 
qinspection or qmaintenance, there is a significant difference in effect based on 
the link to the dominant failure mode.  In this circumstance, the dominant 
failure mode is the one that results in the most renewals. Specifically 
slight variations to the dominant failure mode will have comparatively 
larger impact on the CIF curve.  Therefore, any resources (i.e. personnel 
and/or funding) consideration should be assigned to “fixing” the dominant 
failure mode. 
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Chapter 7: Examples 
 
Introduction 
The original intent of this research was to examine real Repairable Item (RI) data 
from the Defence aviation environment.  Unfortunately, it is very difficult to get the 
life of a single RI (e.g. serial number) from the current Maintenance Management 
System, a common problem within the aviation industry.  That said, some data has 
been obtained for components.  Due to the number of cases it is impossible to 
demonstrate the output from the model, and therefore a representative sample will be 
shown for illustrative purposes.  The following cases will be used to illustrate the 
process: 
1. Case 1A – 2 sets of data from USS Grampus and USS Halfbeak Number 4 
Main Propulsion Diesel Engine from MEEKER and ESCOBAR78; 
2. Case 4A (Single Failure Mode) – 2 sets of data representing Serial No 
1244 and Serial No 10484 for Valve Housings (Part No 710085-1), from 1 
of the 4 Allison T56A-14 turbo-propeller engines of the Lockheed P-3C 
Orion Maritime Patrol aircraft. 
3. Case 4A (2 Failure Modes) – simulated data for use in this model.   
 
                                                 
78  ibid 
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Case 1A Solution – USS Grampus 
Background 
Given the challenge with access to data, alternative sources of data were required.  
Consequently RI from the commonly quoted repairable item data source, USS 
Grampus and USS Halfbeak Number 4 Main Propulsion Diesel Engine from 
MEEKER and ESCOBAR79, were used as the input data for a Case 1A (single FM, 
Instantaneous Repair, Perfect Inspection).  To allow comparison of the model, the 
parameter estimator use the first two thirds of the data set, while the simulator 
predicted the whole data set.  A copy of the USS Grampus and USS Halfbeak 
Number 4 Main Propulsion Diesel Engine is provided at Appendix 1 – Case 1A Data. 
 
Parameter Estimation  
The estimator was run for 5,000 iterations with an interleave value of 5 resulting in 
1,000 parameter sets of α, β and q.  An initial guess of α = 1, β = 1and q = 0.5 was 
used.  The results from the parameter estimator for α, β and q, including the variation 
over their individual space, can be seen in Figure 52 and Figure 53. 
 
                                                 
79  ibid 
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Figure 52: Variation in Parameter Set for USS Grampus (Case 1A) 
 
Of specific interest the results from the parameter estimator α, β and q were converted 
to illustrate the areas of highest likelihood for each of the parameters as shown in 
Figure 54. 
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Figure 53: Parameter Set for USS Grampus (Case 1A) 
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Figure 54: Parameter Set for USS Grampus (Case 1A) 
 
As part of the results from the parameter estimator for α, β and q each of the 
parameters were assumed to be normally distributed and a mean and standard 
deviation calculated including Pearson's r correlation coefficient.  The resulting 
values are provided in Table 15. 
 
Additionally, for comparative purposes the data provided at Appendix 1 – Case 1A 
Data was also analysed using an ORP (2-parameter Weibull model) and NHPP 
(Power Law model).  These values are also provided in Table 15. 
 
KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation Parameter 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Pearson's r 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
ORP 
(2-parameter 
Weibull) 
NHPP 
(Power Law) 
α 0.631 0.263 0.09 0.553 0.418 
β 1.237 0.178 0.018 1.22 1.088 
q 0.828 0.409 0.188 n/a n/a 
Table 15: Summary of Parameter Estimators for USS Grampus Data 
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CIF Simulation 
Each of set from the parameter estimator were then simulated 100 times and the 
averages recorded resulting in 1,000 CIF curves.  The 1,000 CIF curves were then 
averaged to find the average CIF curve for all parameter sets, and the non-parametric 
90 percentile upper and lower confidence limits.  The resulting CIF curve is provided 
at Figure 55. 
 
As can been seen from Figure 55, the results accurately predict the additional five5 
data points, and the non-parametric 90 percentile upper and lower confidence limits 
effectively bound the simulated data. 
 
Case 1A Solution – USS Halfbeak 
Background 
Given the problems encountered with access to data, alternative sources of data were 
required.  Consequently RI from the commonly quoted repairable item data source, 
USS Halfbeak Number 4 Main Propulsion Diesel Engine from MEEKER and 
ESCOBAR80, was used as the input data for a Case 1A (single FM, Instantaneous 
Repair, Perfect Inspection).  To allow comparison of the model to the data the first 
two thirds of the data set was used by parameter estimator, while the simulator 
predicted the whole data set.  A copy of the USS Halfbeak Number 4 Main 
Propulsion Diesel Engine is provided at Appendix 1 – Case 1A Data. 
                                                 
80  MEEKER, W.Q. and ESCOBAR, L.A., Statistical Methods for Reliability Data, Wiley-
Interscience, USA, 1998 
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Figure 55: CIF Curve for USS Grampus (Case 1A) 
 
Parameter Estimation  
The estimator was run for 1,000 iterations with an interleave value of 1 resulting in 
1,000 parameter sets of α, β and q.  An initial guess of α = 1, β = 1and q = 0.5 was 
used.  The results from the parameter estimator for α, β and q, including the variation 
over their individual space can be seen in Figure 56 and Figure 57. 
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Figure 56: Variation in Parameter Set for USS Halfbeak (Case 1A) 
 
Of specific interest the results from the parameter estimator for α, β and q were 
converted to illustrate the areas of highest likelihood for each of the parameters as 
shown in Figure 57. 
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Figure 57: Parameter Set for USS Halfbeak (Case 1A) 
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Figure 58: Parameter Set for USS Halfbeak (Case 1A) 
 
As part of the results from the parameter estimator for α, β and q each of the 
parameters were assumed to be normally distributed and a mean and standard 
deviation calculated including Pearson's r correlation coefficient.  The resulting 
values are provided in Table 16. 
 
Additionally, for comparative purposes the data provide at Appendix 1 – Case 1A 
Data was also analysed using an ORP (2-parameter Weibull model) and NHPP 
(Power Law model).  These values are also provided in Table 16. 
 
KIJIMA Type I GRP Equation Parameter 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Pearson's r 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
ORP 
(2-parameter 
Weibull) 
NHPP 
(Power Law) 
α 4.48 1.26 -0.1 5.45 5.362 
β 2.881 0.435 0.025 2.76 2.717 
q 0.71 0.316 -0.108 n/a n/a 
Table 16: Summary of Parameter Estimators for USS Halfbeak Data 
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CIF Simulation 
Each of set from the parameter estimator were then simulated 100 times and the 
averages recorded, resulting in 10,000 CIF curves.  The 10,000 CIF curves were then 
averaged to find the average CIF curve for all parameter sets, and the non-parametric 
ninety percentile upper and lower confidence limits.  The resulting CIF curve is 
provided at Figure 59. 
 
As can been seen from Figure 59, the results accurately predict the additional 5 data 
points, and the non-parametric ninety percentile upper and lower confidence limits 
effectively bound the simulated data. 
 
Comparison of Case 1A Results from USS Grampus vs USS Halfbeak 
One area of interest was the comparison of the results from the parameter estimation, 
specifically the q value from any real data.  The value and trend over time of q 
highlights a number interesting outcomes.  For example, the ability to compare and 
contrast the parameter estimator values from identical repairable items (i.e. same part 
number but different serial number) may be able to predict future changes due to 
various factors such as location (i.e. temperature, humidity, etc), maintenance 
facility/staff, maintenance tools/manuals/procedures, incorporation of a design 
change/modification, mission profile, etc. 
 
 
 151 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
20
40
60
80
100
Average Simulated GRP from Parameter Estimator
90% UCL Simulated GRP from Parameter Estimator
90% LCL Simulated GRP from Parameter Estimator
Remaining Data for Comparison
Input TTF Data to Parameter Estimator
Power Law NHPP based on MLE
Mean ORP Using Meeker, et al
Time To Failure (Hours)
N
o.
 o
f R
en
ew
als
 
Figure 59: CIF Curve for USS Halfbeak (Case 1A) 
 
Based on the assumption that the uncertainty in the actual values of α, β and q are 
normally distributed it was possible to compare the various GRP parameters 
previously listed in Table 15 and Table 16 as shown in Figure 60, Figure 61 and 
Figure 62.  Additionally, the ORP and NHPP parameter estimations provided in Table 
15 and Table 16 as shown in Figure 60 and Figure 61. 
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Figure 60: Comparison of α for USS Grampus & USS Halfbeak 
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Figure 61: Comparison of β for USS Grampus & USS Halfbeak 
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Figure 62: Comparison of ‘q’ for USS Grampus & USS Halfbeak 
 
Of specific interest was the variation in q as a representative of the goodness of repair 
as shown in Figure 62. 
 
For USS Grampus the q averaged 0.828 based on an initial guess of 0.5 entered into 
the parameter estimator and a non-informative Bayesian prior.  Accordingly, the 
value of q close to q = 1 (i.e. as-bad-as-old) indicated that the repair to the engine 
does not significantly rejuvenate the engine (i.e. reduce the Virtual Age (VA) of the 
engine).  However, the β ≈ 1 shows a constant, if very slightly increasing failure rate. 
 
Conversely, for USS Halfbeak the q averaged 0.71, again based on a guess of 0.5 and 
a non-informative Bayesian prior.  This result and distribution can be seen in Figure 
62 and leaves the impression that the maintenance effectiveness of the USS Halfbeak 
repairs were higher than for the USS Grampus.  However, given the findings from 
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Chapter 6:  Role of ‘q’ in Analysis of Realistic Cases (i.e. KIJIM GRP Type I is less 
sensitive to exact values of q for q > 0.2) then this difference is academic.  Rather 
both these engines should be treated similarly.  Furthermore, the key to this 
comparison is the value of β which varies significantly between the two systems; USS 
Grampus - β =  and USS Halfbeak - β = .  Again the Chapter 6:  Role of ‘q’ in 
Analysis of Realistic Cases highlighted that the KIJIMA Type I equation was very 
sensitive to small variation in β. 
 
Case 4A Solution – Valve Housing (Part No 710085-1) Serial No 1244 and 10484 
 
As part of this study various aircraft System Project Offices (the organization 
responsible for the sustainment of particular weapon systems) were approached for 
component level data.  The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Maritime Patrol 
System Project Office (MPSPO) provided the following data on the Valve Housing 
(Part No 710085-1), from 1 of the 4 Allison T56A-14 turbo-propeller engines of the 
Lockheed P-3C Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft. 
 
Background on Lockheed P-3C Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
The RAAF operates 19 Lockheed AP-3C Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft in a variety 
of missions including Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Surface Warfare 
(ASuW), Search and Survivor Supply (SASS)81 and Surface Surveillance roles.  The 
                                                 
81  This differs from the more known Search and Rescue (SAR) role since being a fixed wing 
aircraft (in comparison with a rotary wing helicopter) the Lockheed P-3C Orion Maritime 
Patrol aircraft cannot actually rescue personnel. 
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original P-3C Orion was designed in 1960’s and 1970’s and the RAAF has been 
operating them since 1978 resulting in an average age of 23 years82.  While the RAAF 
has undertaken modifications over the years, the basic aircraft has essentially 
remained the same.  Furthermore, while the AP-3C Orion aircraft are based at RAAF 
Base Edinburgh in Adelaide, South Australia, they have a significant deployment 
schedule throughout the South Pacific, the South East Asian Archipelago and in more 
recent times, the Middle East.  Each of these deployment regions has different climate 
conditions.  More information on the RAAF AP-3C can be found at 
http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/organisation/technology/aircraft/orion.htm.  
 
 
Figure 63: Lockheed AP-3C Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
 
 
                                                 
82  CROWLEY, C. K., 'Meeting the Ageing Aircraft Challenge – A Life Cycle Management 
Philosophy for Optimizing Safety, Effectiveness And Economy – From “'Lust To Dust”', 
University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales, 
Canberra, September 2004, Table 1.1, pg20 
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Background on Valve Housing (Part No 780085-1) 
The Valve Housing comprises the top part of the propeller control assembly of the 
Allison T56A-14 turbo-propeller engine.  The Valve Housing contains the “brains” of 
the propeller, and is located in the top section of the propeller afterbody.   It is a very 
complex hydro-mechanical assembly, the components of which sense the pilot’s 
command and the propellers condition and then converts any disparity between the 
two into hydraulic actuation to restore the balance.  The valve housing incorporates 
the following sub assemblies: 
 
• Fly-weight sensing governor, 
• Alpha shaft, 
• Beta shaft, 
• Main and standby regulator valve, 
• Feather valve, and 
• Backup valve. 
 
Other functionality that is contained in the valve housing includes Engine RPM 
Governor, reverse blade angle control, Beta schedule, Airstart switch, Auxiliary pump 
cutout switch and beta light and pitchlock reset switch.  A picture of the valve 
housing is provided at Figure 64. 
 
The Valve Housing is considered safety critical since some of the consequences of 
the identified failure modes are assessed as catastrophic.  Accordingly, there is 
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prescribed preventative maintenance which, based on the current maintenance policy, 
is an Overhaul (OH) at 5500 Engine Hours. 
 
Previous Data Review on Valve Housing (Part No 780085-1) 
In 1982 a review of maintenance policy for the valve housing concluded that change 
to the maintenance policy from OH on condition to OH at 3850 engine hours was 
warranted.  Then in 1988 the maintenance policy this was changed to OH at 4500 
engine hours to align with the RAAF C130H aircraft which utilises the same 
engine/propeller configuration.  During 1990 a request to change the lifing policy to 
align the valve housing with the Hub and Blade was rejected for lack of supporting 
data.  In 1991 the Valve Housing was re-lifed twice, firstly to 5000 engine hours and 
then to 5500 engine hours. 
 
Between July 1993 and July 1998 there have been 203 recorded removals of valve 
housings, 92 of which have been failures, 55 of which occurred in flight.  Only 10 
items were recorded as being removed for OH after reaching the stated maintenance 
OH life. 
 
Removed for access (to the pump housing) and failure are highlighted as the two 
main reasons for the removal of Valve Housing which was verified by operating 
Squadron maintenance personnel.  Of the 56% of valve housings removed and 
forwarded to a maintenance facility for repair, 58% were found to be still serviceable.  
This was attributed to the complexity of the Valve Housing and the time required to 
fault find.  Bot of these factors have led to a perception that it is quicker and easier to 
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remove and replace the Valve Housing when a fault is indicated.  Furthermore, 22% 
of the Valve Housings forwarded for maintenance have actually failed; over half of 
these failures were attributed to electrical components and only 7% attributed to 
mechanical component failures. 
 
 
Figure 64: Valve Housing (Part No 780085-1) 
 
Data Provided on Valve Housing (Part No 780085-1) 
MPSPO provided data for 2 individual Value Housing assemblies; specifically Serial 
No 1244 and Serial No 10484.  The Failure Logs for both components are provided at 
Appendix 2 – Case 4A Data for Valve Housing (Part No 710085-1) – Serial No 1244 
and Appendix 3 – Case 4A Data for Valve Housing (Part No 710085-1) – Serial No 
10484.  The description of the various Failure Log descriptors is provided at 
Appendix 4 – Codes for Maintenance Management System for Case 4A Data – Valve 
Housing (Part No 710085-1).  Additionally, MPSPO were able to provide a fleet wide 
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MTBF versus time based on the simple non-parametric analysis provided in Equation 
55, a copy of which is provided at Figure 65. 
 
FailuresTotal
HoursOperatingTotalMTBF
_
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=  
Equation 55: MTBF Equation 
 
 
Valve Housing Historic Cumulative MTBF
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
M
TB
F 
(H
ou
rs
)
 
Figure 65: Valve Housing (Part No 710085-1) Historic Fleet MTBF 
 
From this data it was also possible to calculate the 90% upper and lower Confidence 
Limit MTBF using the equation at Equation 56:   This was completed and is attached 
at Figure 66. 
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Equation 56: Percentile Confidence Limit for MTBF 
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Figure 66: Valve Housing (Part No 710085-1) Historic Fleet MTBF with 90 Percentile 
Confidence Limits 
 
General Principles for the Data Analysis for Valve Housing (Part No 780085-1) 
To ensure consistency in the analysis of the Valve Housing data, a procedure was 
developed and is attached at Figure 68. 
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Data Analysis for Valve Housing (Part No 780085-1), Serial No 1244 
Following the procedure provided at Figure 68 an analysis of Value Housing (S/No 
1244) was undertaken.  To allow a comparison to be made from the failure data and 
the future prediction capability of the method, only 8 of the 11 data points were used 
by the Parameter Estimator to allow the comparison from the CIF simulation with the 
remaining 3 data points.  A CIF plot of the data for Value Housing (S/No 1244) is at 
Figure 67. 
 
Data Analysis for Valve Housing (Part No 780085-1), Serial No 1244 
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Figure 67: CIF Plot for Value Housing Serial No 1244 
 
 
 162 
 
Step 1 – Test of Recurrence Rate Trend and Independent Interrecurrent Time (Serial 
No 1244) 
Based on the procedure provided in paragraphs 16.5.1 and 16.5.2 of MEEKER and 
ESCOBAR 83 it was possible to evaluate the interrecurrent times for Value Housing 
(S/No 1244) for checking point-process model assumptions.  This is shown through: 
 
• Graphical review of Hours Between Maintenance Actions versus 
Maintenance Action as shown in Figure 69, and 
• Review of Serial Correlation between adjacent interrecurrent times by 
plotting the Hours Between Maintenance Actions versus Lag-1 Hours 
Between Maintenance Actions shown in Figure 70.  Additionally, it was 
possible to calculate Pearson's r correlation coefficient as a measure of the 
serial correlation of the Hours Between Maintenance Actions data.  For 
Value Housing (S/No 1244) this was calculated as -0.4038. 
 
                                                 
83  MEEKER, W.Q. and ESCOBAR, L.A., loc cit. 
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Figure 68: Case 4A Data Analysis Flowchart 
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Figure 69: Hours Between Maintenance Actions versus Maintenance Action (S/No 1244) 
 
Based on the results from Figure 69 and Figure 70 it was unclear whether the Valve 
Housing S/No 1244 has independent interrecurrent times.  However, Pearson's r 
correlation coefficient of -0.4038 appears to indicate that there is some dependence.   
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Figure 70: Hours Between Maintenance Actions versus Lag-1 Maintenance Action (S/No 1244) 
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Step 2 – Implementation of an ORP and NHPP Solution 
Regardless of this result the implementation of an ORP and NHPP solution to the 
Value Housing (S/No 1244) was undertaken to help facilitate a comparison of the 
results of the model. 
 
The ORP solution was based on a simple 2-parameter Weibull estimation of the 
failure only data, noting there was only a single OH in the data.  This 
failure/suspension data was entered in Reliasoft Weibull++ (V5) software to estimate 
α and β using the Most Likelihood Estimators (MLE) option.  A copy of the 
Weibull++ solution for Value Housing (S/No 1244) is provided at Figure 71. 
 
Additionally, since the Pearson's r correlation coefficient of -0.4038 appears to 
indicate that there is some dependence, a HPP solution cannot to apply.  Accordingly, 
a NHPP estimation procedure was undertaken based on MLE for α and β using the 
formula from MEEKER, et al84 as shown in Equation 57 and Equation 58. 
 
                                                 
84  MEEKER, et al, op cit, pg 413 
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Equation 57: MLE for α 
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Equation 58: MLE for β 
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The results for the ordinary Renewal Process (RP) and a NHPP solution, both based 
on the assumption that the underlying TTF distribution is a 2-parameter Weibull are 
presented at Table 17. 
 
Parameter 
Estimates 
2-Parameter Weibull 
Distribution 
Power Law NHPP 
α 2632.53 766 
β 1.95 1.184 
Table 17: Parameter Estimates for α and β for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
 
Based on the parameters in Table 17 it is possible to compare the model to the ORP 
and NHPP results through a simulated ORP and NHPP CIFs. 
 
Step 3 – Selection of αmin, αmax and αguess 
Based on guidance provided in Table 7 for the selection of αmin and αmax and Table 9 
for the selection of αguess it was possible to select an initial boundary for α as shown in 
Table 18. 
 
Parameter Value Rationale for selecting Value 
αmin 1 Since the data doesn’t show a lower boundary, set to 
the most extreme value 
αmax 3800 Based on 2xMTBF where MTBF= αguess 
αguess 1900 Given the Fleet MTBF versus time is constant it is 
possible to assume β = 1 and therefore it is possible to 
use αguess = MTBF of the fleet data from Figure 65.  
Furthermore, since the point estimate MTBF, which is 
very close to the 90% lower confidence limit, it is 
possible to just use the point estimate MTBF of the 
fleet data from Figure 65. 
Table 18: Initial Selection of αmin, αmax and αguess for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
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Step 4 – Initial Run Parameter Estimator 
The next step was to run the parameter estimator using the parameters from Table 18 
with an Interleave = 1 for 1000 iterations providing the results in Table 19. 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
α 1077 326 
β 1.569 0.305 
qPM 0.825 0.386 
qCM 0.775 0.402 
Table 19: Initial Run Parameter Estimator for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
 
Step 5 – Review the Autocorrelation Chart and Choose Interleave Parameter Value 
Based on the autocorrelation values for the data set as shown in Figure 72, an 
Interleave value of 20 is recommended to reduce the possible effects of 
autocorrelation. 
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Figure 72:  Autocorrelation Graph for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
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Step 6 – View α Coverage 
Figure 73 shows that the initial values for α were too large and therefore they can be 
reduced in order to reduce computation time. 
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Figure 73:  α Coverage for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
 
Accordingly, the initial boundary for α as shown in Table 18 is modified as shown in 
Table 20. 
 
Parameter Initial Values Extreme Left/Right Data 
Points from Figure 73 
Value 
αmin 1 290 200 
αmax 3800 2581 2600 
αguess 1900 1100 1100 
Interleave 1 n/a 20 
Table 20: Final Selection of αmin, αmax and αguess for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
 
 
 
 170 
 
Step 7 – Re-run Parameter Estimator 
The next step was to re-run the parameter estimator using the modified parameters 
from Table 20 with an Interleave = 20.  As described in Chapter 4:  Mathematical 
Set-up of Each Case the parameter estimator output’s a number of sets of <α, β, qPM 
and qCM> data.  This iterative nature of the results can be seen in Figure 74, Figure 
75, Figure 76 and Figure 77.  A statistical summary of these data sets is provided at 
Table 21. 
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Figure 74: Iterative Variation of α and β for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
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Figure 75: Iterative Variation of α versus β Graph for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
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Figure 76: Iterative Variation of qCM versus qPM for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
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Figure 77: Iterative Variation of qCM and qPM for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
α 1096 347 
β 1.587 0.339 
qPM 0.806 0.408 
qCM 0.865 0.379 
Table 21: Final Run Parameter Estimator for Valve Housing (S/No 1244) 
 
Step 8 – Re-run the CIF Simulator 
Based on the number of sets of <α, β, qPM and qCM> data from the parameter estimator 
it is possible to provide a CIF curve of Valve Housing (S/No 1244), including the 
non-parametric 90% confidence limits.  A graphical representation of the average CIF 
curve, including the non-parametric 90% confidence limits initial data input into the 
model, ORP (2-parameter Weibull) and NHPP (Power Law), is provided at Figure 
78:. 
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Figure 78: CIF Curve for Valve Housing Serial No 1244 
 
As can be seen from Figure 78 the simulated GRP CIF was quite accurate in 
identifying the next TTFs, especially when compared to the NHPP and the RP model 
outcomes.  Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that both the q associated with the 
preventative maintenance was very similar to the corrective maintenance. The value 
of q highlighted the fact that the repairs appear to be less effective at rejuvenating the 
component to a state that was only slightly better than the NHPP assumption of “as-
bad-as-old”. 
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Data Analysis for Valve Housing (Part No 780085-1), Serial No 10484 
Following the procedure provided at Figure 68, an analysis of Value Housing (S/No 
10484) was undertaken.  To allow a comparison to be made from the failure data and 
the future prediction capability of the method, only 8 of the 9 data points were used 
by the Parameter Estimator to allow the comparison from the CIF simulation with the 
remaining data point.  Unfortunately, due to the close proximity of the OH, only a 
single (in lieu of 3 for S/No 1244) data point could be projected.  A CIF plot of the 
data for Value Housing (S/No 10484) is at Figure 79. 
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Figure 79: CIF Plot for Value Housing Valve Housing Serial No 10484 
 
Step 1 – Test of Recurrence Rate Trend and Independent Interrecurrent Time 
Based on the procedure provided in paragraphs 16.5.1 and 16.5.2 of MEEKER et al85 
it was possible to evaluate the interrecurrent times for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
for checking point-process model assumptions. This is shown through: 
                                                 
85  ibid 
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• Graphical review of Hours Between Maintenance Actions versus 
Maintenance Action as shown in Figure 80, and 
• Review of Serial Correlation between adjacent interrecurrent times by 
plotting the Hours Between Maintenance Actions versus Lag-1 Hours 
Between Maintenance Actions shown in Figure 81.  Additionally it was 
possible to calculate Pearson's r correlation coefficient of the Hours 
Between Maintenance Actions data.  For Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
this was calculated as –0.5399. 
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Figure 80: Hours Between Maintenance Actions versus Maintenance Action (S/No 10484) 
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Figure 81: Hours Between Maintenance Actions versus Lag-1 Maintenance Action (S/No 10484) 
 
Based on the results from Figure 80 and Figure 81 it was unclear whether the Valve 
Housing S/No 10484 has independent interrecurrent times.  However, Pearson's r 
correlation coefficient of –0.5399 appears to indicate that there is some dependence.   
 
Step 2 – Implementation of an ORP and NHPP Solution 
Notwithstanding this result the implementation of an ORP and NHPP solution to the 
Valve Housing (S/No 10484) was undertaken to help facilitate discussion of the 
results of the model. 
 
The ORP solution was based on a simple 2-parameter Weibull estimation of the 
failure only data, noting there was only a single OH in the data.  This data was 
entered in Reliasoft Weibull++ (V5) software to estimate α and β using the MLE 
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option.  A copy of the Weibull++ solution for Value Housing (S/No 10484) is 
provided at Figure 82. 
 
Additionally, since the Pearson's r correlation coefficient of –0.5399 appears to 
indicate that there is some dependence, a HPP solution cannot be used to analyse this 
data.  Accordingly, a NHPP estimation procedure was undertaken based on MLE for 
α and β provided in paragraphs 15.2.1 and 15.2.2 of MEEKER et al86 as shown in 
Equation 57 and Equation 58.  The results are presented at Table 22. 
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Figure 82: Weibull++ (V5) MLE of α and β for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
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Parameter 
Estimates 
2-Parameter Weibull 
Distribution 
Power Law NHPP 
α 3194.85 1028.6 
β 1.89 1.139 
Table 22: Parameter Estimates for α and β for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
 
Based on these the parameters in Table 22 it was possible to compare the model to the 
RP and NHPP results through a simulated RP and NHPP CIFs. 
 
Step 3 – Selection of αmin, αmax and αguess 
Based on guidance provided in Table 7 for the selection of αmin and αmax and Table 9 
for the selection of αguess it was possible to select an initial boundary for α.  This 
initial analysis was the same as conducted for Serial No 10484 as shown in Table 18.  
Accordingly, Table 18 data was also used as the initial boundary for α for Serial No 
10484. 
 
Step 4 – Initial Run Parameter Estimator 
The next step was to run the parameter estimator using the parameters from Table 18 
with an Interleave = 1 providing the results in Table 23. 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
α 1544 442 
β 1.825 0.468 
qCM 0.392 0.375 
qPM 0.836 0.386 
Table 23: Initial Run Parameter Estimator for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
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Step 5 – Review the Autocorrelation Chart and Choose Interleave Parameter Value 
Based on the autocorrelation values for the data set as shown in Figure 83, an 
Interleave value of 20 is recommended to reduce the possible effects of 
autocorrelation. 
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Figure 83:  Autocorrelation Graph for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
 
Step 6 – View α Coverage 
Figure 84 shows that the initial values for α were too large and therefore they can be 
reduced in order to reduce computation time. 
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Figure 84: α Coverage for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
 
Accordingly, the initial boundary for α as shown in Table 18 was modified as shown 
in Table 24. 
 
Parameter Initial Values Extreme Left/Right Data 
Points from Figure 84 
Value 
αmin 1 377 350 
αmax 3800 3378 3400 
αguess 1900 1544 1544 
Interleave 1 n/a 20 
Table 24: Final Selection of αmin, αmax and αguess for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
 
Step 7 – Re-run Parameter Estimator 
The next step was to re-run the parameter estimator using the modified parameters 
from Table 24 with an Interleave = 20.  As described in Chapter 4:  Mathematical 
Set-up of Each Case the parameter estimator output a number <α, β, qPM and qCM> 
data sets.  This iterative nature of the results can be seen in Figure 85, Figure 86, 
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Figure 87 and Figure 88.  A statistical summary of these data sets is provided at Table 
25. 
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Figure 85: Iterative Variation of α and β for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
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Figure 86: Iterative Variation of α versus β Graph for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
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Figure 87: Iterative Variation of qCM versus qPM for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
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Figure 88: Iterative Variation of qCM and qPM for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
α 1570 431 
β 1.873 0.46 
qPM 0.343 0.352 
qCM 0.831 0.379 
Table 25: Final Run Parameter Estimator for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
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Step 6 – Re-run the CIF Simulator 
Based on the number of sets of <α, β, qPM and qCM> data from the parameter estimator 
it was possible to provide a CIF curve of Valve Housing (S/No 10848), including the 
non-parametric 90% confidence limits.  A graphical representation of the average CIF 
curve, including the non-parametric 90% confidence limits, initial data input into the 
model, RP (2-parameter Weibull) and NHPP (Power Law), is provided at Figure 89. 
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Figure 89: CIF Curve for Valve Housing (S/No 10484) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 89 the simulated GRP CIF is more accurate in identifying 
the next TTF’\s, especially when compared to the RP model outcomes.  Furthermore, 
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it was interesting to observe the large difference between the q’s associated with the 
preventative maintenance (e.g. q = 0.343) which was significantly lower than the 
corrective maintenance (e.g. very similar q = 0.831).  This difference in q highlighted 
the fact that the repairs appear to be less effective at rejuvenating the component to a 
state that was only slightly better than the NHPP assumption of “as-bad-as-old”. 
 
Case 4A Solution  
Background 
For the reasons previously stated the Case 4A results are based on simulated data for 
a repair item with two distinct failure modes which are not independent.  The input to 
the data simulator is provided in Table 26. 
 
Failure Mode 1 Failure Mode 2 
αFM1= 150 hours 
βFM1 = 1.5 
αFM2 = 300 hours 
βFM2 = 3.5 
qinspection_FM1 = 0.5 qinspection_FM2 = 1 
qmaintenance_FM1 = 0.7 qmaintenance_FM2 = 0.2 
qmaintenance_FM1-2 = 1.2 qmaintenance_FM2-1 = 0.2 
Scheduled Inspection every 400 operating hours 
Table 26: Input to Data Simulator for Case 4A 
 
To allow comparison of the model to the data, the whole set of data less the last 5 
points was used by parameter estimator, while the simulator predicted the whole data 
set.  A copy of the simulated data is provided at Appendix 5 – Case 4A Data. 
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Parameter Estimation  
The estimator was run for 5,000 iterations with an interleave value of 5 resulting in 
1,000 parameter sets of the various parameters.  The initial guesses for the values are 
provided in Table 27. 
 
Failure Mode 1 Failure Mode 2 
αFM1 = 1 
βFM1 = 1 
αFM2 = 1 
βFM2 = 1 
qinspection_FM1 = 1 qinspection_FM2 = 1 
qmaintenance_FM1 = 0.5 qmaintenance_FM2 = 0.5 
qmaintenance_FM1-2 = 1 qmaintenance_FM2-1 = 1 
Table 27: Case 4A Guess Values for Parameter Estimator 
 
The results from the parameter estimator, including the variation over their individual 
space can be seen in Figure 90.  From Figure 90 it possible to observe the variation of 
the two dependent failure modes. 
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Figure 90: Variation of α and β Parameters for Case 4A Simulated Data 
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The variation in the α and β parameters for each failure mode can be observed better 
in Figure 91 and Figure 92 respectively. 
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Figure 91: Comparison of α and β Parameters by Failure Mode for Case 4A Simulated Data 
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Figure 92: α and β Parameters Sets for Case 4A Simulated Data  
 
Given the set-up of Case 4A it was also possible to observe the values of the q 
parameter for each failure mode for: 
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• Inspection, 
• corrective maintenance (CM), and 
• dependant q values for the CM activity. 
 
Figure 93 provides a graphical representation of the variation of q for each of these 
factors while Figure 94 provides a comparison of q by failure mode. 
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Figure 93: Variation of ‘q’ Parameters for Case 4A Simulated Data 
 
As part of the results from the parameter estimator for α, β and q each of the 
parameters was assumed to be normally distributed and a mean and standard 
deviation calculated including Pearson's r correlation coefficient.  The resulting 
values are provided in Table 28. 
 
 
 188 
 
0 0.5 1 1.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
q(Maint) (FM1 vs FM2)
q(Maint) (FM1-2 vs FM2-1)
q (Maintenance)
FM1 & FM1-2
FM
2 
&
 F
M
2-
1
0 0.5 1 1.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
qI (FM1 vs FM2)
q (Inspection)
FM1
FM
2
 
Figure 94: Comparison of ‘q’ by Failure Mode for Case 4A Simulated Data 
 
Parameter Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Pearson's r Correlation 
Coefficient 
αFM1 230.161 141.239 -0.147 
αFM2 196.247 141.207 0.07 
βFM1 1.657 0.741 -0.123 
βFM2 1.49 0.657 0.029 
qFM1_Inspection 0.751 0.435 0.062 
qFM2_Inspection 0.759 0.425 0.018 
qFM1_CM 0.7 0.437 0.031 
qFM1 due to FM2 0.732 0.445 -0.097 
qFM2_CM 0.718 0.446 -0.046 
qFM2 due to FM1 0.741 0.415 0.08 
Table 28: Summary of Parameter Estimators for USS Grampus Data 
 
CIF Simulation 
Each of the set from the parameter estimator were then simulated 100 times and the 
averages recorded resulting in 1,000 CIF curves.  The 1,000 CIF curves were then 
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averaged to find the average CIF curve for all parameter sets, and the non-parametric 
90% upper and lower confidence limits.  The resulting CIF curve is provided at 
Figure 95. 
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Figure 95: CIF Curve for Case 4A Simulated Data 
 
As can been seen from Figure 95, the results predict the additional 5 data points, and 
the non-parametric ninety percentile upper and lower confidence limits effectively 
bound the simulated data. 
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion  
 
Summary 
Over the duration of this research (since June 2002) I have seen the concept of the 
General Renewal Process (i.e. introducing Virtual Age into the Stochastic Point 
Processes to enable them to represent the full spectrum of repair assumptions) appears 
to have emerged at the forefront of academic literature.  Furthermore, while there is a 
wide variation in potential models, a number of these models utilise an “age 
reduction” technique, (typically referred to as GRP), which is now widely accepted.  
As such, the Reliability Engineering community is beginning to see the benefit of 
moving away from the unrealistic maintenance assumptions of either the Ordinary 
Renewal Process (ORP) (i.e. as-good-as-new) or the Non-Homogenous Poisson 
Process (NHPP) (i.e. as-bad-as-old).  Moreover, KAMINSKIY, et al87, YANEZ, et 
al88, METTAS, et al89 and JACK90 have all developed Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator (MLE) approaches to the single failure mode problem, some of which are 
implemented in Reliability software91.  Additionally, HURTADO et al92 provided an 
alternative to the MLE through the application of a Genetic Algorithm (GA). 
                                                 
87  KAMINSKIY, M. and KRIVTSOV, V., loc cit. 
88  YANEZ, et al, loc cit. 
89  METTAS, et al, loc cit. 
90  JACK, N., loc cit. 
91  Weibull++ (V7) by Reliasoft (http://www.reliasoft.com/Weibull/index.htm) and Bayesian 
reliability assessment tool (BRASS) (V1.2) by Prediction Technologies 
(http://www.prediction-technologies.com/products/brass.htm) for additional information. 
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While these solutions offer resolution of the maintenance assumption, they do not 
address the full spectrum of complexities that exists either in the Aviation industry, or 
in wider reliability community.  Specifically, these complexities include the 
simultaneous ability to address: 
 
• imperfect corrective and/or imperfect preventative maintenance for 
multiple failure modes existing in a single component;  
• failure mode dependencies (e.g. repair of failure mode 1 may effect the 
Virtual Age of failure mode 2 by making the future failure earlier or later); 
• imperfect inspection for multiple failure modes for a single component; 
• data uncertainty in terms of unknown failure times (i.e. observe a failure at 
next inspection but cannot establish exactly when the failure occurred 
within the inspection period); and 
• use of “soft-data” (e.g. data from similar equipment such as previous 
models, engineering judgement, etc) as an input to model. 
 
Despite this trend the current engineering literature does not include any discussion 
on either the implementation or interpretation of the results (e.g. What does q = 0.67 
mean?  What should I do and why should I care?).  Consequently, there is a potential 
that without an understanding of the underlying GRP methodology and subsequent 
                                                                                                                                           
92  HURTADO, et al, loc cit. 
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meaning and sensitivity of all the GRP variables, the GRP simply becomes a different 
type of 3-parameter Weibull equation for an analyst to use. 
 
One of the reasons for the increasing interest in GRP is the desire for a more accurate 
model which may lead to a reduced Total Cost of Ownership (TCO).  There is a high 
level of interest in the aviation industry which is dependent on the accuracy of failure 
prediction to determine spares holdings to maximise Operational Availability (Ao).  
When accuracy is assured profits are maximised through optimal utilisation of the 
individual aircraft.  To achieve this, aviation operators (civil and military) the airlines 
will often purchase additional “insurance” spares to ensure the ALDT, specifically the 
delay due to a lack of a spare, is minimised.  However, the cost of these “insurance” 
spares, both in terms of initial purchase and on-going repairs can represent a 
significant portion (up to 10%) of the TCO.  For example, assuming a TCO for a 
major defence system is at least 500 million dollars (usually 10 times this), the 
management of RI’s is therefore critical to ensure efficient and effective use of 
government, and ultimately, taxpayer, monies.  Moreover, given the negligible profit 
margin for the commercial Aviation industry in the post 911 era, dependable RI 
model that more accurately reflects the aviation environment is clearly warranted. 
 
Regardless of this need there are currently no solutions that simultaneously address 
the combined complexities of imperfect maintenance of multiple, dependent failure 
modes, imperfect inspections, data uncertainty and allow the contribution of various 
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soft-data.  Accordingly, the goal of this research was to address these complexities 
through completion of the following objectives: 
 
• Develop a more “realistic” GRP model which addresses imperfect 
maintenance of multiple, dependent failure modes and imperfect 
inspection. 
• Enable the use of a broader range of information type (i.e. engineering 
judgement, uncertain data, etc) with the explicit representation of all 
uncertainties, possibly through a Bayesian implementation. 
• Provide an insight into behaviour of the model with changes in parameters 
through exploring the meaning of the model parameters including relating 
these parameter to operational and environmental factors, and applying the 
model to “real” data. 
 
Research Contributions 
In response to this demonstrated need, research was undertaken to meet the above 
objectives above were conducted to address both the development and 
implementation of a GRP model which realistically represents the life of an RI.  The 
following summarises the research undertaken and illustrates the contributions to the 
management of RIs in the Aviation environment, and wider Reliability community. 
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Contribution 1 – Reformulate the GRP Model 
The first contribution was the adaptation of the GRP model to address the realistic life 
of an RI.  Specifically the transformation of the original single parameter, single 
failure mode KIJIMA Type I GRP model to a multivariate KIJIMA Type I GRP 
Model with the ability to manage: 
• Multiple dependant failure modes – it is highly unlikely that any 
component will have only one failure mode, let alone failure modes that 
are independent (e.g. failure of a mechanical bearing will increase the heat 
within a component and may increase the probability of future “heat 
related” failure modes); 
• Imperfect corrective maintenance/preventative maintenance/inspection –
maintenance activities are conducted by a human and, by it’s very nature, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of incorrect maintenance; and 
• Uncertainty in failure times – given there are components where a failure 
is not observable during operation but only observed, and therefore 
repaired, during scheduled inspection point and it is reasonable that both 
are included in any model. 
 
To allow the simple single parameter, single failure mode KIJIMA Type I GRP 
model to cater for these realistic additions, 10 cases were developed as part of this 
research allowing the analyst a board range of models that can be utilised in the 
modelling of any aviation RI based on: 
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(1) complexity of the component, and/or 
(2) accuracy of failure/maintenance data. 
 
The contribution from this part of the research was the development of a new GRP 
based model which has the ability to simulate the CIF of a representative life of an RI 
including imperfect maintenance of multiple, dependent failure modes, imperfect 
inspections and delays in repair actions. 
 
Contribution 2 – Develop Bayesian Parameter Estimation Procedure 
Given one of the objectives of the research was to ensure that any solution was able to 
utilise a broader range of information type (i.e. engineering judgement, uncertain 
data, etc) with the explicit representation of all uncertainties a Bayesian solution to 
the 10 Cases above was developed.  The development of the Bayesian solution 
allows: 
 
• Use of prior knowledge including engineering judgement; and 
• Ability to manage uncertainty in the data (e.g. failure times of various 
individual failure modes, etc) and possible dependencies between failure 
mode (e.g. repair of failure mode 1 may effect the Virtual Age of failure 
mode 2). 
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The contribution from this part of the research was the development of Bayesian 
estimation procedure as the solution to the new GRP models which addressed the 
realistic life of an RI. 
 
Contribution 3 – Develop a Numerical Procedure to Solve Bayesian Parameter 
Estimation Procedure 
Given the GRP model produced was mathematically intractable, the research led to 
the development of a numerical estimation procedure to estimate the parameters for 
the Bayesian GRP model described above.  As part of the development of the 
numerical estimation procedure an alternative sampler, known as the Slice Sampler, 
developed by NEAL93 was utilised in lieu of the mode widely used Gibbs sampler or 
Metropolis-Hasting algorithm.  The selection of the Slice Sampler was due to its 
unique ability to work with little to no tuning, or knowledge of an appropriate 
distribution.  Furthermore, the Slice Sampling technique has the ability to: 
 
• evaluate a “black-box” function that is proportional to its density, and in 
some cases, to also evaluate the gradient of this function; and 
• include a Bayesian prior to facilitate the input of soft-data. 
 
Unfortunately, the implementation of the Slice Sampler was not without difficulty.  
The two main challenges were (1) establishing an f(x), and (2) limited guidance of the 
                                                 
93  NEAL, R, loc cit 
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implementation since, although the Slice Sampler has been informally published in 
2003, there is no literature of implementation of this sampling technique. 
 
Contribution 4 – Insight into Behaviour of the Model with Changes in Parameters 
The final contribution of this research was insight into the behaviour of the GRP 
model for all cases, simple and complex, which has been missing from engineering 
literature.  This insight allows the reader to answer the traditional question of “so 
what?”.  Should I spend my limited budget on fixing imperfect inspection or 
imperfect maintenance?  Are there some rules of thumb to support these questions?  
Which GRP model should I use and why?  Without acknowledging the methodology 
there is the potential that the results, and potentially the decision(s) that may result 
from the analysis to be in error.    For example, it has been observed that the Time To 
Failure (TTF) of the KIJIMA Type I GRP model is: 
 
• very sensitive to variation of low values of q (e.g. 0 ≤ q ≤ 0.2); and 
• very sensitive to variation in the value of β. 
 
Furthermore, when examining the effect on multiple q, whether representing change 
qinspection or qmaintenance, there is a significant difference in effect based on the link to the 
dominant failure mode.  In this circumstance the dominant failure mode is the one 
that results in the most renewals.  Specifically that slight variations to the dominant 
failure mode will have comparatively larger impact on the CIF curve.  Therefore, any 
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resource (i.e. personnel and/or funding) consideration should be aligned to “fixing” 
the dominant failure mode. 
 
Future Area(s) of Research 
Not being content with this representing the end of the journey there are some facets 
of this research that should be continued.  They are as follows: 
 
Access to Aviation Datasets 
Given the issue with data at the time of writing the main aim of the additional work is 
to apply this technique to a number of actual Australian Department of Defence 
(DOD) aviation datasets for a series of parts to examine the variation of the GRP 
parameters.  There is particular interest in comparing q between items due to 
operational factors such as the operating location, maintenance facility/staff, 
maintenance tools/manuals/procedures, incorporation of a design 
change/modification, mission profile, etc. 
 
The ability to get access to high fidelity datasets based on individual serial number is 
assessed as likely since there are a number of large acquisition contracts94 which 
require Reliability Demonstration Tests as part of their contracts. 
 
                                                 
94  Project AIR 5077 – Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C), Project AIR 5402 – 
Multi-Role Tanker/Transport and Project AIR 9000 Phase 1A – Additional Troop Lift 
Helicopter 
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Transfer to to C++ Windows® based environment 
While not essential, one area to be completed in the transfer of the algorithms for the 
individual cases from development environment, MathCad®, to C++ Windows® 
based environment including optimising the code for speed.  This development would 
be expected to aid the model’s commercial application/acceptance. 
 
Use of q as a Metric within Performance Based Logistic (PBL) Contracts 
One area of significant interest to the author, and area of work for the next 2 years 
(i.e. January 2006- December 2007) is the possible use of the GRP equations as a 
measure of the effectiveness of maintenance activities.  Given the Australian DOD 
desire, reflecting the majority of Western militaries, to outsource “non-core” 
activities, in this case Deeper Maintenance (DM) and RI Maintenance, new 
contractual frameworks are being constructed to focus on achievement of contract 
outcome rather than monitoring the process.  Specifically recent Australian DOD 
research95 has shown that while the outcomes are aspirational statements of military 
priorities, they are underpinned by physical performance characteristics.  
Accordingly, the RAM characteristics of Availability, Reliability, Maintainability and 
Supportability of an RI provided a framework for developing ASD outcomes (see 
Figure 96) for all systems (e.g. defined at a whole of aircraft level) and RIs. 
 
                                                 
95  RICHARDSON, D. and JACOPINO, A., “Use of R&M Measures in Australian Defence 
Aviation Performance Based Contracts”, Reliability, Availability and Maintainability 
Symposium (RAMS), Newport Beach, CA, USA, 2006 
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Availability
SupportabilityMaintainabilityReliability
 
Figure 96: Relationship between Availability and Reliability, Maintainability & Supportability 
 
As a part of this activity Strategic [Australian] Defence and Aviation doctrine was 
then examined to align system level characteristics to Defence priorities.   Ultimately, 
Systems Readiness (Availability), Mission Reliability (Reliability), Light Footprint 
(Maintainability) and Assurance of Supply (Supportability) were chosen and are 
defined in Table 29.  These metrics are defined in detail, including their 
implementation, in the Australian DOD Aviation System Division (ASD) 
Performance Based Contract (PBC) Handbook96, which was a co-authored by the 
author of this paper. 
 
Where the use of q has the greatest potential to benefit is in the management of the 
Deeper Maintenance and/or RI contracts.  Additional Australian DOD research has 
shown that the performance at this level can be defined in terms of three outcomes as 
follows: 
 
• Timeliness of maintenance/repair; 
• Quality of Workmanship, and 
• Consistency of maintenance/repair. 
                                                 
96  Aviation System Division (ASD) Performance Based Contract (PBC) Handbook – Guiding 
Principles and Performance Framework, 1st Ed., Australian Department of Defence, 
Canberra, Australia, 2005 
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Clearly the GRP framework by definition lends itself to a measurement of the Quality 
of Workmanship metric, however, the key to its utilisation within a contractual 
framework is linking the value of q to the extent of the maintenance/repair 
Contractor’s responsibilities.  That is to ensure that the maintenance/repair Contractor 
can control this value.  This is a non-trivial exercise especially considering that under 
current Australian DOD policy, approximately 30% of the At Stake margin97 of these 
contracts may be linked to the performance of q. 
 
Outcome Explanation 
Systems readiness The state of readiness of systems required to perform a specified 
mission or task. 
Mission Success A measure of the ability of an item to perform its specified mission 
under stated operating conditions. 
Light footprint Minimising the logistics support required for Weapon Systems in 
order to reduce vulnerability to attack and dependence on 
transportation. 
Availability of Parts Confidence in the provision of the right materiel and services, at the 
right place, at the right time and with the right quality, and to sustain 
that support over time. 
Table 29: Summary of ASD Sustainment Outcomes 
 
                                                 
97  The At Stake margin typically is equal to the amount of profit of approximately 10% – 15% 
of contract price.  For example, if the annual cost of an individual contract is $10,000,000 and 
has an At Stake margin – profit margin = 10%, then the Quality of Workmanship metric will 
be equal to $300,000 per year.  This will clearly get the attention of the contractor; the whole 
idea of performance based contracting. 
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Appendix 1 – Case 1A Data98 
 
Renewal Number USS Grampus Data  (‘000 Hours) USS Halfbeak Data (‘000 Hours) 
0 0 0 
1 0.86 1.382 
2 1.258 2.99 
3 1.317 4.124 
4 1.442 6.827 
5 1.897 7.472 
6 2.011 7.567 
7 2.122 8.845 
8 2.439 9.45 
9 3.203 9.794 
10 3.298 10.848 
11 3.902 11.993 
12 3.91 12.3 
13 4 15.413 
14 4.247 16.497 
15 4.411 17.352 
16 4.456 17.632 
17 4.517 18.122 
18 4.899 19.067 
19 4.91 19.172 
20 5.676 19.299 
21 5.755 19.36 
22 6.137 19.686 
23 6.221 19.94 
24 6.311 19.944 
25 6.613 20.121 
26 6.975 20.132 
27 7.335 20.431 
28 8.158 20.525 
29 8.498 21.057 
30 8.69 21.061 
31 9.042 21.309 
32 9.33 21.31 
33 9.394 21.378 
                                                 
98  MEEKER, W.Q.et al, op cit, pg 395. 
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Renewal Number USS Grampus Data  (‘000 Hours) USS Halfbeak Data (‘000 Hours) 
34 9.426 21.391 
35 9.872 21.456 
36 10.191 21.461 
37 11.511 21.603 
38 11.575 21.658 
39 12.1 21.688 
40 12.126 21.75 
41 12.681 21.815 
42 12.795 21.82 
43 13.399 21.822 
44 13.668 21.888 
45 13.78 21.93 
46 13.877 21.943 
47 14.007 21.946 
48 14.028 22.181 
49 14.035 22.311 
50 14.173 22.634 
51 14.173 22.635 
52 14.449 22.669 
53 14.587 22.691 
54 14.61 22.846 
55 15.07 22.947 
56 16 23.149 
57 - 23.305 
58 - 23.491 
59 - 23.526 
60 - 23.774 
61 - 23.791 
62 - 23.822 
63 - 24.006 
64 - 24.286 
65 - 25 
66 - 25.01 
67 - 25.048 
68 - 25.268 
69 - 25.4 
70 - 25.5 
71 - 25.518 
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Appendix 2 – Case 4A Data for Valve Housing (Part No 710085-1) – Serial No 1244 
 
Date Raised Serial Number 
LIFE 
SINCE OH
ENHRS 
LIFE 
SINCE 
NEW 
ENHRS 
RR Fault Symptom WFD USC Unserviceability Details FF MAT Maintenance Comment 
24 Mar 86 1244 432.9 432.9 01 28 DEG MICRO ON ALPHA SHAFT WILL NOT ACTUATE 28 03 
28 DEG MICRO ON 
ALPHA SHAFT WILL NOT 
ACTUATE 
03 02 
MICRO REP 
WITH A SERV 
ITEM 
18 Apr 86 1244 497.0 497.0 01 28 DEG SW TO BE CALIBRATED AND TESTED 27 06 
28 DEG SW TO BE 
CALIBEATED AND 
TESTED 
07 03 
MICRO 
ADJUST 
CHECK SERV 
10 Feb 92 1244 2253.7 2253.7 01 NO FEATHER   01 02 FAILED FEATHER MICRO 03 02   
03 Jun 92 1244 2444.5 2444.5 01 WONT PULL REVERSE HORSEPOWER 02 07 
METS SUSPECT STICKY 
PILOT VALVE 02 02 BB 
04 Jun 93 1244 2444.5 2444.5 01 
PITCHLOCK RESET OUT OF 
ADJUSTMENT - FOUND 
DURING INSTALLATION 
27 06 
PITCHLOCK RESET 
SWITCH OUT OF 
ADJUSTMENT 
09 02 BB 
12 May 94 1244 2935.1 2935.1 01 TWENTY EIGHT DEGREE SW MADE CONTINUALLY 02 03 FAILED SW 03 02 
AA  ALPHA 
SHAFT 
SWITCH 
REPLACED 
07 Nov 94 1244 3015.4 3015.4 01 
BETA LIGHT FAILS TO 
ILLUMINATE IN GROUNG 
ANGE 
02 11 BETA LIGHT INOP 03 02 BB 
01 Aug 95 1244 3313.4 3313.4 10 FLUCTUTATIONS BEYOND SERV LIMITS 02 02       
OH 
CONDUCTED 
01 Aug 95 1244 3313.4 3313.4 03   00 00   01 07 BB 
01 Mar 99 1244 651.1 3964.5 01 ELEC FAIL 31 03   03 02 
BETA SWITCH 
REPLACED 
WITH SERV 
ITEM 
12 May 00 1244 1044.4 4357.8 01 
OVERSPEED TO 102 
PERCENT DURING NTS 
CHECK 
01 06 MECHANICAL GOVERNING 09 02 AA 
28 Oct 00 1244 1051.5 4364.9 01 OVERSWING PLUS MINUS 3 PERCENT 02 02 SUSPECT GOVERNOR 15 02 AA 
08 Apr 02 1244 1408.0 4721.4 01 
NO CHANGE INDICATED 
WHEN REVERSE HP 
ADJUSTED 
02 02 RAN OUT OF REVERSE HP ADJUSTMENT 15 02 AA 
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Appendix 3 – Case 4A Data for Valve Housing (Part No 710085-1) – Serial No 10484 
 
Date Raised Serial Number 
LIFE 
SINCE OH
ENHRS 
LIFE 
SINCE 
NEW 
ENHRS 
RR Fault Symptom WFD USC Unserviceability Details FF MAT Maintenance Comment 
27 Jul 84 10848 902.5 902.5 01 NTS INOP LT AT FEATHER 01 03 AIR START MICRO SW CONTINUALLY MADE 07 03 
AIR START 
SWITCH 
ADJUSTED 
05 Aug 85 10848 1254.8 1254.8 01 FAILED 26 06 OUT OF TOLERANCE 01 04 
FEATHER 
LIGHT                   
TX 
12 Nov 86 10848 1581.3 1581.3 01 NO FEATHER LIGHT 01 03 MICRO SWITCH FAILURE 09 02   
08 Jun 90 10848 3073.4 3073.4 01 NTS LIGHT INTERMITTANT 02 10 FEATHER MICRO ADJUSTED 07 01   
15 Oct 90 10848 3232.0 3232.0 01 
POWERLEVER TO REVERSE 
ENG RPM DECAYED 
SECURED ENG 
02 10 FAULT COULD NOT BE REPRODUCED 02 02   
05 Aug 92 10848 4036.8 4036.8 10 ENG OSPEED WHEN SYNC ON 02 06 
SPEED BIAS MOTOR 
IRRATIC 02 02 BB 
07 Aug 98 10848 5461.3 5461.3 03         01 07 AA 
24 Nov 99 10848 216.7 5678.0 01 NIL FEATHER VALVE LITE DURING NTS CHECK 01 02 
INOPERATIVE FEATHER 
VALVE MICRO 03 02 
AA  FEATHER 
VLV MICRO 
REPLACED 
28 Nov 02 10848 1410.3 6871.6 01 ELECTRICAL FAILURE 04     03 02 REPAIR 
24 Aug 05 10848 1566.7 7028.0   CURRENT LIFE STILL SERV             
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Appendix 4 – Codes for Maintenance Management System for Case 4A 
Data – Valve Housing (Part No 710085-1) 
 
Fault Found 
A set of mutually-exclusive codes that describe the nature of any fault found (if any) on an item 
or MMI during the course of a Job or Arising. These codes are listed and defined below and can 
be found on the reverse side of the EE435 form or the back page of a blank CAMM2 Travel Tag. 
 
01 No Fault 06 Moisture 11 Faulty 
Lubrication 
16 Faulty 
Ordnance 
02 Mechanical
Component 
Fail 
07 Bad 
Adjust/Align 
12 Corroded 17 Ordnance 
Feed/ 
Release Fault 
03 Electrical 
Component 
Fail 
08 Damage 13 Faulty 
Manufacture 
18 Software/Data 
Fault 
04 Open 
Circuit 
09 Out of 
Tolerance 
14 System 
Tolerance 
High/Low 
  
05 Short 
Circuit 
10 Contaminated 15 Expected 
Deterioration
  
 
Maintenance Action Taken 
A set of mutually-exclusive codes that describe the type of preventative or corrective 
maintenance performed on an item or MMI in order to resolve or complete a Job or Arising. 
These codes are listed and defined below and can be found on the reverse side of the EE435 form 
or the back page of a blank CAMM2 Travel Tag. 
  
01 Repair in 
Situ 
04 Check/Test Serv 07 Overhaul 10 Calibration 
02 Repair 05 ESA/Throwaway 08 Mod/STI 
Incorp 
11 Special 
Servicing 
03 Adjust/Align 06 Bay Service 09 Throwaway 
Storage 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 207 
 
Reason for Report 
A set of mutually-exclusive codes that describe the original reason why a Job or Arising was 
initially raised or opened on an item or MMI. These codes are listed and defined below and can 
be found on the reverse side of the EE435 form or the back page of a blank CAMM2 Travel Tag. 
 
01 Failure 06 Calibration 
Due 
11 FOD 16 Pre-
Installation 
Maint 
02 Bay Service 
Due 
07 Scheduled 
System 
Performance 
Monitoring 
12 Damaged 17 Reduce to 
Spares 
03 Overhaul 
Due 
08 Mod/STI 
Required 
13 Removed for 
Access 
18 Special 
Servicing 
Due 
04 Throwaway 
Due 
09 Cannibalisation 14 Configuration 
Change 
  
05 Scheduled 
Functional 
Check/Test 
10 Abnormally 
Operated 
15 Fault Finding   
 
Unserviceability Code 
A set of mutually-exclusive codes that describe the nature of the unserviceability identified (if 
any) against an item or MMI during the course of a Job or Arising. These codes are listed and 
defined below and can be found on the reverse side of the EE435 form or the back page of a 
blank CAMM2 Travel Tag. 
  
0
1 
Damaged/Crac
ked 
0
6 
Out of 
Tolerance
1
1 
Inoperative 1
6 
Worn/Frayed 
0
2 
Mechanical 
Failure 
0
7 
Binding 1
2 
Contaminat
ed 
1
7 
Delaminated/Ero
ded 
0
3 
Electrical 
Failure 
0
8 
Blocked 1
3 
Corroded 1
8 
Noisy/Vibrations 
0
4 
Overheated 0
9 
Leaking 1
4 
Deteriorate
d 
1
9 
System 
Investigation 
0
5 
Overspeed/ 
Overstressed 
1
0 
Intermitte
nt 
1
5 
NO 
LONGER 
USED 
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When Failure Discovered 
A set of mutually-exclusive codes that describe at what point a Failure was discovered against an 
item or MMI at the commencement or during the course of a Job or Arising. These codes are 
listed and defined below and can be found on the reverse side of the EE435 form or the back 
page of a blank CAMM2 Travel Tag. 
  
01 In Flight 10 R3 Servicing 19 D Servicing 28 Higher 
Assembly 
Maintenance 
02 During 
Operation 
11 R4 Servicing 20 E Servicing 29 During 
Mod/STI 
03 During 
Standby 
12 Other R 
Servicing 
21 Pre-
Deployment
Servicing 
30 During 
Cannibalisation 
04 Aircrew 
B/F 
13 Special 
Servicing 
22 Post-
Deployment
Servicing 
31 During Access 
05 Technical 
B/F 
14 Analytical 
Condition 
Inspection 
23 System 
Performance
Monitoring 
32 During Fault 
Finding 
06 Turnaround 15 Depot Level
Maintenance 
24 Calibration 33 During Config 
Change 
07 After Flight 16 A Servicing 25 Other 
Scheduled  
Servicing 
34 During Flex 
Op Servicing 
08 R1 
Servicing 
17 B Servicing 26 Pre-
Installation 
Maint 
35 During 
Reduction to 
Spares 
09 R2 
Servicing 
18 C Servicing 27 Functional 
Check/ 
Test 
99 No Fault 
(U/S’s ONLY) 
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Appendix 5 – Case 4A Data 
 
Renewal No 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Time To Failure 0 19 33 236 318 318 354 359 400 500 558 591 771 773 800 805 
Activity - CM 
FM1 
CM 
FM1 
CM 
FM2 
CM 
FM1 
CM 
FM2 
CM 
FM1 
CM 
FM2 
I CM 
FM2 
CM 
FM1 
CM 
FM2 
CM 
FM1 
CM 
FM2 
I CM 
FM1 
 
Where: 
I = Inspection 
CM FM1 = Corrective Maintenance – Failure Mode 1 
CM FM2 = Corrective Maintenance – Failure Mode 2 
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Glossary 
 
Administrative Delay 
Time 
ADT The accumulated time during which an action of corrective 
maintenance on a faulty item is not performed due to 
administrative reasons.  Typical examples of ADT include 
time raising paperwork for the job, time assigning 
personnel priorities, Labour strike, time taken to travel to 
equipment site, time taken to complete paperwork to 
release equipment from maintenance, etc. 
After Flight AF The maintenance, including inspection, conducted by the 
Operational Level maintenance personnel after a flight had 
been completed. 
Before Flight BF The maintenance, including inspection, conducted by the 
Operational Level maintenance personnel before an 
aircraft is release for a flight.  May be equivalent to the TA 
maintenance. 
Carried Forward 
Unserviceability 
CFU The RAAF terminology for the delay in repair of a 
component before the next flight to allow the aircraft to 
complete a scheduled mission.  A CFU is only allowed on 
certain components that do not affect safety, and can only 
be authorised by specifically appointed personnel. 
Corrective 
Maintenance 
CM  
Cumulative Intensity 
Function 
CIF  
Cumulative 
Distribution Function 
CDF  
General Renewal 
Process 
GRP  
Genetic Algorithm GA  
Logistics Time Delay LTD The accumulated time during which a maintenance action 
cannot be performed due to the necessity to acquire 
maintenance resources, excluding any administrative 
delay.  LDT includes time waiting for a Spare to become 
available, time waiting for an item of test equipment, time 
waiting for transportation, time waiting to use a facility, 
etc.  LDT may also be referred to as Supply Delay Time. 
Non-Homogenous 
Poisson Process 
NHPP Repairable Item model which uses as-bad-as-old repair 
assumption. 
Ordinary Renewal 
Process 
ORP Repairable Item model which uses as-good-as-new repair 
assumption. 
Preventative 
Maintenance 
PM  
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Royal Australian Air 
Force 
RAAF Information on the RAAF can be obtained from the 
official web site located at 
http://www.defence.gov.au/raaf/main.htm.  
Rectification  Any corrective maintenance that requires the aircraft to be 
removed from the Flight Line as a result of failures that 
were identified either during the previously flight or 
during a pre/post flight inspection (e.g. BF, AF or TA). 
Repairable Item RI An item which can be restored to perform all of its 
required functions by corrective maintenance, Military 
Standard 721C (MIL-STD-721C), Definitions of Terms 
for Reliability and Maintainability, 12 June 1981, pg 9 
Serviceable  The RAAF terminology use to describe when an aircraft, 
system or sub-system is in a working or operational state. 
Turn-Around TA The maintenance, including inspection, conducted by the 
Operational Level maintenance personnel between 
successive flights on the same day. 
Time-To-Failure TTF  
Unserviceable U/S The RAAF terminology use to describe when an aircraft, 
system or sub-system is in a failed state. 
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